Was It Worth It?

Two days after Reagan signed the tax bill and its legislative taking into law, Annie Snyder and one hundred devoted followers joined in a victory gathering of prayer and song on the William Center land. Since the beginning of the long fight, Hazel/Peterson's burly guards had blocked their entrance to the tract. As Bruce Craig remembered later, it was "very much an emotional feeling" finally to step on the land they had worked so long to save. A small plane flying overhead tried to break the solemnity of the event with its banner "The taking of private land is un-American." The image of the mall protesters and the plane highlights the mixed lessons from the incorporation of the William Center tract into the Manassas battlefield park. [51]

The National Park Service gained a great deal from the legislative taking. First and foremost, it obtained control of a 558-acre tract of land its historians, beginning in the 1930s, had identified as having sufficient historical significance for inclusion in the battlefield park. Second, the Park Service learned the importance of working with outside jurisdictions to protect its lands. Rolland Swain's discussions with Hazel/Peterson in 1986 resulted in numerous concessions by the developer for the battlefield park.

Fig. 16. Annie Snyder's unwavering commitment to the preservation of land associated with the two Manassas battles inspired millions of Americans to voice their opposition to perceived threats to the battlefield park, which ranged from historical theme parks to shopping malls. (Photo by Andres Alonso. © 1988, The Washington Post. Reprinted with permission)

The Park Service also learned a hard lesson. It needed to act quickly in response to the mall proposal and to include all parties in discussions: the county, the developer, the preservationists, members of Congress, and relevant state and federal officials. By excluding the Save the Battlefield Coalition, which had created a national communications network and support system, NPS and Interior forced the preservationists to defend their position without compromise. The taking became the only viable option. [52]

For Swain and Susan Moore, who were on the front lines throughout, other lessons became apparent. They needed a way to use basic data effectively in analyzing the impact of development on the park. Swain took photographs of red helium-filled balloons to show how the building might be seen by park visitors. This method, the only one available in the Park Service at the time, was ineffective for convincing the county zoning board to impose height restrictions on developments. The newly emergent technology of the Geographic Information System (GIS), a system that uses computer imaging to show how a construction project would appear from different areas, makes a much more compelling argument for restrictions. Since 1988 GIS has become a staple tool for Park Service employees, although demand has often overwhelmed its availability. [53]

Swain and Moore also learned the importance of having good zoning lawyers amid technical advice available to the Park Service. During the 1986 rezoning process, they could have used zoning law assistance to understand exactly what a planned mixed-use district allowed. This information would have helped them make informed assessments on potential development next to the park. When in negotiations with Hazel/Peterson before the mall announcement, Swain and Moore also could have used legal expertise to review the proffers and ensure the park's concerns had been addressed. A zoning lawyer could have pointed out that the PMD retail component might include a mall, thus enabling the Park Service to anticipate the development. [54]

Finally, the Park Service learned the importance of taking the lead when confronting difficult issues. Long-range strategic planning following the Marriott controversy would have enabled the NPS to consider the impact of possible future developments and prepare a response before the situation became unmanageable. The lack of a proactive stance made a later controversy inevitable. When confronted with this type of situation, NPS continued its reactive position, with damaging consequences. Aside from a letter to Kathleen Seefeldt of the Prince William Board of County Supervisors, the Park Service remained silent until late April when Mott and Hodel presented their compromise plan. During this period, the Save the Battlefield Coalition established a nationwide media campaign and became, in effect, the voice of the Manassas National Battlefield Park. Interior's compromise plan contradicted what Snyder and her supporters believed about the mall—that the mall would destroy the historic integrity of the battlefield park—and left the public, educated by the SBC's media blitz, uncertain of the Park Service's ability to protect the land. Interior reinforced this perception by negotiating with the developer and the county, not the preservationists. [55]

The $134 million that the federal government has paid for the William Center tract has left some observers wondering if the Park Service gained anything from the legislative taking. This amount, almost twice what was originally predicted, reflects the agreed upon value of improvements Hazel/Peterson made. Til Hazel later commented that for that same sum, the roads at the Stone House intersection could have been closed to traffic. Instead, the park has another piece of land, but the road situation continues to worsen. The federal government, however, would never have allocated such a sum for the battlefield park, for any project. The legislative taking required adequate compensation for the taken land, and Hazel set that price with his nonstop building. Superintendent Swain questioned the appropriateness of the legislative taking, especially considering its cost, because understanding Second Manassas does not require having that land, in his opinion. Betty Duley, a local resident, also noted that the Park Service had money to obtain more land but lacked the resources to care for its existing property, pointing to the rundown buildings and the lack of adequate patrols around the park. Duley and others believed that the NPS should have focused on capital improvements, not acquiring more land. [56]

Others consider the money well spent and in accordance with the park's mission. Craig noted that every year Congress designates a considerable sum, reaching well into the hundreds of millions of dollars, for the Land and Water Conservation Fund, an account designated specifically for land purchases. Since the early years of the Reagan administration, only a small portion of this fund is spent to acquire parklands; most is left to accumulate, in effect to offset a portion of the country's budget deficit. If Congress used the fund to its full potential, Craig believed, expensive takings like the William Center property could be avoided. For Craig, Snyder, Powell, Bumpers, and other preservationists, owning the site from which Lee staged one of the most impressive Confederate victories justified the expense and accorded with the battlefield park's mission. [57]

Prince William County officials believed they lost a great deal with the legislative taking. The anticipated jobs evaporated, the estimated $23 million in annual tax revenues was gone, and the promise of increased investment that would have spun off from the William Center was lost. The tract, designated in the county plan for economic development and thus tax generation, was removed from the tax rolls. With the county's growing population demanding more services, the legislative taking presented a host of economic issues for county officials. [58]

The events leading to the acquisition of the William Center property profoundly influenced historic preservation in the United States. The mall announcement resulted in a highly publicized coalition of preservation groups: conservationists, Civil War enthusiasts, and historic preservationists joined hands. They created a united front, under the Save the Battlefield Coalition and the National Heritage Coalition, which proved unbeatable. Each organization involved in the fight benefited from the heightened visibility and increased membership. Some observers even thought that the national organizations gained more from the exposure than they contributed to the SBC in its particular fight against Hazel/Peterson. [59]

The mall controversy and the expense of the legislative taking made clear to historic preservationists that they had to find alternative means for saving significant lands from development. This realization led to two related efforts: the introduction of the Heritage Preservation Conservation Act legislation and the establishment of Civil War battlefield preservation organizations both within the federal government and in the private sector. The example of the William Center controversy prompted Bruce Craig of the NPCA and Ian Spatz of the National Trust for Historic Preservation to draft the Heritage Preservation Conservation Act as a vehicle for addressing any future land-use conflicts adjacent to national parklands. Although it was never passed, the act would have established an overlay district adjoining a park where development would be restricted and would have provided other safeguards, such as authorizing the federal government to stop a construction project for a period of days while parties tried to negotiate a solution. If the government determined the land should be acquired, money would come from a special emergency fund. [60]

Other successful preservation efforts have been directed toward saving unprotected Civil War battlefield sites. In June 1987, about thirty interested individuals met in Fredericksburg, Virginia, to assess the events at the Manassas battlefield and at the Chantilly battlefield, a site in Fairfax County under immediate threat from development. They realized that a private-sector organization specializing in Civil War preservation needed to act in tandem with the government to save threatened areas. In July they formed the Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites (APCWS). As the Manassas story played out in 1988, APCWS members, including A. Wilson Greene, a Park Service historian who eventually left his job to serve as APCWS's executive director and later president, grew more convinced that the sort of "eleventh-hour-and-fifty-ninth-minute rescue operation, at a cost that is so astronomical, is simply not a blueprint" for battlefield preservation. [61]

The APCWS developed an alternative. It conducted numerous surveys to identify the core historic areas of battlefields across the country and then assessed each parcel within the core area for its integrity and the level of threat from outside development. From these surveys, the APCWS established a set of priorities to determine which lands to buy. Using funds raised through private sources, the APCWS purchases tracts and holds them in a land trust until the federal government can accept them. In this way, battlefields are preserved before development overwhelms them and before prices make the land prohibitively expensive. Efforts by the APCWS have been augmented by the Civil War Trust, established by Congress at the behest of Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan Jr. to work toward preservation, and Jerry Russell, founder of the Civil War Round Table Associates, who has publicized the need to save battlefields in his monthly newsletter. [62]

Congress responded to the lessons of the William Center controversy and established a fifteen-member Civil War Sites Advisory Commission in November 1990. Secretary of the Interior Lujan, Hodel's successor, proposed such a commission at the July 1990 ceremonies for the 129th anniversary of First Manassas. The commission, which included Civil War historians, individuals experienced in preservation and land-use issues, members of Congress, and the National Park Service director, set out to identify historically significant Civil War sites and determine their relative importance. Individual sites were assessed for their existing condition and the threat of impending development. Based on this information, the commission recommended alternatives for preserving and interpreting the sites in its 1993 report, which detailed the status of every significant Civil War battlefield site and proposed cooperation between the public and private sectors to save the highest priority areas before they are lost. Despite early efforts by Lujan to raise money for implementing these recommendations, action has not been taken. [63]

There have been some gains for historic preservation as a result of the William Center controversy, but at a cost. By adamantly opposing any compromise that would have preserved part of the tract and allowed development on the rest, preservationists appeared unwilling to negotiate. Jody Powell later remarked that preservationists must find a reasonable balance between saving aspects of American history and allowing economic opportunity. If they say "no, no, no" all the time, the public will be unwilling to listen to their concerns and they will lose their overall effectiveness in preserving lands. Til Hazel believes preservationists have already bankrupted their credibility: any piece of property for which they can devise historical allegations for saving has become fair game for their efforts. Hazel agrees that some places, such as George Washington's home at Mount Vernon, warrant protection, but price and relative historical significance, according to Hazel, should determine what other areas deserve preservation. [64]

The National Park Service did not have long to assimilate what it had learned from then William Center controversy before an even larger issue developed. In November 1993 the Walt Disney Company announced its intention to build a historical theme park in Haymarket, Virginia, 3.5 miles from the battlefield park. The resulting battle highlighted the shift in concerns facing Manassas National Battlefield Park. During its first thirty years, the park had to contend with development threats on land the Park Service wanted to acquire. Beginning with the 1973 Marriott theme park proposal and ending with the William Center, the NPS had to determine its response to development immediately outside park boundaries on land of some historical significance. In the 1990s the Park Service had to shift its attention to land that did not adjoin the park but could be developed in a way that would detrimentally affect the battlefield park. The Service entered a new area of defining the significance of resources, recognizing that historic resources could not be protected solely by extending park boundaries.