Indiana Dunes Administrative History

Nathaniel P. Reed Visits the Dunes

In August 1970, NIPSCO filed an application with the licensing board of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) for a permit to construct a nuclear power plant adjacent to its fossil—fuel Bailly generating facility at Burns Harbor. The proposed 685—megawatt nuclear reactor, called Bailly Nuclear I, bordered the national lakeshore on the west and the Bethlehem Steel Company plant on the east. The environmentalists' uproar over Bailly I reinvigorated the passions of the port versus park controversy. Industrialists pointed to the growing demand for energy to fuel the factories and homes in northern Indiana. While conservationists did not initially dispute the area's electrical needs, they vociferously objected to putting Bailly I in the back yard of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore.

The conservation group most active in opposing Bailly I was the Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League led by Herbert and Charlotte Read. While the Save the Dunes Council focused its attention on promoting the lakeshore expansion effort through Congress, the Izaak Walton League conducted a series of legal challenges to NIPSCO's plans. Some of the principal members of both organizations' however, were involved in both efforts, namely the Reads, Sylvia Troy, and Edward Osann. Because the majority of public opinion favored Bailly I and its positive economic benefits, the initial fight took place exclusively in the courts. [34]

Anti—Bailly I forces participated in the AEC/NIPSCO licensing permit process by filing petitions establishing a legitimate interest in the affair by showing how they as groups and individuals could be potentially harmed by the plant's construction. The group, called the "Joint Intervenors," had the support of the Chicago—based public interest group called the "Businessman for the Public Interest" (BPI), later renamed "Business and Professional People for the Public Interest." BPI, which used its tax—exempt status to accept donations on behalf of the Joint Intervenors, advised that at least $100,000 would be needed over several years to litigate all of the contentions. Edward Osann initially accepted the task of presenting the Joint Intervenors' case at a significantly reduced fee. The enormous amount of time the case required almost jeopardized Osann's position with his law firm. In later years, BPI assumed most of the legal responsibility.

Herbert Read's extensive activity on behalf of the Joint Intervenor's did cost him his job as an architect with a Chicago firm. Both Herbert and Charlotte Read assisted Edward Osann greatly. Herbert Read masterfully showed how NIPSCO's site map minimized the area's population. He exposed NIPSCO's misrepresentation of the proposed nuclear site in what the company described as in the middle of an industrial complex with no nearby residential centers. Entire communities were omitted with Dune Acres, Ogden Dunes, and Miller appearing only as "forest cover." Distances to cities like Gary—10 miles as opposed to the actual 5.2 miles—were blatantly in error.

The citizens of Dune Acres were unanimously against the siting of Bailly Nuclear I adjacent to their community. NIPSCO's existing fossil fuel plant and problems associated with air and water pollution had already antagonized the residents who formed the "Concerned Citizens against the Bailly Nuclear Site." The Concerned Citizens conducted fund—raising drives to assist the Joint Intervenors' legal effort. James E. Newman, professor of history at Indiana University Northwest, and Edward Osann co—chaired the Dune Acres organization. The Concerned Citizens was not an anti—nuclear group, but were simply opposed to the siting of the plant. They objected to the proposed two cooling towers, each two stories tall, overlooking their town and the national lakeshore. Some were afraid of it. What about radioactive leaks? How could an orderly evacuation take place on traffic—congested Highway 12 during a shift change at Bethlehem Steel? How hazardous would the roads become in winter when the steam from the cooling towers froze on them? [35]

The concerns of the Joint Intervenors and the Concerned Citizens were shared by the National Park Service, but with it outside the boundaries, there was little the Service could do except monitor the activity and express its position. Before any official Department of the Interior policy could be formulated, however, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation began investigating the matter in mid—1971. The Advisory Council had three concerns pertaining to Bailly Homestead National Historic Landmark. First was the visual impact of two 450—foot—high and 400—foot—wide cooling towers looming 1.8 miles away. The difference in elevation further exacerbated the problem, especially in winter when the trees were bare. Second, with the prevailing northerly winter winds, the fogging and drift from the plant would enshroud the Bailly Homestead. Third, the historic setting would be adversely impacted from humidity and temperature changes caused by Bailly I. Because the Department of the Interior was still gathering information from its various bureaus, the Park Service recommended the "Council to take no action which might weaken the Department's position with reference to the impact of the plant on the National Lakeshore." Speaking for the Northeast Region, George Palmer added, "There is no doubt in our own mind that the environmental effects of the plant will be detrimental to the Landmark itself."* [36]

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*Soon after his retirement in mid—1973, Palmer prepared a position paper against Bailly I and submitted it to the Washington Office. The paper formed the basis of the agency's stand against the nuclear power plant which was soon to be adopted by the Department. Palmer subsequently reflected that had his recommendation not been formulated and presented to the Atomic Energy Commission, the momentum of Bailly I would have proven overwhelming before opposition forces could mobilize against it. Palmer considers his memorandum the most important during his eighteen—year tenure in the Northeast Regional Office. See George A. Palmer interview, 12 October 1987.

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One key official responsible for formulating Departmental policy was Nathaniel P. "Nat" Reed, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks. Reed's first visit to Indiana Dunes came at the invitation of Save the Dunes Council lawyer Edward Osann. The visit came early in Assistant Secretary Reed's tenure, probably April 1972. Reed later recalled:

I was dumbfounded, totally ill—prepared for the beauty and the multi—ecotones of Indiana Dunes. We walked from the Lakeshore up and over the bluff and went through the wind—swept Blackjack forest and up and down through the sand dunes into a ponded area. Positively walked miles and miles and immediately fell in love with Indiana Dunes. [37]

Reed, a young, outspoken Republican conservationist from Florida, accepted his position in May 1971 following a White House meeting with President Richard M. Nixon. Reed's position that no unit of the National Park System should serve as a buffer zone for a nuclear power plant met opposition within the Nixon Administration. [38] Powerful circles within the Republican Party which promoted industrial development campaigned for the Department's endorsement of Bailly I and the firing of the stubbornly outspoken Assistant Secretary. Nat Reed formulated his decision to fight Bailly I in the aftermath of President Nixon's reelection landslide in November 1972:

I decided that I had to oppose the Bailly nuclear power plant.... My staff was not too keen to have me oppose Bailly. Bailly still had some political muscle. Quite a bit of political muscle! The Nixon Administration was pretty strongly supporting nuclear power. I made the case at the White House with [Assistant to the President John] Ehrlichman one afternoon that I was not opposed to nuclear energy, that I had licensed three nuclear power plants in Florida when I was head of DER [Department of Environmental Resources] so that I could not be accused of having any nuclear bias. But I was absolutely determined that that nuclear power plant, plus its cooling tower could not invade either the aesthetic qualities of the park or, equally important, could not affect the park adversely through the tremendous amount of water coming out of those cooling towers.... But I considered it, nevertheless, a fundamentally important struggle in the sense that the Park Service and their Assistant Secretary said, "It is not a case of being pro or con nuclear energy. We are going defend the borders of the National Park System." [39]

It was not until Reed threatened to resign that Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton allowed him to go to Indiana in 1973 to testify before an AEC hearing.

For two days, September 19—20, 1973, Nat Reed visited Indiana Dunes and testified before the AEC hearing in Valparaiso. He had done his homework. Prior to testifying, Reed ignored NIPSCO's threat to prosecute trespassers and explored the entire area in order to etch the landscape firmly in his mind.* What he saw convinced him of the accuracy of his position, concluding, "There was no way you could say, 'We'll plant some trees around the cooling tower.'" [40] Appearing before the AEC panel, Reed first established the national significance of the area, then declared:

Since November 5, 1966, the Federal Government has invested $27,900,000 of Land and Water Conservation Funds for land purchases in the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore and $1,710,600 for operation and development planning purposes. It is anticipated $5,981,500 will be obligated or expended in the fiscal year 1974 for operation, development and resource protection. Beyond fiscal year 1974, we contemplate costs of $49,000,000, a sum which does not include such additional monies as may be needed for continued costs and land acquisition.

The Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore is situated near a densely populated urban region which is heavily industrialized. It offers greatly needed recreational opportunities and a refuge of open space to this growing population, many of whom cannot afford to go to national parks more distant from the region.

Siting the proposed Bailly nuclear plant on the border of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore would appropriate one and one—half miles of the most outstanding natural area of the Lakeshore for the plant's low population buffer zone. In the event of accidental discharge of radioactive waste from the nuclear plant into the atmosphere or into the waters of Lake Michigan, visitors to the National Lakeshore would be subject to emergency evacuation. In view of the capacity of the Lakeshore to accommodate 87,000 visitors per day, evacuation would represent a major operation as well as a massive interference with their use and enjoyment of the park. I do not believe that the Congress intended the National Park System to be used as a buffer zone for industrial accidents, and, as a matter of policy, the Department is opposed to such use. [41]

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*Whitehouse recalled the unusual visit: "We went up into Dune Acres where you can get up on a high ridge and look down below and see all of Cowles Bog and see all of NIPSCO, and the hole they were digging, and the whole bit. Now, to really see it properly, you've got to get out of your car and you've got to walk down a long dunes and circle around, and walk through the dunes grass and the swampy, bog—like landscape and I mean with vegetation over your head! You've got to work your way through four or five miles which is really tough. You know what the man did? That gentleman from Washington walked, and hands—on, through that disputed area. Walked it and saw it! And he came out of it with a smile on his face! A remarkable person and a remarkable day that one was, and the next day, too, at the hearing. Yes, he's a man that, if you didn't have enthusiasm, he would soon inspire you with it!" See Whitehouse interview, 11 March 1987.

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Reed was particularly concerned about the nearby Cowles Bog National Natural Landmark and its surrounding dunes and wetlands. He cited adverse effects which the AEC's own Environmental Impact Statement did not identify. Aside from the highly objectionable aesthetic intrusion from the massive cooling tower, ecological damage would result from the mixing of emissions from the two NIPSCO plants (fossil—fuel and nuclear) forming acid rain. The salt emissions would also result In defoliation, Reed argued, and seepage from waste ponds as well as alterations in the water table would also harm the national lakeshore. Reed concluded:

When one weighs costs and benefits, given alternatives to the Bailly site, it is clear that moving the site is the only way to consistently uphold both Congressional policies involved, namely protection of the National Lakeshore, and promotion of nuclear power.

For these reasons, it is the position of the Department of the Interior that construction of the proposed Bailly Generating Station Nuclear—I on the border of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore does not serve the highest public interest. We accordingly request that the Atomic Energy Commission withhold issuance of a construction permit for Bailly Nuclear—I at the proposed site and recommend a more suitable site for the project. [42]

Following the AEC hearing, Nat Reed told reporters he agreed NIPSCO needed more electrical power in the area, but "after spending a hell of a lot of the taxpayers' money on a national park, I'm concerned about putting a nuclear facility only 400 feet away from it." [43

Reed was amazed by the depth of polarization between industrialists and preservationists he witnessed during his visit. The polarization similarly split the Advisory Commission. Chairman William Lieber, who believed the Commission's responsibility was principally to advise the Secretary, had kept the Bailly I controversy off the agenda. Other members, who believed their first allegiance was to the special groups they represented, wanted to debate the Department's position. [44] Of all of the Commission members, John Schnurlein strongly supported NIPSCO's plans to build Bailly I because he believed at the time that it was environmentally and economically sound. Schnurlein thought that Reed was voicing unfounded "scare tactics" and needlessly "meddling" in local affairs. [45] Lieber pinned his hopes on Nathaniel Reed's vow to help the national lakeshore, as he told a fellow commissioner: "By the way, Reed is very interested now in doing something for the Dunes. He had never been out before and was impressed with its beauty and also with its lack of development. We'll see just what he can accomplish back in Washington." [46] (See following section on West Beach development.)

After convincing his boss of the justness of his Bailly I stand, Nat Reed enjoyed the full support of Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton whose self—admitted favorite bureau within the Department of the Interior was the National Park Service. Morton's management philosophy was to state his ideas on a controversial subject, then turn it over to his Assistant Secretary to handle. Morton stayed in the background, but provided valuable insights garnered from Capitol Hill as well as his broad—based political support. The Secretary rarely reversed any of Reed's decisions. According to Reed, "He would stand with you and fight with you at the White House, at OMB [Office of Management and Budget], and on the Hill." While Secretary Morton endured the political "heat" within the Nixon Administration over the Bailly I dispute, Nat Reed was in the public limelight engaged in "hand—to—hand combat"—principally against NIPSCO and its chairman of the board who swore not only to build Bailly I in the dunes, but to strip Reed of his job. Nonetheless, the Morton/Reed position proved to be vitally important to the future course and resolution of the Bailly I conflict. [47] Much to the environmentalists' dismay, however, the Department would not enter the legal dispute by joining the Joint Intervenors against NIPSCO's Bailly I. [48]

The three—member AEC licensing board heard sixty days of testimony over an eleven—month period, the longest in AEC history. The Joint Intervenors objected to a wide range of environmental and safety issues. In the end, it became obvious that the panel was biased in favor of nuclear power. The Joint Intervenors were prepared to litigate all the way to the Supreme Court. [49] On April 5, 1974, the AEC licensing board rejected all of the Intervenors' contentions and approved NIPSCO's construction permit for Bailly I. In effect, AEC concurred with NIPSCO's claim to 640 acres of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore as a "buffer zone" in the event of a nuclear accident. The move angered Congressmen Henry Reuss (Democrat—Wisconsin) and Guy Vander Jagt (Republican—Michigan) who wrote to AEC:

We are unaware of any provision in either the Atomic Energy Act or the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Act which authorizes your agency... to grant, by executive fiat, an easement over these federal lands without the express approval of Congress. We believe the Board's action is illegal and should be promptly reversed. [50]

The Intervenors appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit Court in Chicago which rescinded the decision on April 1, 1975. The landmark decision represented the first judicial reversal for the construction of a nuclear power plant. NIPSCO appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, and in November 1975, although it did not hear the case, the Supreme Court did overturn the ruling by affirming the AEC's right to establish and execute its own policies. [51]

With its AEC construction permit restored, NIPSCO alerted its contractor and construction began in late 1976. Meanwhile the Joint Intervenors regrouped and filed new lawsuits.

Bailly I appeared to be unstoppable.

Fiasco in Indianapolis: West Beach Development

At the conclusion of the January 19, 1973, Advisory Commission meeting held in Indianapolis, the National Park Service unveiled a Development Concept Plan (DCP) for West Beach. Up to this time, as with other Service plans, there was no established mechanism for public review and comment. It enjoyed the highest level of review both in the Service and the Department. Assistant Secretary Nat Reed remembers clashing violently with Director George B. Hartzog, Jr., over the first development plans at both Indiana Dunes and Cumberland Island National Seashore, Georgia:

In both cases, I had the privilege of sitting with the planners well in advance of the plan. We went over philosophy, discussed sizing, discussed the State's interest in both places where the State had equal opportunity to do something much more intense, the Park Service would do something much less intense, much more creative, much more simple and with stronger emphasis on protection of natural values than on recreation. In both cases, the planners came back with Disney Worlds, total Disney Worlds! I remember at Cumberland Island I threatened to throw the Chief Planner out the window! I terrorized the poor man. I screamed, "My God, what have you brought? This is the most terrible thing I have ever seen in my life!" [At] Indiana Dunes. . . I said to George [Hartzog], "That's the most awful thing I have ever laid eyes on; and to prove to you that it is absolutely awful, I'm going to authorize you to take that to public hearing."

He said, "The people in northern Indiana are going to love it. What are you going to do when they all are supportive?"

I said, "I'll worry about that later." [52]

Robert Steenhagen, member of the Denver Service Center's Northeast Team, introduced the A/E representative from the Milwaukee firm of Howard, Needles, Tammen and Bergendoff who explained a series of photographs, maps, and architectural plans.

For the Save the Dunes Council and most Advisory Commission members present, it proved to be a great shock. The A/E proposed twenty—six facilities including two swimming pools and steel bathhouses, a three—story parking garage for 2,000 automobiles, a pavilion, assorted sports fields, an amphitheater, maintenance and administration buildings, and sixteen homes for Service employees. Steenhagen commented the Service had already approved the design concepts and an environmental impact statement was underway. The Council and some members of the Advisory Commission were angered by the fait accompli approach. They resented being shutout of the planning process and were surprised that a public agency operating with public funds acted so secretively. According to Herbert Read:

It might have been some kind of ingrained, bureaucratic feeling that the Park Service planners considered themselves the experts and they weren't going to let any ordinary person come in and tell them what to do. But, in reality, of course, we were the experts. We knew what could go here. There weren't any Park Service planners or any other planners that knew better or what could go here than we. We knew what to do! We were the experts here. [53]

Following the meeting, the design plans were whisked away and Save the Dunes Council members were denied a chance to review them closer. The Council, decrying the intensity of developments and use, demanded an opportunity for the public to review and comment on the plans. Area planning boards, namely the Gary and Michigan City Planning Commissions and the Northwest Indiana Regional Planning Commission (NIRPC), expressed outrage at being shut out of the planning process. Strategizing to change the plans, a coalition of groups in Indiana and Illinois launched a massive press and letter—writing campaign; enlisted the support of other conservation groups; and lined up Congressional support. The strategy worked. Less than two months later, the Service made the West Beach development plans available for public review.* [54] Reed's prediction proved correct. He later recalled:

The Park Service officials barely got out of the room alive! I mean, you talk about the return of the massacre of a Red Indian! My God, they took one look at this. Here they had spent all these years fighting for the preservation of the sacred Indiana Dunes. And now, it was going to be defiled by masses of swimmers and cars and campers. It was going to be the rec[reation] area of all rec[reation] areas. It wouldn't fly. So the Park Service put its tail between its legs and very wisely went back to the drawing boards. [55]

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*According to Whitehouse, "I think the first, full—blown hearing occurred at Portage, Indiana, and boy, it was a wild, swinging outfit! Everybody, almost to a person, was opposed to this thing. So Save the Dunes Council didn't shoot this thing down; it was shot down by northern Indiana and Illinois." See Whitehouse interview, 11 March 1987.

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New Assistant Superintendent Don Castleberry also recalled the heated meeting and his shock at the villification of the Park Service by the public which charged the bureau with high—handedness and misreading the intent of Congress. [56]

J. R. Whitehouse subsequently accepted full responsibility for the fiasco. In his first superintendency, Whitehouse did not fully understand his role in the planning process. Assigning primary responsibility to the planners, who were not sensitive to local concerns and unfamiliar with the fragile resources, the concept naturally became so grandiose that Whitehouse knew it would never fly. Even the Advisory Commission openly condemned it. The bitter lesson compelled Whitehouse to take charge of the lakeshore's development planning and, henceforth, no more West Beach-type public relations disasters occurred. [57]

At a December 6, 1973, meeting of the Advisory Commission, Dr. Richard Curry, Nathaniel Reed's Special Assistant, informed the Commission that the planning process had been changed Servicewide to accommodate public review during, rather than after formulation of plans. Dr. Curry, elaborating on Reed's pledge to get West Beach operational by the summer of 1975, outlined the stages of developments beginning with one bathhouse with a capacity of 3,400 and an 850—car parking lot. The conservationists' desire to preserve natural values at all costs prevailed. In an effort to limit concrete, the elaborate plans of 1973 were scaled down. [58] Subsequently, the Save the Dunes Council objected vigorously to NIPSCO's plan to run West Beach utility lines into Ogden Dunes by carving a straight swath across the dunes. After lengthy negotiations, the Council, Park Service, and NIPSCO agreed to bury the utility lines parallel with the winding road. In addition, planners limited pavement in the bathhouse area in order to exclude a pond and the maintenance area was placed elsewhere. [59]