Lake Roosevelt
Administrative History
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CHAPTER 11:
Regaining Ground: Leases and Special Use Permits (continued)


Changes in Policy, 1980s

Special use permit policy came under even greater scrutiny starting in 1981 with the arrival of a new superintendent, Gary J. Kuiper. He was experienced in dealing with trespass and encroachment issues, having started with this during the early 1960s when he was a ranger at Natchez Trace Parkway in Mississippi. "I kind of waded into that and was successful in turning around a tradition of inappropriate use of public lands," remembered Kuiper. "That's kind of followed me my whole career." Turning around the well-established situation at LARO proved to be a challenge for Kuiper and his staff. [4]

Early in 1982, Chief Ranger Charles V. Janda distilled the background and current issues concerning special use permits at LARO. He blamed the dilemma on the Tri-Party Agreement that committed the Park Service to managing the Recreation Zone under a multiple-use concept. He suggested that this management paradox had led to policies with no clearly defined objectives, bringing marginal success and frequently setting untenable precedents. He pointed to several problems and made suggestions for improvement including standardized guidelines and procedures; clearly defined roles; a system to track special use permits and encroachments and to circulate such information among key staff; establishment of goals for resolving encroachments; and an active public relations program that included regular contact with permittees. [45]

The presence of private facilities at or near the shoreline creates the unmistakable impression that public use within these areas is not invited. In extreme cases, permittees have actually denied visitors access to Federal lands. . . . Essentially, adjacent land owners have de facto control of much of Lake Roosevelt's shoreline.

-- LARO Resources Management Plan, 1982
[46]

The 1982 Resources Management Plan (RMP) showed the influence of both Kuiper and Janda. It, too, pointed to problems stemming from the Tri-Party Agreement that implied that "private, commercial, agricultural and industrial uses are at least on a par with Service developed recreational programs." Forcing the Park Service to assume responsibility for administration of the wide variety of leases and special use permits caused the staff of the 1940s and 1950s to develop land use policies more through innovation and compromise than by strictly following Park Service principles. Most of the encroachment problems could be traced to current permit holders who had built on federal land without detection. Over the years, this had produced enough development along the shoreline to give the impression that much of the lakeshore was privately owned. The RMP admitted that, by 1982, adjacent property owners essentially controlled large areas of Lake Roosevelt waterfront. LARO suggested three possible alternatives for dealing with the complex issue of special use permits and encroachments. The first continued present lax and inconsistent management practices; the second introduced strict and consistent enforcement measures; and the third, the preferred alternative, was a combination of both. Under this approach, the Park Service was to analyze the problem thoroughly, review objectives, and develop policies and guidelines. Managers would be allowed some latitude in dealing with encroachments to mitigate hardships faced by property owners. Good public relations were important to keep the situation from degenerating into adversarial relationships. [47]

Superintendent Gary Kuiper and his staff developed an Encroachment Plan for LARO in 1982. Although all encroachments were considered violations, Kuiper urged his staff to approach those responsible in a neighborly, non-intimidating fashion. "If our objective is legally and morally valid," he wrote, "our methods must be of equal stature and above reproach." He cautioned his staff not to expect an instant turnaround on a situation that had been building for two or three decades. The Encroachment Plan outlined procedures that designated the District Ranger as the key person in the resolution of all encroachments. Other LARO staff, including the Land Management Specialist, Chief Ranger, and Superintendent, were available for advice and assistance but only if requested by the ranger in charge. The Chief Ranger directed the program, reporting to the Superintendent. The plan emphasized written communications to document each encroachment, with all key personnel kept informed. District Rangers were to inventory all encroachments by June 1, documenting new ones. Minor infractions could be resolved immediately, but more complex ones would need investigation. Special use permits could resolve some encroachments, but the plan cautioned against this approach: "An encroachment is, first and foremost, a violation of the law, not a logical extension of a Special Use Permit or cause for its issuance." [48]

The push to regain control of federal lands at LARO was further strengthened with the arrival of Kelly Cash in 1983. He became Assistant Superintendent, bringing to the job his experience as a planner with the former Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in Seattle. Cash immersed himself in the difficult issues of special park uses, writing much of the policy and correspondence during his twelve-year tenure. "It was like pulling teeth," he recalled, "but it had to be done." [49]

In January 1986, LARO held a parkwide staff meeting at Kettle Falls to discuss new guidelines for special use permits. After dividing the permits into various categories of uses, individuals agreed to draft guidelines. They were encouraged to think about what they were trying to achieve as well as what the resource should look like in twenty years. They also agreed that new permits did not have to be handled the same way as existing ones. [50]

LARO adopted a policy in 1987 to use special use permits as leverage to encourage permittees to remove encroachments. This did not involve putting encroachments under permit, as had been done in the case of the Moody cabin and others over the years. Instead, if verbal negotiation with the permittee failed to produce results, the Park Service could apply special conditions to any existing permits in an effort to promote compliance. For instance, LARO could recommend against renewal until the encroachment was removed. Where the permit had already been renewed, the park could shorten the renewal period to ensure compliance. If the permit were not renewed, the encroachment could be removed by LARO, with the owner paying costs or, in the most difficult cases, it could be referred for legal action. Finally, LARO could refuse to issue the permittee any further permits until all encroachments were removed. [51]

Just as LARO was moving to tighten up special uses, the Park Service did the same with the publication in 1986 of the "Special Park Uses Guideline NPS-53." The new policy stated clear limitations on private use of federal lands, "A special park use must not be granted unless the authority for allowing the action can be clearly cited, its need or value is confirmed, and its occurrence has been judged to cause no derogation of the values or purposes for which the park was established, except as directly and specifically provided by law." Derogation involved a judgment call based on the particular park and the context of the park use. It included not just physical resources, but visitor experience as well. The Park Service encouraged phasing out existing activities and uses that conflicted with this policy. The agency knew that permittees would resist the changes, so it stressed the need to keep careful administrative records to support all decisions. Before any controversial termination, park managers needed to assess the performance of the permittee over time, examine the legal/policy implications of both approval and denial of the permit, assess the impacts, and list alternatives that might achieve desired ends. [52]

As LARO personnel moved into action, they sought approval from Reclamation for their new policies. Following an interagency meeting in November 1986 to discuss land management at LARO, Reclamation's Regional Director restated his agency's policy. In general, it did not object to other land uses as long as they did not interfere with the primary purposes of the project. Reclamation did not, however, approve of "private or semiprivate uses" of Reclamation lands unless denial of such use would amount to a hardship, such as with a utility right-of-way. The Bureau had transferred management responsibility to the Park Service, but it still expected coordination of the two agencies on land-use decisions. It deferred to the Park Service on all other management issues. The Park Service Regional Director compared Reclamation policy with NPS-53 and found the two "very compatible." He was relieved, since individuals cited for encroachments often questioned Park Service authority and policy. "As we address these conflicts, it will be beneficial to cite the mutually supportable policies of both our agencies." He promised that the Park Service would work with Reclamation at Lake Roosevelt when developing new land-use guidelines. [53]

During this same time, the Park Service requested permission from Reclamation to keep the fees it collected from special use permits to help offset administrative costs of managing permits and leases at Lake Roosevelt. These expenses had risen steadily with the increase in permits and the complexity of the situation, yet LARO received no funding for this work in its base appropriation and no reimbursement from Reclamation. Instead, the agency used funding designated for both visitor services and resources management to administer permits. The Park Service estimated the costs at $50,000 per year, with revenues from permits and leases totaling approximately $22,000 per year in FY1984-1986. Reclamation agreed in September 1987 to let the Park Service keep the fees to partially offset administrative costs. Within a few months, Gordon D. Boyd, LARO's Chief of Interpretation & Resource Management, did a careful analysis of the costs of administering special use permits. The twelve staffers working part time on permits amounted to 2.11 full-time equivalents for the permanent, full-time employees and .10 full-time equivalents for the temporary rangers. Adding wages, benefits, and support costs, the total came to $66,275 per year. Boyd estimated FY1988 permit fees would total $23,242, leaving $43,033 to come from the Park Base. [54]


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Last Updated: 22-Apr-2003