Indiana Dunes Administrative History

The Kennedy Compromise, 1963-1964

While bulldozers were leveling the middle of the Central Dunes in order to build the new Bethlehem Steel plant, Senator Douglas introduced yet another park bill—S. 650—to save the remainder of the dunes. Boundaries were adjusted to include unsold tracts in Dune Acres as well as land west of Ogden Dunes owned by Inland Steel. For the fourth time the Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings and Monuments recommended that the area be preserved through the establishment of a national park. [23]

The Park Service's and Department's position on the Douglas bill remained the same, but Acting Director Hillory A. Tollson interjected a warning:

We feel that, unless action is taken soon to protect and preserve this nationally significant resource for the enjoyment of future generations, it will be gradually, but surely, denuded and destroyed. Pressures to devote this area to development or uses that are inconsistent with the preservation objectives of S. 650 will continue to increase. [24]

Douglas privately felt the National Park Service was no longer as staunchly committed to the proposed park now that the largest unspoiled area outside the Dunes State Park was gone. While he had the tacit support of the administration, Douglas repeatedly encountered only lukewarm Interior Department approval. He believed this new attitude was dune in large part to tremendous political pressures as well as to the fear of harmful pollutants from the increasing number of area blast furnaces. Douglas later wrote disdainfully of the Service (by referring to it incorrectly) and its Director: "The Eisenhower—appointed head of the Bureau of Parks, Conrad Wirth,* who had endorsed the Dunes proposal, reversed himself in public before the opposition of Capehart and his merry men. He is regarded as a great conservationist." [25]

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*No documentation was found to substantiate Senator Douglas' assertion. A solicitation to former Director Conrad L. Wirth to discover Wirth's position was made via correspondence. No response, however, was received. Also, Wirth was appointed during the Administration of President Harry S Truman.

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In a repeat of the October 3, 1962, emergency meeting in Senator Douglas' Washington office, officials of the Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, and Bureau of the Budget met with Douglas and Save the Dunes Council Members Herbert Read and George Anderson on June 28, 1963. The Council members detailed three alternatives for Burns Ditch Harbor designed to save the shoreline dunes of the Bethlehem Steel tract, also known as "Unit 192." This meeting led to a Save the Dunes Council—led tour of the area for Senator Douglas and George B. Hartzog, Jr., Associate Director of the National Park Service. [26]

In August 1963, a Park Service report identified new areas to replace that lost to the steel mill. The report, compiled by an inter-disciplinary team from the Washington Office and Northeast (formerly called Region V from 1955 to 1962) Regional Office, excluded both the Bethlehem Steel and Burns Ditch Harbor areas from consideration, but did target areas to the immediate south for inclusion in the park. The report identified a national lakeshore composed of four distinct units with a combined shoreline total of eight and three—quarters miles. [27]

In yet another high—level meeting in Senator Douglas' office with the same cast of players on September 5, 1963, the Corps of Engineers responded to the three harbor alternatives proposed by the Save the Dunes Council. Ominously, despite Douglas, Read, and Anderson's best arguments, the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) concurred with the overall Corps position. The proposals were "not acceptable to local interests," i.e., the two steel companies. In a last—ditch effort, the Council appealed to Bethlehem Steel officials themselves. Although the corporation agreed that the alternatives for preserving the lakeshore dunes were feasible, it had already made up its corporate mind. [28]

In September 1963, BOB completed its study as requested by President Kennedy. The so—called "Kennedy Compromise" ensued. BOB recommended the establishment of an 11,700-acre national lakeshore. Under BOB direction, the Corps of Engineers report included alternate port sites, but for the recommended Burns Ditch Harbor site, the Corps listed reservations in accordance with the Save the Dunes Council view. Before Federal money could be expended, environmental and economic considerations had to be satisfied.* The "Kennedy Compromise Bill," drafted by the National Park Service, provided for an Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore in accordance with the August 1963, Park Service report. In a conference call to the Save the Dunes Council, Douglas recommended acceptance of the compromise even though the Central Dunes would be lost. To continue the fight, Douglas believed, would extend the deadlock indefinitely and then no duneland would be left to save. After much agonizing, the Council concurred.

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*In retrospect, most of the Save the Dunes Council's projections for the harbor proved to be more accurate than the Corps' position. As for the stipulated BOB conditions that had to be satisfied before Federal appropriations were justified, according to the Council, most of these were never met. See Herbert Read to Ron Cockrell, letter, 26 March 1988, Cultural Resources Management files, Midwest Regional Office.

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On October 21, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, introduced S. 2249 on behalf of Paul H. Douglas, Clinton P. Anderson, Vance Hartke, Birch Bayh, and a score of other cosponsors. The support of both Indiana Senators Bayh and Hartke was a heartening testimonial to the spirit of compromise. In the House, Rep. Morris Udall of Arizona introduced a similar bill, H.R. 8927, which was cosponsored by, among others, Rep. J. Edward Roush of Fort Wayne, Indiana. [29]

Despite the hopeful outlook engendered by the compromise, swift Congressional action was not to be. With the assassination of John F. Kennedy in Dallas the following month, the transition to the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, and the frenzied enactment of many of the New Frontier programs kept the Congress from considering the dunes park bills. Hearings were held in the Senate Public Lands Subcommittee from March 5 to 7, 1964. Approximately fifty witnesses testified. It became apparent on the first day of hearings that not all of Indiana's Congressional Delegation was willing to ride on the bandwagon of compromise.

The stalwart leader of the opposition was Representative Charles A. Halleck. Halleck recounted the effort since 1935 to secure a public port to "open Indiana as a gateway of the greatest agricultural and industrial area" in the nation. Halleck objected to surrounding the port and steel mills with parkland because it would destroy the area's economic potential, thereby depriving his constituents of thousands of jobs. He cited the overwhelming local opposition to the Federal Government preserving the dunes when the State of Indiana had already incorporated a prime dunes tract into the State Park System—a unit which Halleck affirmed Indiana would never give away. He criticized the National Park Service for advocating the inclusion of land which did not even feature dunes. As for Park Service plans to establish nature trails near the industrial zones, Halleck scoffed, "I can't conceive of anyone even walking across the street to explore some of those parcels." [30]

A spokesman from the Gary Chamber of Commerce expressed his displeasure over the wide expanse of the park. [31] A resolution from the Porter County Board of Commissioners stated unalterable opposition to any Federal park in northern Porter County. [32] Another resolution from the town board of Beverly Shores also expressed opposition as did the Beverly Shores Citizens Commission which questioned the apparent discrimination in excluding "wealthy and powerful" Ogden Dunes and Dune Acres from the park. [33] Other Beverly Shores representatives asked the committee to either include all of the town within the national lakeshore or compensate the town for the loss of sixty percent of its tax base. [34]

Donald E. Foltz, Director of the Indiana Department of Conservation, testified that his organization favored the national lakeshore's authorization. Foltz reported Indiana parks were overused, that no new public lands had been acquired since the Depression, and the state's population had doubled since 1945. While he could not agree to relinquishing all or part of the Indiana Dunes State Park, he could support "a cooperative management arrangement" in the area. [35]

The testimony of Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall was decidedly favorable. Secretary Udall declared that to his knowledge the twenty—six Senators cosponsoring S. 2249 were the largest number of patrons for the establishment of any unit in the history of the National Park System. Udall recognized the national support base for the preservation of the dunes. He expressed disappointment in the preceding negative testimony in light of the best efforts initiated by John F. Kennedy in early 1963 to secure a compromise. Udall praised the committee for approving Point Reyes National Seashore on the Pacific Coast, Cape Cod National Seashore on the Atlantic Coast, and for considering the pending Fire Island National Seashore in New York. The Secretary pointed out that Mid—America was also a prime area for a national park unit in the form of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore. [36]

Augmenting Secretary Udall's testimony was Allen T. Edmunds, Assistant to the Regional Director of the Northeast Region and "father" of the Great Lakes Survey. Edmunds outlined for the committee with maps and illustrations the proposed boundaries. When asked about the problems of administering a disjointed park, Edmunds assured the committee that the inherent difficulties would not be insurmountable. [37]

The highlight of the hearings was the well—delivered plea of Senator Paul Douglas. Calling the establishment of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore the "most important conservation issue before the nation," Douglas lauded the efforts of the Save the Dunes Council: "This is undoubtedly one of the most public spirited, courageous, and self—sacrificing volunteer groups in the nation." [38] Among the organized supporters of the national lakeshore, Douglas recognized the Izaak Walton League, Wildlife Management Institute, Sport Fishing Institute, National Wildlife Federation, Nature Conservancy, National Council of State Garden Clubs, Wilderness Society, Sierra Club, National Parks and Conservation Association, Citizens Committee for Natural Resources, American Planning and Civic Association, and Garden Clubs of America. Alongside the scientific community stood northern Indiana and Illinois blue collar workers represented by key labor unions: United Steelworkers of America and the United Auto Workers. [39]

Douglas condemned the proposed Federal harbor as infeasible and an unfair subsidy of the steel companies which were conspiring to block the creation of a national park. He outlined the Kennedy Compromise providing for both port and park. He warned the committee, "[Do] not lose sight of the fact that this compromise plan gave up to the bulldozers the most beautiful section of the Indiana Dunes. The loss is tragic. No words and no amount of profit to anyone can possibly justify the inability or failure of our society and Government to preserve the irreplaceable 'Unit 2' section of the park." [40]

Dorothy Buell added her own statement to that of Paul Douglas. Praising Douglas' commitment in contrast to the shunning of the dunes by Indiana politicians, Buell presented stacks of petitions demonstrating the widespread popularity of the proposed national lakeshore. [41]

In August 1964, the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee reported S. 2249 favorably and it passed the Senate on September 29, 1964. With the 88th Congress facing its closing months, the conservationists remained hopeful as Representative J. Edward Roush presented a companion bill, H.R. 12096, in July 1964. They were realistic, however, faced by the powerful coalition of park opponents led by the uncompromising Charles A. Halleck and Inland Steel. [42]