Battling for Manassas: The Fifty-Year Preservation Struggle at Manassas National Battlefield Park

Table of Contents

Foreword

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Chapter 9

Chapter 10

Chapter 11

Bibliography

Appendix I

Appendix II

Appendix III

Appendix IV

Appendix V (omitted from on-line edition)

Appendix VI

Appendix VII

Appendix VIII

Manassas Chapter 5

Reenacting the Past

More Lands for the Park

With the battle over the routing of the interstate highway won, Wilshin still had to contend with the larger issue of land. A housing boom hit the town of Manassas in 1958, and land values steadily increased by 15 to 20 percent each year during the remainder of Wilshin's superintendency. The prospect of direct access to Washington made the area near the battlefield attractive to developers. Wilshin knew that lands designated for inclusion in the park might become prohibitively expensive if the Park Service did not act quickly. Tracts might end up part of housing developments or shopping centers, their historic landscapes buried under concrete and asphalt. [26]

Wilshin understood the value of these lands to the battlefield park, and he shared this knowledge with anyone who would listen. His modus operand was to depict on maps troop movements during each Manassas battle, explaining that the Park Service established the relative significance of given tracts based on the official records of the war. Land acquisition plans developed from this information. Finally, as the park's interpretive program took shape, Wilshin incorporated information on battle movements and historic lands in museum displays and historical markers. In this way, Wilshin showed that the park's land acquisition program followed a thoughtful approach based on the history of the battles and alleviated fears that the Park Service wanted the lands for other purposes, such as park housing. [27]

Wilshin used every means available to him to acquire historic lands. He learned in 1957 that the owners of the Stone House Inn planned to sell their property at public auction. The inn's land adjoined the Stone House tract, which the park had purchased in 1949, and consisted of a restaurant, warehouse, and three cottages. By virtue of its proximity to the site of heavy fighting during the Civil War, the Stone House Inn was an important tract long considered for inclusion in the battlefield park. Wilshin prodded the regional and Washington offices to find the necessary $35,000 to buy the inn. National Park Service interpretive chief Ronald Lee scraped up the money, and the Stone House Inn transferred to the federal government in 1958. [28]

The experience of purchasing the Stone House Inn with miscellaneous NPS funds indicated to Wilshin that he needed a large, secure financial base to accomplish his Mission 66 land acquisition objectives. The interstate highway controversy taught him the importance of gaining allies and publicizing his efforts. He applied these lessons to the park's land program. Wilshin often gave personal tours of the battlefield, especially for congressional and other political representatives. By making contacts, Wilshin hoped to attain his goals for the park. His efforts were richly rewarded in 1958. [29]

Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.) arrived unannounced at Manassas National Battlefield Park one day in April 1958 and accepted Wilshin's offer of a guided tour of the battlefield. Wilshin took Senator Stennis to the Stonewall Jackson statue. While looking north across Lee Highway, Stennis asked what lands the federal government actually owned. Wilshin replied that the park included "a solid block of land" south of the highway running from the Stone Bridge almost a mile and a quarter to Groveton. But, pointing to Matthews Hill behind the Stone House where Mississippi troops had fought with Confederates Barnard E. Bee, Nathan G. Evans, and Francis S. Bartow the morning of 21 July 1861, Wilshin stated, "Sir, we don't own that land." Stennis struck his fist into his hand and exclaimed, "That's not right!"

Wilshin then escorted Stennis to the high ground west of Deep Cut. He related the story of how Confederate Stephen D. Lee's artillery permitted Robert E. Lee's army to sweep the field, thus turning the tide of Second Manassas. With perfect timing, Wilshin ended with the reprise, "Sir, we don't own that land." And, Stennis returned, "That's not right!" Back in Wilshin's office, Stennis asked what lands had the highest priority, and Wilshin responded with two key areas of Second Manassas, Battery Heights and Deep Cut. Stennis wrote them down, and by the end of August he had coaxed the Senate to pass a Supplementary Appropriation Bill providing $100,000 for land acquisition at Manassas. [30]

Stennis remained committed to getting more lands at Manassas, partly because some of his relatives had fought there. He and Wilshin kept up a correspondence, and the senator provided the park with some letters from his family collection relating to the battles. In 1959 Stennis returned to the funding issue and convinced Congress to appropriate $450,000 toward land acquisition at Gettysburg and Manassas. [31]

Fig. 10. Superintendent from 1955 to 1969, Francis Wilshin enthralled listeners with his retellings of the First Battle of Manassas, often gaining allies in the process who later proved crucial in opposing adverse development projects or in providing money to acquire more lands for the battlefield park. (National Park Service photo)

The Manassas battlefield park eventually obtained the entire sum because Congress had stipulated that the money could not be obligated until the secretary of the interior confirmed that local governments had adopted adequate zoning regulations to assure against future commercial developments in the park areas. Gettysburg did not have any zoning laws, but the Prince William Board of County Supervisors had already zoned the area surrounding Manassas battlefield park as agricultural-forestry, which was in line with the congressional requirement. The board of supervisors disapproved the proposal supporting further land acquisition for the park, but the Manassas town council had passed a resolution in April 1959 expressing its support for further land acquisition. With the proper zoning in place, the total obligation of $450,000 went to Manassas. [32]

With $550,000 available, the Park Service embarked on an extensive land purchase program at Manassas. Most of the land acquired lay north of Lee Highway, the area Wilshin had pointed out to Senator Stennis. The Stone House and the Dogan House, which had been the lone park properties on the north side of the highway, now had the protective embrace of national parkland around them. Tracts immediately along Bull Run remained privately owned, but most of the land along Route 234 to Sudley Church came into the park. [33]

Wilshin explored the possibility of using land exchanges to acquire other significant tracts, including the Stone Bridge. The Stone Bridge had served as the left anchor of the Confederate line at First Manassas and had been an avenue of Union advance and the principal avenue of Union retreat during Second Manassas. The Commonwealth of Virginia held title to the bridge and about three acres of land around it. The Park Service offered to exchange its temporary leases on roadway relocations near Sudley Church and the south boundary of the park for the Stone Bridge and its land. Virginia agreed to the proposal, but with a stipulation. The federal government had to obtain an agreement from the United Daughters of the Confederacy to transfer to the Park Service a monument the organization had erected on the bridge. [34]

Wilshin faced a delicate situation when he approached Isabel Hutchison, the president of the UDC chapter in Manassas, about the Confederate monument on the Stone Bridge. He wanted the bridge, but the monument represented an intrusion on the historic scene. So he had to convince Miss Hutchison, a devoted Confederate, to agree to the transfer and demolition of her organization's memorial. He had already established friendly relations with her chapter by assisting in First Manassas anniversary ceremonies, so he built on that relationship. He showed her Civil War-era photographs of the bridge to indicate its original appearance and explained its significance to the battles. He then argued that transfer of the bridge and removal of the monument would "further the cause of her dear Confederacy" by restoring the historic appearance of the Stone Bridge. Miss Hutchison and her chapter agreed to Wilshin's proposal, and the Stone Bridge came into the park in 1961. [35]

The Park Service sometimes acquired lands under less friendly circumstances. The federal government, anxious to consolidate its holdings in Manassas now that it had the money and the impetus provided by Mission 66, resorted to a process known as a declaration of taking to condemn property that landowners refused to sell. Government officials also used this procedure if a property owner threatened the historic features of property that had been designated for inclusion in a park. In response to a refusal to sell land associated with Battery Heights, the Park Service chose to use a declaration of taking against the Steele family, who owned one tract of this historic scene, and Luther Tinsley and Virginia Huffman, who owned one of the other tracts. [36]

As one longtime neighbor of the park remembers, Arthur and Rosalie Steele had built a nice house on their property in anticipation of retiring there. They had no children, and they intended to will their tract to the Park Service, but they wanted to spend their last years on their land. The Park Service did not want to accept this condition and proceeded with a declaration of taking. The United States District Court ruled on the price for the settlement, based on an assessment of the land, and the Park Service accepted the land in October 1960. The rest of Battery Heights transferred to the Manassas National Battlefield Park in 1962. [37]

Land condemnation antagonized relations between the battlefield park and its neighbors. People like the Steeles, who had either grown up on these lands or spent most of their adult lives there, wanted to decide for themselves when to leave, not be removed forcibly by the government. In the case of the Steele property, the Park Service exacerbated the situation by turning the Steeles' retirement home into park housing. Further conflicts occurred because land acquisition plans remained confidential to avoid driving up prices. But landowners never knew for sure if their property, which may have been within the designated park boundaries, was on the list for immediate acquisition. This situation increased tension and drove rumors of massive land buying by the government. [38]

Wilshin tried to alleviate residents' fears. He met with them and explained why certain tracts merited inclusion in the park, and he stressed that the Park Service intended to limit its purchases to ground essential to park interpretation. These efforts settled some of the wilder rumors, but the park continued to have opponents within the local community because of its land acquisition dealings, lasting for decades. [39]

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