Big Bend Administrative History

No better statement of the chilling effect of oil nationalization on the international park could be found than the cryptic letter of November 21, 1938, from Conrad Wirth to NPS director Cammerer. "There are no new developments in connection with the Mexican side of the proposed park," Wirth reported, other than the approval by both nations of the boundary markers. Yet the NPS could not report to Mexican officials any success in the campaign to raise $1.5 million dollars in private funds for land acquisition, nor in the effort to revive the vetoed Texas legislation for state purchase of the future Big Bend National Park. Then a minor controversy arose in 1939 when NPS planners discovered that they had no official measurement of the Mexican portion of the international park. Ross Maxwell, the junior geologist for the NPS's Region III, turned to Everett Townsend for help in determining where the Mexican and U.S. officials had traveled in search of boundary sites. When the surveying parties had gone to the South Rim, wrote Maxwell, "Sr. Daniel Galicia asked Mr. Townsend to point out certain landmarks in Mexico that had been selected by the Mexican Government as points of boundary for the park." Relying upon Townsend's vast knowledge of the border region, Galicia and his Mexican colleagues sketched out an area of some 900,000 acres that would constitute the southern portion of the international park. [48]

Once the park service learned of the actual dimensions of the Mexican land base, they discovered a discrepancy in the eastern markers for both countries. Conrad Wirth informed Region III officials that their reliance on the drawings made at the 1936 El Paso conference by Daniel Galicia had not been followed carefully. He had determined that "the eastern Mexican boundary coming to the Rio Grande at Rancho Stillwell on a tangent from the [promontory] called Pico Eterea" should be relocated "four miles north opposite the mouth of Stillwell Creek." Wirth suggested that Galicia had relied upon maps that did not include Stillwell Creek, and concluded that "he inadvertently drew the line to Rancho Stillwell believing it to be at the mouth of Stillwell Creek." The NPS assistant director then asked Ross Maxwell to research this dilemma, and the junior geologist reported that "the apparent misunderstanding as to the erection of monuments near the Rio Grande marking the eastern limits of the Big Bend International Park Project in Mexico and Texas appear to have developed because of the questionable location of the Stillwell ranch." Maxwell's study found that "the Stillwells apparently ranched temporarily anywhere in southern Brewster County, Texas and the adjacent parts of Mexico where they could find grass and water." This resulted in "old Stillwell ranches at several localities in that area." In particular, said the geologist, "two Stillwell ranches are indicated on the U.S. Geol. Survey Topographic map, the Chisos Mountains quadrangle, within the proposed park," while "several sites were used by the [Stillwells] that are not included in the present proposed boundary." [49]

Upon closer examination of both sides of the river, Maxwell learned that there were as many as three Stillwell cow camps in Mexico, and that there was a Stillwell Crossing not related to Stillwell Creek's entry into the Rio Grande. Thus Maxwell reported to Maier that "the Mexican officials are probably correct in erecting their monument at the Stillwell ranch and we are possibly also correct in placing our monument opposite another of the Stillwell cow camps." The NPS geologist had more trouble with the designation of the eastern boundary of Big Bend at the mouth of Heath Creek. Calling this location "ambiguous," Maxwell claimed that "the Chisos Mountains quadrangle [map] shows that the drainage designated as Heath Creek separates into about one dozen streams after it passes through Hubert Ridge." Where the western branch of Heath Creek entered the river more than one mile above the present boundary marker, Maxwell preferred to locate the monument closer to Boquillas Canyon (where "the lower Heath Creek drainage . . . is approximately correct"). Maxwell then suggested another issue for NPS planners: whether "we should move our monument or convince the Mexican officials that they should move [theirs]." He reported to Maier that "the present location of our monument and the eastern park boundary as described by the new state law provides for a buffer strip at the mouth of Boquillas Canyon which is the chief scenic feature in the area." At present the boundary did not include Stillwell Crossing, "a historical site that was used as a route of travel across the Rio Grande by the Indians, the early Spaniards, and the early Anglo-Americans." By moving downriver to the Mexican marker site, this crossing would be part of any new park land. In addition, Maxwell surmised that "if there should be a road built along the eastern side of the Sierra del Carmen highland the Stillwell crossing would probably be [the] best place to cross the Rio Grande." [50]

Maxwell had concerns as well about the language of the new Texas legislation on Big Bend that called for location of the United States boundary across the river from the Mexican marker. Should the NPS adopt this site, said the geologist, "the Big Bend National Park (proposed) would then include virtually all of the Texas portion of the Sierra del Carmen (Dead Horse Mountains)." The park service would acquire "the remainder of the backbone ridge of the Sierra del Carmen highland, Margaret Basin, and the most of Big Brushy Canyon." Unfortunately for Maxwell, "this area does not include any important scenic or geological features that are not virtually duplicated in that portion of the Sierra del Carmen already . . . in the park area." The geologist believed that "it is doubtful if it contains any additional wildlife," and as for cultural resource value: "I know nothing about the Archaeology, but I suspect that it is too far from water to be important." Yet Maxwell recognized "a few points that may favor this strip to the park area." One of these was that "the land is not worth much for grazing." In addition, "the difficulties of a boundary survey and a boundary fence will be greatly reduced by shifting the boundary eastward to the flank of the highland belt." Finally, "Margaret Basin and Big Brushy Canyon are possible sites for the proposed Longhorn Cattle ranch." The geologist then recommended that Maier review the maps drafted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Geological Survey, and identify "a representative of the National Park Service to meet with Sr. [Galicia] at Stillwell Crossing (Las Vegas to some) and decide in the field on a satisfactory location for both U.S. and Mexican Rio Grande markers." [51]

Maxwell's advice on the international park boundaries appealed to NPS officials, both in the regional office in Santa Fe and the national headquarters in Washington. Herbert Maier informed the director that attendees of the international park commission conference in El Paso had been shown maps that did not locate the eastern park boundary to "include all of the horizon, there being several high points on the Del Carmen crest which would distinctly fall outside the park." Language in the Texas land purchase bill called for acquisition of up to one million acres of park land, instead of the projected 788,000 acres defined in the 1935 congressional act. Arthur E. Demaray, acting NPS director, reviewed the reports of Maxwell and Maier, and noted that "the boundary change suggested in your memorandum of May 27 would add approximately 50,000 acres to the Big Bend National Park Project." As to Maxwell's suggestion for a meeting with Daniel Galicia, Demaray believed that "it may not be necessary to meet the Mexican officials on the ground since it may be possible to agree on the proper location of the boundary markers without further field work." [52]

Maier agreed, deciding to seek the advice of his regional geologist, Charles Gould. "The line should run from Sue Peaks to a point opposite the Mexican marker at the mouth of Stillwell Creek," said the Region III director. He also noted that "since a CCC camp has been approved for the Big Bend for the 14th Period, it probably will be most practical to survey and establish the marker on the American side after the camp has been occupied and a survey party is available." Maier would include the additional 50,000 acres that this boundary change would affect, as "investigation during the past two years has shown that the point selected at Sue Peaks throws the boundary inside the horizon and leaves out the very valuable area, both scenically and geologically, known as Margaret Basin." Maier advised against informing Texas officials of this decision. Instead, he told the NPS director, "after the success of the fund-raising campaign can be better gauged, it may be well to take a party including certain important Texas individuals into this area and have them render an opinion so that the suggestion, if it is adopted, will come from them." In like manner, Maier declined Maxwell's suggestion to invite Mexican officials to review the boundary markers on site. The NPS regional office had agreed to move the American marker downstream to coincide with that of Mexico, and Galicia and his staff "will be advised of the new location of the American marker when same has been accurately located." [53]

Herbert Maier and his associates within the park service had no clue when they reviewed the boundary-marker issue in early August that three weeks later the world (and Big Bend) would change forever. The German invasion of the European nation of Poland, while thousands of miles removed from the canyons and cliffs of the Rio Grande, would mobilize the United States government and shift the emphasis from the social-welfare programs of the New Deal to military preparedness. For Mexico, the effect would be similar, if not on the scale of American industrial production. Friedrich Schuler wrote that "suddenly, the U.S.-Mexican border became the southern front of U.S. territory that required protection and defense against a possible Axis invasion." Within 30 days of Adolf Hilter's actions in Eastern Europe, said Schuler, "the absence of a viable Mexican air force and a national Mexican air-defense system motivated U.S. military planners to take over the defense of Mexico." This blend of American interventionism and economic centralization for the war effort rendered obsolete any plans for an international park far from the capitals of Washington and Mexico City. Lane Simonian defined the implications of the wartime emergency for natural resource preservation, and for Miguel Angel de Quevedo's department. "With the push for heavy industrialization that began during the 1940s," wrote Simonian, conservation ceased to be a concern among most high-level government officials." Simonian believed that "only a few retained Quevedo's conviction that forests should be protected for their biological value." The final blow came in the fall of 1940, when outgoing president Cardenas abolished Quevedo's department, and scattered his staff to other agencies like the Agrarian Department. It had not helped, said Simonian, that "Quevedo did not favor Cardenas's land reform program because he believed the peasants would expand their fields at the expense of the forests." Meyer and Sherman added that Cardenas's "last two years were characterized by severe economic difficulty." Food prices in 1940 were nearly 50 percent higher than when Cardenas took office, wealthy Mexicans refused to invest in the Mexican economy, and foreign capitalists looked elsewhere for lucrative investment fields. Schuler summarized these complex forces by concluding: "As far as Mexican foreign relations were concerned, Mexican history between 1934 and 1940 was a grand dialogue between the domestic push for capitalist economic development and the reverberations of international war." [54]

Hindsight intimates that the two nations had their best chance to make history at Big Bend in the chaotic days of the 1930s. The momentum for creation of an international park would not return until the last decade of the twentieth century, when Big Bend's first Hispanic superintendent, Jose Cisneros, would build upon the work of the preceding six decades and make the international relationship a cornerstone of his leadership. More typical of the desultory nature of the partnership between Mexico and the United States were the events of 1940, such as those outlined in a memorandum of George L. Collins, acting chief of the park service's land planning division, to Conrad Wirth. The assistant director was to meet with the new Interior undersecretary, Alvin Wirtz, and Big Bend was one of the agenda items. Summarizing the work of the NPS and Mexican officials since the heady days of 1935-1936, Collins could only report: "Aside from evidence of considerable interest in the project on the part of the Mexican officials, nothing is known as to what progress has been made toward the establishment of the Mexican national park." Wirth's supervisors likewise had to temper the enthusiasm first displayed by Harold Ickes for the international park by 1940, as seen in correspondence between the acting secretary and Cordell Hull. The Secretary of State had received a letter from Albert W. Dorgan, of Castolon, "who proposes the creation of a Pan American Peace Park in the Big Bend section of Texas." The Interior official apologized for not being able to accommodate Dorgan's wishes, as "the immediate problem is that of land acquisition." [55]

Horace W. Morelock, the son of the Sul Ross president, tried to fashion a new paradigm for the international park in a letter of August 10, 1940, to Ickes. The younger Morelock had read a story in a recent issue of The Saturday Evening Post, in which critics of Ickes disparaged his efforts to expand the acreage of the "Cascade Mountains National Park" and Olympic National Park in the state of Washington. Praising Ickes as "not a man to let a minority opinion prevail against your own good judgment," Morelock nonetheless worried: "Is it possible that you are overlooking a far better bet in Texas?" The Austin resident cautioned Ickes that "right now the burning issue before our people is that of self-defense." Only "slightly less important," said the park advocate, was "continental solidarity." Citing a recent trip of Cordell Hull to Cuba, Morelock believed that "those people lying south of the Rio Grande are willing to meet us half way if we will only extend the hand of friendship to them." Morelock then humbly declared: "In my opinion the establishment of the BIG BEND INTERNATIONAL PEACE PARK on the Texas-Mexican border would do much to win the friendship of Mexico and other Latin American nations." In so doing, said the observer of his father's efforts to create a national park in Brewster County, "we are giving all, asking nothing," offering "a gesture motivated by no material or monetary motives." [56]

Then Morelock focused on Texas's own problems with Big Bend, which he hoped that Ickes could cure with such a proclamation. "The state wide drive to raise funds for this park," said Morelock, "has been delayed for many reasons, principally because of the war scare." He reminded the Interior secretary that "your department seems to have established the general rule that the Federal Government will not furnish funds to pay for national park acreage." Yet Morelock believed that Interior "could well afford to appropriate one million dollars for the purchase of this park site, and its returns in good will and friendship would bring more gains to this country than all the Pan-American conferences ever held." Echoing the prose of his father, Horace Morelock appealed to Ickes's sense of history (if not his vanity), by commenting: "That American statesman who is foresighted enough to put this project through to completion will find that his name was 'not writ in water' but in letters of everlasting bronze." After a decade of negotiations, surveys, meetings, and publicity, Morelock subconsciously revealed the lost momentum of the international park initiative when he pleaded with Ickes: "Why not put your shoulder to the wheel?" [57]

A year after the onset of World War II, the Interior department could not offer Horace Morelock (or anyone else advocating creation of Big Bend National Park) the hope to joining Mexico and the United States in a park for peace. Undersecretary Wirtz spoke for Ickes when he told Morelock: "I believe that the State of Texas could make no more significant contribution to the solidarity of the Americas than by doing its share toward the establishment of this international park now." But the most compelling indication of the change of attitude forged by war came in December 1940, when Walter McDougall, chief biologist for Region III, arrived in Alpine only to learn that "three Mexican officials were in town and wished to spend the next two days in the Big Bend area." The party, consisting of J. Pedrero Cordova, the Mexican commissioner for the IBC; Joaquin Bustamante, the IBC's consulting engineer; and their translator, W. C. de Partearroy, had requested the assistance of Everett Townsend, whose ill health forced him to decline their offer. As the biologist had the best perspective on park issues, McDougall accompanied the Mexican officials to the Chisos basin, and the canyons of Santa Elena, Mariscal, and Boquillas. The NPS biologist noted that "while their trip prevented me from doing most of the things I had planned doing in the Big Bend, I think it was well worth while to change my plans in order to accompany them." Then McDougall warned Region III director Minor Tillotson of the new order of Mexican priorities in the Big Bend region. "The only unpalatable thing about the trip," he reported, "was the fact that the Mexican gentlemen were most interested in the canyons because of the possibility of building dams in them." After six years of discussions, meetings, conferences and surveys, McDougall was surprised to discover that they did not know that "the Park Service does not want any such dams." Thus the biologist concluded in his report to the Region III office: "I did not tell them this, however, since I saw no reason why I should discuss matters of policy with them." [58]

This posture towards Mexican involvement in Big Bend would prevail for decades after 1940. Yet the Mexican officials who had appeared on Everett Townsend's doorstep that winter faced their own agenda of economic development and international diplomacy. The degree of enthusiasm and energy expended in the 1930s for the international park subsided, replaced with fitful moments of interest, indifference, and tension. Yet a letter written to Townsend within days of the Mexican IBC visit to Big Bend revealed the power of the dream that a partnership on the border could instill even in those officials bent upon identifying multipurpose water project sites in the canyons of the Rio Grande. J. Pedrero Cordova wanted Townsend to know that "we have just returned from our trip to the Big Bend region, and are still under the spell of the days spent in that area." The IBC commissioner told the former U.S. customs agent: "I shall never forget the night we spent at the [C.C.C.] Camp in Chisos Mountains, where due to Mr. [McDougall] and the Officials in charge, we were treated with the utmost courtesy." Cordova, whose job took him throughout the Rio Grande basin, believed that the site "where this camp is located is one of the most beautiful I have ever seen." He now knew "that it is just one of many forming what in a very near future will be known as the Big Bend International Park." Then Cordova, perhaps speaking for many who shared Townsend's dream of peace along the Rio Grande, closed by writing: "I wish to take advantage of my recent visit to that area in order to congratulate you for your untiring efforts in that connection." The IBC commissioner believed that "in a very short time your dream will come true for the benefit of the numerous visitors the International Park will have." [59]

Figure 15: E.E. Townsend and W.B. Hamilton, Green Gulch (c. 1935)