Bandelier Administrative History

By the middle of the 1950s, it was apparent that Los Alamos was going to be a permanent community and that it would continue to increase in size and significance. Binnewies' successor, a lanky wildlife biologist named Paul A. Judge (1954-1962) who had been on the front lines of conservation battles for two decades, was concerned that local demand for housing and recreational land might impinge upon the monument. In 1958, the Park Service began to negotiate with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to acquire the Frijoles Mesa tract, which stretched from the northern boundary of the monument to State Highway 4. Judge saw the 3,846-acre addition as a "protective barrier for Frijoles Canyon," as well alleviating crowding in the Canyon itself. [9] The tract contained the existing entrance station as well as the approach road. The NPS planned to add new visitor use facilities atop the mesa, including a campground, a picnic area, and minor utilities.

Since the end of the Second World War, NPS-AEC relations had been characterized by a spirit of cooperation. The AEC offered little objection to the transfer of the Frijoles Mesa. It acquired the tract from the Forest Service in 1956. Since its closest point was four miles from Los Alamos, the AEC perceived the area as a buffer zone for its testing facilities. [10] As long as the NPS would agree to limit development in the region, the local AEC office had no trouble with the transfer. The Park Service agreed to AEC terms and the transfer was expedited. On October 16, 1958, Associate Director E. T. Scoyen requested that John A. McCone, Chairman of the AEC, authorize the transfer.

Even with the concurrence of both agencies, there were obstacles to the transfer of land between Government agencies. A legal and acceptable way to transfer the land had to be found. In a March, 1959, meeting, the AEC suggested that there were three ways to affect the transfer: a specific act of Congress, a use of the statutory authority of the AEC, or a use of the existing acts of Congress that allowed the General Services Administration (GSA) to dispose of real property. The GSA method was chosen, for it meant that the NPS would not have to reimburse the AEC or GSA for the market value of the land.

As long as the NPS did not impinge upon the activities of the AEC, the Los Alamos AEC office remained cooperative. After the selection of the GSA method, Paul Wilson, the local AEC manager, expedited the transfer by recommending the proposal to the Albuquerque AEC office. [11] AEC officials even helped accommodate Park Service policies before the area was transferred. Although they allowed hunting there during the 1958 season, AEC officials in Los Alamos informed the NPS that their 1959 hunting map of the region would label the Frijoles Mesa a "no hunting" area. The AEC was less susceptible to public pressure than the Park Service, and its declaration of a prohibition of hunting paved the way for similar NPS sanctions. Gestures of this nature made interagency cooperation a simple task.

The paperwork regarding the transfer also went smoothly. The GSA reported shortly afterward that it would consider a qualified declaration of excess by the AEC, but that the declaration would have to be withdrawn if any agency besides the NPS made a claim on the land. At a meeting on June 25, 1959, Curtis A. Ross of the GSA told Park Service officials that the GSA would "probably" find that the addition to the monument would "constitute the highest and best use of the land." [12] The GSA was amenable to the wishes of both agencies and the transfer appeared imminent.

In the meantime, Director Conrad L. Wirth began to express interest in another tract of AEC land. Adjacent to the Frijoles Mesa tract, the Upper Crossing area, west of the "back gate" road to Los Alamos and mostly south of Highway 4, was previously the subject of closed-door discussion. When Wirth brought up the possibility in a meeting on July 29, 1959, with his Assistant Director, E. T. Scoyen, the latter was not sure to what the Director referred. Judge immediately recognized Wirth's oblique reference and informed the regional office that the AEC was interested in acquiring parts of the Otowi section "on an exchange basis." [13] Judge intimated that if the Park Service considered the elimination of portions of the Otowi section, the AEC would concede the Upper Frijoles tract.

The Park Service faced a difficult choice. It had to compare the relative value of two very different tracts of land. One was an area of pristine wilderness, the other a section of tremendous archeological value upon which the growth of Los Alamos encroached. From Judge's perspective, this meant that the NPS had to "decide how much, if any, of the Otowi Section we would be willing to exchange for the Upper Frijoles area." [14]

Otowi had been an administrative headache since its addition in 1932. Although it contained two important ruins, Otowi and Little Otowi, as well as a cave kiva with 14th century drawings, an aboriginal animal trap, and other archeological features, its distance from the Frijoles headquarters made it difficult to protect. During the 1940s The AEC had cut authorized and unauthorized roads and installed power lines and other utility service structures. The area west of New Mexico Highway 4 was particularly compromised. Others within the Southwest Regional Office hierarchy believed that a portion of the detached section ought to be turned over to the AEC.

The Frijoles Mesa transfer was not yet official, and Judge believed that the completion of that transaction should precede any discussion of the deletion of Otowi from the monument. Hugh Miller, the Regional Director, concurred that two transactions were the best way to achieve the goals of the agency. [15] Park Service officials tried to complete the Frijoles Mesa acquisition while simultaneously working out a policy regarding the possible transfer of Otowi.

Late in 1959, the Frijoles Mesa transaction was completed quickly and easily. On December 4, 1959, the AEC presented Assistant Director Jackson E. Price with the paperwork transferring the Frijoles Mesa tract to the Park Service. On January 9, 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower formalized the transfer in Executive Proclamation 3388.

Judge's driving motivation in the acquisition was to prevent the development of the immediate area surrounding the monument. "It is not impossible to assume," he wrote, "that future pressure from sources not now apparent would envisage the crest of Frijoles Canyon an ideal location for industrial or residential development." [16] Judge's astute realization that development beyond the boundaries of the park could affect the experience foreshadowed later concerns of the Park Service. By moving in the 1950s, the agency precluded potential development controversies in the 1980s and 1990s, effectively insulating the primary visitor attraction at Bandelier—Frijoles Canyon—from the careless and uninspired development that has come to surround many parks and monuments.

The acquisition of Frijoles Mesa also afforded the agency additional options in administering the Frijoles Canyon ruins. The mesa provided the Park Service a safety valve through which future crowding in the canyon could be alleviated. The transfer of some employee housing and all of the camping to the top of the mesa meant reduced pressure on the limited space in Frijoles Canyon.

The Upper Frijoles tract, however, temporarily remained beyond the grasp of the agency, largely because the Park Service lacked a policy regarding the Otowi section. The AEC became more aggressive, and in 1960, NPS management personnel made a number of studies to determine the efficacy of NPS administration for the detached section. Bandelier Chief Ranger George Von Der Lippe and District Ranger Edward J. Widmer visited Otowi, and on March 4, 1960, filed a report that recommended that the Park Service either administer the section vigorously or release it to the AEC.

According to the report, Otowi was a disaster. The encroachment of a variety of vehicles damaged vegetation, there was a vast "network of non-designated roads," and there was evidence of substantial vandalism, pot-hunting, and target shooting. Benign activities such as picnicking and camping also existed. Otowi was not being administered as if it were a part of the monument. Because of a lack of visible Park Service presence, conditions in the detached section were abominable.

Von Der Lippe and Widmer felt that the residents of Los Alamos were responsible for most of the damage. Otowi was "a convenient outlet for that group of local residents bent on ignoring the town regulations." [17] On a daily basis, the ruins were protected only by warning signs, which were flagrantly violated. Although rangers issued warnings during their patrols, these were also ignored. From the perspective of Von Der Lippe's and Widmer, the impact of the surrounding community upon the Otowi section was already too great. If the Park Service did not have the time and money to patrol it properly, in their opinion the agency should delete the area from the monument.

The AEC was interested in the Otowi section, the NPS had designs upon the Upper Frijoles tract, and it seemed that the two agencies could work out an agreement. But NPS sentiment about the portion of Otowi to be deleted was far from unanimous. On March 25, 1960, William L. Bowen, Southwest Regional Chief of Recreational Planning, headed a field trip to the Otowi section. Judge, Von Der Lippe, and Park Archeologist Edward Jahns represented Bandelier, while Regional Chief of Ranger Activities Thomas Williams, Regional Archeologist Charlie Steen, Regional National Park System Planning official Leslie P. Arnberger, and Recreational Planner Paul Wykert came from Santa Fe.

After an inspection tour, the group unanimously agreed that portions of the Otowi section should be deleted. There were, however, a variety of ideas concerning the retention of various areas. All agreed that the Tsankawi section of the monument, east and south of Highway 4 and away from AEC development, ought to be retained. One suggestion was for the AEC to administer Otowi and the Little Otowi ruins and turn them into a city park. Believing that these were major ruins under any circumstances, Steen resisted this proposal.

Another plan was that the NPS should retain the ruins, but would give up other land north of the truck road to Los Alamos. The major drawback to this idea was that the transfer would allow the development of Los Alamos to "envelope" the ruins, creating an even stronger possibility that the ruins would be further damaged and desecrated. The third proposal, inspired by Steen's objections, was a corridor arrangement that would allow the AEC to develop its access to a testing site west of Otowi. The corridor would include areas needed by the AEC for "logical expansion." Steen's idea was to enlist the support of the AEC by accommodating its needs. [18]

As Paul Judge pointed out in his report on the trip, the deletion of the section would relieve his staff of much of its guardianship obligation. "Other than archeological features," Judge wrote, "there are no significant Park Service values in the Otowi section." If the agency was to curtail illegal use, it had to consider "proper fencing and sufficient manpower." Without added protection, Judge implied that there was little point in a continued Park Service presence at the Otowi section. His solution was to transfer the section to the AEC, with the stipulation that it adequately protect the ruins. In return, Judge wanted to acquire the Upper Frijoles tract. "It is a scenic wilderness area," he wrote, "completely Government owned and is definitely of Park Service caliber." [19] Since the AEC was willing to transfer the Upper Frijoles area whether or not the NPS decided to give up Otowi, Judge suggested taking over the Upper Frijoles area and then sorting out the Otowi question.

Judge's Boundary Status Report (BSR) of June 28, 1960, reflected his views. He recommended the addition of the Upper Frijoles tract, which was "entirely wilderness in character." He wanted to delete all of Otowi except the Tsankawi portion, "the only part of the Otowi Section which still has potential for orderly park development." [20] Judge compared the value of the two tracts and made his decision. The addition of an unimpacted wilderness tract outweighed the value of keeping the severely impacted archeological area. From a management standpoint, the Upper Crossing tract was more valuable than the detached area.

Trading the parts of Otowi upon which Los Alamos impinged for the Upper Frijoles tract was a logical outgrowth of Judge's management philosophy. Before he came to Bandelier, he worked at Glacier National Park, Jackson Hole National Monument and Grand Teton National Park. A wildlife biologist by training, Judge had little experience with archeological areas and focused upon the natural side of Bandelier. In his view, the value of the upper canyon area far outweighed that of the Otowi section.

While the Park Service favored the acquisition of the Upper Canyon area, the Otowi question was not so easily resolved. When submitted to the regional staff, the boundary report evoked a broad range of response. Land managers in the regional office supported the deletion. Les Arnberger remarked that the Upper Crossing area was "marvelous wilderness country . . . [and] a particularly desirable objective," but he said little about the loss of the archeological values of the Otowi section. Jerome Miller thought the proposal was "radical . . . but o.k.," while George Kell wondered why the agency needed to retain even the Tsankawi section. [21]

Charlie Steen led the "keep Otowi" faction. "I am strongly in favor of keeping the sw corner of Otowi section, (south of 'back' road.) Bandelier was established for its archeological values. It is very well to add a patch of wilderness but at the same time this proposal will eliminate an unusual feature - the game trap. . . . [W]e have no other example of one in Bandelier, or so far as I know, in the National Park System." Steen's argument was based upon the organic legislation establishing Bandelier, and made important points concerning the future of the site. "There exists in the present southwest corner of the Otowi section . . . a very nice group of structures which could easily be developed for interpretation; the game-trap, some cavate rooms and a small, mesa-top pueblo. We do not need these now —but two or three generations hence they may be quite valuable." [22] No other Federal agency had the archeological experience of the Park Service. Steen believed that turning the ruins over to the AEC was tantamount to suggesting that Otowi had no value. He effectively positioned the needs of the future against the expediency of the present.

Associate Regional Director George Miller agreed with Steen, saying that Otowi "was important enough for the Service in the 30s to have it set aside [and] there is nothing . . . to indicate that most of the values are not there now. Because Los Alamos is nearby - resulting in an additional protection problem, does not justify the deletion of any part of the monument." [23] Steen and Miller argued that the encroachment of Los Alamos did not compromise the absolute value of the ruins.

In essence, the argument came down to comparing archeological and recreational values. The recreational planners could clearly see the advantage of an additional tract of mountain wilderness. While the wilderness was indeed a fine tract, Steen was right to point out that Bandelier was an archeological park. If the funds and work power to maintain Otowi were not forthcoming, Judge, Von Der Lippe, and the rest of the Bandelier staff had a valid point when they suggested that it might be better to let the AEC protect the ruins. Each proposed alternative fell within the boundaries of agency policy, and there was ample precedent for any combination of proposed courses of action.

Before the regional staff had a chance to comment, Regional Chief of Recreational Planning William Bowen initially approved the Boundary Status Report. In light of the objections, he reconsidered. On August 3, 1960, he laid out the options that he believed were available to the NPS. He preferred to approve Judge's report and be done with the issue, but listed three other possible alternatives. The most desirable of these was to modify the report to continue NPS management of the southwest corner of Otowi. Bowen's major objection to keeping the game trap was that it required that the NPS purchase adjacent private lands, in order to protect the "park values" of the ruins. [24] Less advantageous was to approve the addition, but disapprove the deletion. The least effective option Bowen could see was to preserve the status quo by disapproving the entire Boundary Status Report. With the options clearly articulated, Miller turned the problem over to Regional Director Thomas J. Allen.

No stranger to questions of land acquisition, Allen passed on a recommendation of no concurrence with the boundary report to the Washington office. He knew how hard the Park Service fought to acquire Otowi and the rest of the monument during the 1920s and 1930s. Allen was instrumental in the acquisition of a number of southwestern parks. He was also a veteran of many controversies with the Forest Service and recognized the role of the Park Service in protecting archeological sites. In his view, good forest land did not constitute a significant enough reason to add the Upper Canyon area to the monument. Allen believed the threat of forest fire in the new addition would present a greater protection problem than the one that existed at Otowi. He presented the proposals as intrinsically linked. Either the Park Service would have Otowi or the Upper Canyon area. From his perspective, the whole project was flawed. The Park Service was merely trading one headache for another. [25]

In Judge's eyes, Allen's manner of presenting the issue to Washington narrowed the choices available to the agency. By not offering a recommendation on the proposal, Allen furthered the notion that one could not happen without the other. Judge objected to this, pointing out that the "AEC does not expect nor require the Otowi Section in exchange for the Upper Frijoles area." [26] He urged that the agency evaluate the two proposals separately, on their individual merit. The separation of the two proposals made the acquisition of Upper Canyon likely even if the Park Service decided to keep all of Otowi.

On May 26, 1960, Bowen, Judge, Arnberger, Wykert, and John J. Burke, the AEC manager for the Los Alamos area, met and discussed the transfer. Agreement seemed close at hand, but on June 21, 1961, Burke wrote NPS Regional Director Allen that Forest Service Supervisor R. E. Lattimore requested that the same tract be added to the Santa Fe National Forest. Burke felt that AEC, NPS, and USFS representatives should meet to iron out the transfer. By the early 1960s, Forest Service animosity to Park Service attempts to enlarge Bandelier was legendary. Rather than battle it out with the USFS once again, on June 28, 1961, Allen put the entire proposal on hold. [27]

The proposal remained in limbo until early the following year, when high-level interest in the project put pressure upon the Forest Service. In January, 1962, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, New Mexico Senator Clinton P. Anderson, United States Representative Joseph A. Montoya, USFS Regional Forester Fred Kennedy, and Allen met in Albuquerque to discuss lands on the Pajarito Plateau. The interest of such important officials put Kennedy in a difficult spot. He was pressured to relinquish all USFS claims to the Upper Frijoles tract.

Kennedy did not bow to the pressure and the USFS once again obstructed NPS plans for the Bandelier region. Regional Director Allen was adamant about completing the transfer quickly, for he was aware that a bill to include the Baca location in a Bandelier-vicinity national park was about to be introduced in Congress. The introduction of such a bill would immediately arouse the ire of the USFS, cause it to resist the Upper Canyon transfer, and make the entire project into a visible controversy. Although the Upper Frijoles transfer was really not the concern of the USFS, the AEC wished to maintain good relations with all Federal agencies in the Pajarito Plateau region. It was not prepared to offend the USFS to satisfy the NPS. Allen was aware of this and wrote Wirth that he believed the AEC would not make the transfer until the USFS relinquished all claims to the tract. Although he thought that the USFS position would delay the transfer, he wrote: "we will, however, keep trying." [28]

But the AEC and the NPS circumvented the USFS. The two agencies created a compromise that gave both sides what it wanted. In June 1962, the Upper Frijoles tract was declared "excess to needs of [the] AEC." Local AEC officials informed Superintendent Albert Henson that they would try to acquire all of Otowi except the Tsankawi section. The NPS decided that this was an equitable transfer and the Acting Director of the Southwest Region, George W. Miller, opined that AEC officials believed that the proposed Valle Grande National Park bill, S. 3321, gave the AEC "justification for [the] transfer without USFS concurrence." [29] There remained, however, a major problem. S. 3321 did not call for the deletion of Otowi and its passage would therefore not cause the simultaneous transfer of the two areas.

Director Wirth quickly solved this problem. He assured Miller that a Presidential Proclamation to exclude Otowi and restore it to the public domain could be arranged. [30] The Secretary of the Interior would then issue a Public Land Order, reserving Otowi for the AEC. If the Valle Grande bill was not enacted, then the Presidential Proclamation excluding Otowi would also include the Upper Frijoles tract. After the Valle Grande bill died in Congress, a Presidential Proclamation on August 10, 1962, included the Upper Frijoles area. The GSA again applied the deletion procedure used to acquire the Frijoles Mesa, and on February 15, 1963, the GSA authorized the transfer. On May 27, 1963, after four years of maneuvering, President John F. Kennedy issued Presidential Proclamation 3539, accomplishing the transfer.