Battling for Manassas: The Fifty-Year Preservation Struggle at Manassas National Battlefield Park

Table of Contents

Foreword

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Chapter 9

Chapter 10

Chapter 11

Bibliography

Appendix I

Appendix II

Appendix III

Appendix IV

Appendix V (omitted from on-line edition)

Appendix VI

Appendix VII

Appendix VIII

Manassas Chapter 6

Changing of the Guard

Burial Ground for the Nation's Veterans

A new threat to the integrity of the battlefield park appeared just as the new exhibits graced the visitor center and Wilshin prepared the Stone House for its opening. In January 1969 Congressman William L. Scott (R-Va.) introduced H.R. 1357, which proposed establishing an annex to the Arlington National Cemetery within the boundaries of the Manassas National Battlefield Park. Scott, who sat on the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, reasoned that the undeveloped sections of the battlefield park offered an attractive location for the national cemetery. With Arlington close to full, a new national cemetery near Washington was needed, and Scott thought a location in his home district would address this need. [13]

Debate on the appropriateness of housing a national cemetery at the battlefield park erupted soon after Scott introduced his bill. In 1968 Scott had surveyed his constituents about the idea and had gained overwhelming support for having a portion of the Manassas park designated a national cemetery. H.R. 1357 did not, however, specify how much of the park would be used, and some park neighbors concluded that the historic scene at the park would be jeopardized by the intrusion of the cemetery. Annie Snyder, whom Wilshin had converted to the battlefield cause during the interstate highway controversy, joined forces with Gilbert LeKander, another local resident who also worked as a legislative aide for Congressman Frank Bow (R-Mo.), to oppose Scott's proposal. The battle between Scott and the park neighbors who supported preservation stretched into the 1970s and across three park superintendencies. [14]

Although many park neighbors opposed any proposal to use the battlefield park for a national cemetery, National Park Service Director George Hartzog gave conditional support for the idea. In a 10 February 1969 meeting with Scott and Wilshin, Hartzog suggested that the cemetery use lands within the authorized park boundaries but currently privately owned. Hartzog believed that approximately 500 acres along the southern border of Bull Run and lying northeast of the park had only "moderate historical significance" and could be designated a national cemetery without conflicting with the park's interpretive plans. Hartzog convinced Scott to consider this land as opposed to the "most valuable historic portion" of Manassas battlefield, and Scott submitted revised bill H.R. 8818 to Congress on 12 March. This bill proposed acquiring the lands suggested by Hartzog, which lay adjacent to the northeast corner of the park along Bull Run, for the national cemetery. [15]

The Department of the Interior supported Hartzog's proposal. Under Secretary Russell Train told the chairman of the House Committee on Veterans Affairs that Interior had no objection to establishing the cemetery on the proposed 500 acres because the lands had only moderate historical significance. Train also believed that the cemetery would be more compatible with the park's mission than some "future adverse private development." Interior did want to take part in selecting the specific tracts for the cemetery, and the department also wanted the legislation to make clear that land chosen for the cemetery would no longer be considered within the authorized boundaries of the battlefield park. In this way, Train could object to any proposals that intended to place the cemetery on federally owned park land. [16]

Both Hartzog and Train based their decisions on the idea that the adjacent 500 acres of land had only moderate historical significance. Ed Bearss, at the time a Park Service historian in the Washington office, questioned this interpretation. He noted that the 500 acres had "at least as high a degree of historical significance" for Second Manassas as areas already included in the battlefield park. [17]

When Representative Scott first submitted H.R. 1357, Wilshin considered the proposal "absolutely adverse to the whole concept of park development." He worried that using Manassas for a purpose other than the one for which it had been created would set a dangerous precedent. The integrity of other national park sites would be threatened. In response to these fears, Wilshin acted as he had during the interstate highway crisis. His talks to local community groups and Civil War enthusiasts, informing them of the situation and enlisting their support, helped generate letters to Capitol Hill and the secretary of the interior. [18]

In addition to giving talks to local organizations, Wilshin attended several strategy meetings with the newly formed Friends of the Park, later called the Save the Battlefield Committee. Annie Snyder and fellow opponents to the national cemetery proposal had organized this group. As Wilshin freely admitted to the southeast regional director at the time, he provided the Friends of the Park with specific information on the extent to which the cemetery proposal would adversely effect interpretation and development at the park. Wilshin's information became the basis for numerous letters of protest to Congress. [19]

Wilshin's actions soon drew the attention of Congressman Scott. Scott accused Wilshin of voicing opposition to the cemetery bill when Wilshin attended the first public meeting of the Friends of the Park and a Prince William Board of County Supervisors' meeting in March 1969. The Department of the Interior defended Wilshin's actions at both of these meetings, indicating that Wilshin had acted as an official observer, answering questions about park development and interpretation plans. But Scott was unconvinced. As Bearss later remembered, when word arrived that Wilshin had publicly denounced Scott in "rather acerbic language" at a Manassas supermarket, Hartzog decided to transfer Wilshin. Wilshin left the Manassas National Battlefield Park in April 1969 and took a Park Service historian position in Washington. [20]

Wilshin believed that he was acting in an appropriate manner when he helped the Friends of the Park develop their strategies to oppose the cemetery. In reply to Scott's first concerns about his actions, Wilshin stated that "any contacts" he had had in talks before various organizations "reflected solely the official policy" (his emphasis) of the Department of the Interior and the National Park Service. He believed that both agencies opposed establishing the national cemetery at the battlefield park, and so his efforts to help the opposition seemed correct official actions to him. In reality, the official policy articulated by Park Service and Interior favored establishing the cemetery on less historically significant lands designated for inclusion in the battlefield park but not yet acquired. Wilshin's opposition to the cemetery contradicted this official determination. [21]

Hartzog's decision to remove Wilshin from the park superintendency followed federal agency protocol. Once an agency had established a policy on a particular issue, subordinates had the option of either accepting that decision or resigning. Since Wilshin did not resign, he had a responsibility as an agent of the National Park Service to accept Interior's decision on the national cemetery proposal. [22]

Public debate over the national cemetery proposal continued after Wilshin's removal. On 23 September 1969, when one of the subcommittees of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs held a hearing on H.R. 8818, almost 150 people submitted letters or gave statements. Opinions varied on the merits and problems associated with the bill. Veterans groups favored establishing the cemetery adjacent to the Manassas National Battlefield Park because it would give appropriate recognition to the sacrifices made by all veterans in serving their country. The Prince William Board of County Supervisors opposed the idea of taking the privately owned 500 acres off the tax rolls and placing them under federal ownership, whether for a cemetery or for the battlefield park. Park neighbors who favored the cemetery argued that the loss in taxes on the land would be more than made up by the increased amount of sales tax generated by cemetery visitors who chose to purchase goods or services in the county. [23]

Although joined in opposition to H.R. 8818 with the Board of County Supervisors, the Save the Battlefield Committee, led by Snyder, considered the historic significance of the battlefield lands and the opportunity for recreational activities more important than any perceived loss in taxes. Snyder argued that the scores of gravestone markers, chapels, military barracks, and supporting maintenance buildings would "destroy the mood and visual aspects" of the park. The somber cemetery would discourage park visitors from hiking and picnicking in the park's inviting green space. Snyder used soil maps to suggest that the land, believed to be underlain by a thick layer of rock, would require dynamiting grave spots and special sanitation measures since the soil did not drain well. Snyder also expressed concerns about the expected future expansion of the cemetery, which would spread to the battlefield park itself. [24]

In light of these concerns, the Save the Battlefield Committee urged Congress to support H.R. 8921, which was introduced by Congressman Bow in March. LeKander, Bow's aide and also a vocal member of the Save the Battlefield Committee, had contributed to this bill's creation because he wanted to provide an alternative location for the cemetery. Both LeKander and Snyder recognized the need for an annex to the almost filled Arlington National Cemetery and did not oppose a location somewhere in Prince William County, so long as it did not destroy historically significant land. Bow's bill proposed placing the cemetery within the boundaries of the United States Marine base at Quantico, Virginia, the Fort Belvoir Military Reservation in Virginia, Andrews Air Force Base, or Fort George G. Meade, the latter two located in Maryland. [25]

Congress failed to pass any of the 1969 cemetery bills, and the issue remained unresolved. In Snyder's opinion, public opposition was a significant factor in defeating Scott's proposal. In response to the Save the Battlefield's successful public relations tactics, people from across the country wrote to Congress and registered their views. [26] These tactics echoed the work done in 1957 to fight the interstate, and the same method would serve equally well in subsequent campaigns. Save the Battlefield Committee members wrote letters to the Civil War Round Tables and other people who had previously expressed support for the park. They encouraged the local papers to run stories, hoping the issue would be picked up by the national press. With the story out, Snyder later said, "people will come to you." And when people came to help fight the cemetery proposal, Snyder and the Save the Battlefield Committee got them involved stuffing envelopes, circulating petitions, and making phone calls. As these people got involved, they became committed and served as allies in future controversies. [27]

Wilshin was one of these committed individuals until his death in 1990. According to Snyder, he designed and colored maps for her to use in her appearances before Congress. Wilshin obtained the names of committee members and researched which regiments from their states fought in what place. He then tutored Snyder on this information, ensuring that each committee member would take an interest in Snyder's presentation. [28]

http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/mana/adhi6b.htm