Part of a series of articles titled Great Alarm at the Capital.
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Battle of Cool Spring
NPS Photo
“The Yankees were driven pell-mell into the river, with a heavy loss in killed and wounded,”
North Carolina Confederate soldier
Following a partially successful raid into suburban Washington, D.C., Confederate Lieut. Gen. Jubal Early retreated west into the Shenandoah Valley in July 1864. With his 15,000-man Army of the Valley, Early had recently won the Battle of Monocacy near Frederick, Maryland, on July 9, but was repelled by Federal forces just outside Washington at Fort Stevens on July 11-12. Fearing for the safety of the capital and President Lincoln, United States Army commanding General Ulysses S. Grant had sent his 6th Corps and other troops north just in time to thwart the Confederates.
Cool Spring Battlefield
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Early Retreats to the Shenandoah Valley
Although denied Washington, D.C., Early had accomplished two objectives for his commander, General Robert E. Lee. Not only had the Confederates threatened the Federal capital, they had also drawn a sizeable force away from Grant who was fighting Lee down south around Richmond, Virginia.
Following Early’s retreat across northern Virginia and into the Shenandoah Valley was a combined Federal force from the 6th, 8th, and 19th Corps under the overall command of Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright. Early entered the Valley at Snicker’s Gap in the Blue Ridge Mountains on July 16-17, crossed the Shenandoah River, and established a temporary base at Berryville, Virginia.
Hearing reports of Federal cavalry pursuing through the Blue Ridge, Early ordered Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge to send two divisions back to block any Federal attempts to cross the Shenandoah at nearby Castleman’s Ferry. Meanwhile, Federal commander Wright decided to attack and force a river crossing the next day, July 18, 1864.
Wright ordered Brig. Gen. George Crook and the 8th Corps (Army of West Virginia) “to cross the river if practicable and attack.” The 6th Corps would support the attack and exploit success, while the 19th Corps would follow. Assuming the Confederates intended to retreat toward Richmond, Wright apparently expected minimal resistance from Early.
The next morning, while Federal cavalry probed the banks of the Shenandoah River searching unsuccessfully for attack openings, Crook and Wright decided to flank the Confederates from the north. Leading the assault force across the river was one of Crook’s division commanders, Colonel Joseph Thoburn of Ohio, a veteran of many battles in the Shenandoah Valley and West Virginia.
With orders to advance about two miles north to Island Ford, cross the Shenandoah River, then head south along the river’s west bank to attack Confederates holding Castleman’s Ferry, Thoburn began his march around 2 p.m. To cover Thoburn, Crook launched a small diversionary maneuver against Confederates under Maj. Gen. John Brown Gordon guarding Castleman’s Ferry. Gordon, however, had already sent troops to picket the river’s west bank at Island Ford near a groundwater source called Cool Spring. As Thoburn’s advance under Colonel George Wells approached the Shenandoah River, Confederates waited.
Concealed by woods and vegetation on the east side of the river, Wells’s troops, including the 34th Massachusetts and 5th New York Heavy Artillery regiments, crossed the relatively shallow water, but were met by musket fire from Virginia pickets posted on the west side. Wells deployed skirmishers to chase off the Confederates, then sent the rest of his brigade across the river to establish a Federal foothold.
Learning from captured Confederates that sizeable forces under Maj. Gen. Robert Rodes and Brig. Gen. Gabriel Wharton were on the way, however, Col. Thoburn informed Generals Crook and Wright and requested further orders. Crook apparently wanted to withdraw Thoburn’s force, but Wright overruled him and ordered the 6th Corps division of James Ricketts to reinforce Thoburn. Taking as strong a temporary defensive position as possible, Thoburn remained on the west side of the Shenandoah and awaited the reinforcements.
Although stuck in a precarious position with their backs to the water and facing an enemy of unknown strength, Thoburn’s troops were very lucky to be able to take cover behind a stone wall running parallel to the river. Deploying his reserve behind the stone wall, Thoburn sent his front line of troops forward about fifty yards to a small ridge crest where they hoped they could spot oncoming Confederates through the trees. After finding its positions, Thoburn’s force probably numbered fewer than 5,000 men.
Caught somewhat by surprise by Thoburn’s downstream crossing of the Shenandoah, Gen. Breckinridge sent Wharton’s division forward to come in on Gen. Gordon’s left flank. Wharton’s troops took artillery fire from a Federal battery on the east side of the river but were unseen by Thoburn’s men near the river.
By 4 p.m., Rodes’s Confederate division was also on the move and shortly occupied relatively high, wooded ground on Wharton’s left flank. Rodes’s 3,000-man force approached the battlefield undetected by the Federals. With Rodes in position, Thoburn’s Federal force now faced approximately 8,000 Confederates.
Before the Confederates attacked, sharpshooters from all three divisions, Gordon’s, Wharton’s, and Rodes’s, advanced and hit the Federal skirmish line. Very effective, the Confederates forced the Federals back to their main defensive line. Around 6 p.m., Rodes launched his main attack, largely concealed by woods, with his Alabamans and Georgians on his left flank heading south near the river to hit Thoburn’s far right flank. The North Carolinians came down through the woods to hit Thoburn’s right front. Seeing that his entire right flank was vulnerable, Thoburn sent the 4th West Virginia and some dismounted cavalry to join the 18th Connecticut’s defense against Rodes.
The Confederate pressure was too much, however, and the dismounted cavalrymen broke, many fleeing the battle and plunging into the river to escape. The 4th West Virginia retreated to the stone wall near the river. The 18th Connecticut also withdrew close to the stone wall, but was joined by the 12th West Virginia, 1st West Virginia, 2nd Maryland, and fire from the Federal artillery on the east side of the river to slow the Confederate advance.
Sensing the main Confederate attack would be this one against his right flank, Thoburn pulled troops from his left who had not been heavily engaged and ordered them to swing to their right to block Rodes’s oncoming troops. This maneuver, however, exposed soldiers from at least six regiments of Ohioans, Pennsylvanians, West Virginians, and New Yorkers to flanking fire from Wharton’s Virginians who manned higher ground and had clear fields of fire. Seeing an opportunity, North Carolinians from William Cox’s brigade of Rodes’s division charged downhill to seize part of the stone wall from these Federals. One Confederate wrote, “away went both lines of battle at full speed as fast as their feet could carry them…” These Confederates unleashed a volley of musketry that drove the Federals in retreat toward the river.
Meanwhile, Wharton’s and Gordon’s sharpshooters poured fire into Thoburn’s exposed troops. Federal brigade commander Col. Daniel Frost was mortally wounded in this flanking fire. The Confederate crossfire caused panic in the Union ranks and many of the unnerved Federals retreated across the river. A North Carolinian noted that his unit fought, “handsomely, killing and wounding a great many, throwing them into confusion and making them retire to the river.”
By now, most of Thoburn’s troops still in the fight took cover behind the stone wall. These included men from the 18th Connecticut, 2nd Maryland, 12th West Virginia, 4th West Virginia, and 116th Ohio, along with others who decided to stay and resist the Confederates. Rallying these remaining soldiers behind the wall, Thoburn slowed the Confederate advance and provided cover for those retreating across the Shenandoah River. One Federal soldier noted about Thoburn, “he was the coolest man on the field.”
While the remnants of Thoburn’s division tried to hold the line on the river’s west bank, the Federal 6th Corps division under Brig. Gen. James Ricketts arrived on the east bank around 6 p.m. With Thoburn’s troops retreating across the river, however, Ricketts decided not to reinforce what looked like a losing effort.
Thoburn’s commander, Gen. George Crook, appealed to Gen. Wright to force Ricketts to attack. Wright refused and Ricketts stayed put. Sixth Corps artillery chief, Col. Charles Tompkins, however, deployed three artillery batteries on the river’s east side to disrupt Confederate attacks and cover Thoburn’s withdrawal. Some Confederates later thought this Federal artillery fire saved Thoburn’s force from annihilation.
Back on the east side of the Shenandoah River, Thoburn’s wet, tired, and beaten troops made camp in the woods. Although many good soldiers had been lost, Federal casualties were only 422, while the Confederates lost about 400. The Federal defensive position behind the stone wall and Thoburn’s repositioning of soldiers to plug gaps certainly saved lives.
The next day, July 19, pickets traded shots across the river, but there were no attacks. Gen. Early received intelligence of a sizeable Federal force approaching Berryville from the north, so he vacated and headed west to Winchester. Thus, the Confederates’ tactical victory at Cool Spring meant little as Wright’s force easily crossed the Shenandoah River in pursuit. But frustration with the war in the Valley soon caused Gen. Ulysses S. Grant to rebuild the Army of the Shenandoah and put a new, aggressive officer in command, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.
Last updated: February 1, 2023