Battling for Manassas: The Fifty-Year Preservation Struggle at Manassas National Battlefield Park

Table of Contents

Foreword

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Chapter 9

Chapter 10

Chapter 11

Bibliography

Appendix I

Appendix II

Appendix III

Appendix IV

Appendix V (omitted from on-line edition)

Appendix VI

Appendix VII

Appendix VIII

Manassas Chapter 9

Seeking Partnerships

Tough Decision

Satisfied that he got "the best deal he could," Swain spoke at the county hearing in support of rezoning the William Center tract from agricultural to planned mixed use. As Swain expected, the board of county supervisors voted six to one in favor of the application (the local representative voted against the rezoning), making the rezoning and the attached proffers legally binding. Swain did not want the William Center development next to the park, but he knew that his negotiations with Hazel/Peterson, along with those by the NWPWCA, resulted in a proposal that would have much less impact than other possible developments. He had toured the Fair Lakes development with one of Hazel/Peterson's landscape architects and felt that the same kind of "campus like office park" could be done at Manassas without being overwhelmingly intrusive. Swain also knew that the county could not have negotiated the same types of concessions with Hazel/Peterson that he obtained. According to Virginia state law, Prince William County could accept proffers, but it could not demand them as a condition for approving a development. [30]

Swain made a tough decision to enter into negotiations with Hazel/Peterson Companies, and many members of the preservation community attacked him for appearing to favor development over the battlefield park's integrity. Jerry Russell, national chairman for the Civil War Round Table Associates, advocated in his organization's monthly newsletter Swain's reassignment to another park where he would "not need to be sensitive to history, or be a strong representative of NPS." Russell's call prompted many of his readers, all Civil War enthusiasts, to write the National Park Service or their congressional representatives demanding explanations for Swain's action. Other preservationists argued that if Swain had resolutely stood for protection of the battlefield park, the Prince William Board of County Supervisors would have taken his stance into account when determining the fate of the old Marriott tract. Preservationists believed that the Park Service managers should aggressively defend park sites from outside assaults. Talking with developers and local landowners was acceptable, especially because so many parks were becoming islands in a sea of development, but preservation of park resources should remain paramount. [31]

National Park Service representatives defended Swain's negotiations with Hazel/Peterson Companies. Susan Moore, who came to the Manassas National Battlefield Park in the fall of 1985 as a management assistant and had worked closely with Swain on land-use and land protection issues, including the William Center development, later argued that the Park Service had to talk with developers and county planners to protect the park. Moore stated that unfortunately "it looked like we were in cahoots with the developer," which she insists was never the case. Chief Historian Bearss also defended Swain to Russell and other Civil War enthusiasts, pointing out that Swain had "stuck his neck out" for the Service and had negotiated an honest deal that was in the park's best interests. Bearss considered Swain a "first-class manager" who discharged his responsibilities at the Manassas battlefield in a "conscientious and satisfactory manner." National Capital Regional Director Jack Fish and NPS Director Mott echoed these statements in support of Swain. For Mott, Swain had implemented the very call for partnerships that he had proposed. [32]

Swain may have appeared less committed to preservation because of his quiet manner in handling issues. Bearss characterized him as low key: "He doesn't lose his temper. He is viewed as somebody that can talk reasonably with both sides." Moore stressed Swain's nonconfrontational nature, his "voice of reason" in which he thought things through very carefully and then acted in the way he felt best preserved the park's resources. And Moore perceptively pointed out that this was new territory for the Park Service: the agency had not been an active negotiator with developers in then past. To Bearss and Moore, Swain's personality and management style were assets when addressing Hazel/Peterson's proposal. To Russell and other preservationists, though, Swain appeared more like an "automaton bureaucrat" who "rolled over and didn't do anything." [33]

Swain had also generated some bad press in spring 1986. When the park had acquired land to the east of the Stone Bridge, as allowed under the 1980 boundary expansion legislation, the NPS had to remove an old gas station. Swain brought in contractors to demolish the building and remove the debris. To save money, Swain agreed to let the contractors place the waste on the northern slope of Henry Hill as opposed to hauling it to the county dump. Swain chose the side of Henry Hill because his maintenance chief had complained that ground depressions there had made the hill difficult to mow. The debris and added top soil would have helped fill in the depressions. The local newspaper reported the event and included a photograph showing the "battlefield eyesore" within sight of the Stone House. In response to public pressure, Swain had the debris moved, but his decisions raised doubts about his commitment to historic preservation. [34]

Despite his poor judgment on the gas station debris, Swain's actions following the William Center rezoning demonstrate his continued commitment to preserve the historical integrity of the Manassas battlefield park. Just days after the rezoning approval, Swain wrote Regional Director Fish and requested immediate assistance in reidentifying the exact park boundaries around the Stone House intersection. Swain needed this information to show that the state did not have sufficient right of way to add left and right turn lanes to the intersection, an idea pushed by the local county supervisor. Swain feared that adding turn lanes would ultimately result in the widening of Lee Highway and Route 234 through the park, an idea that the county and state came to support in 1987. The park's historic flavor would be lost in the noise and pollution of thousands of commuters traveling the high-speed multilane roads through the park. The fact that the county had failed to support funding for the William Center interchange at I-66, thereby making Lee Highway a major access road to the new development, added extra urgency to Swain's request for help. [35]

Swain's strategy worked. Years before, the county had straightened out a dogleg on Route 234 just south of the intersection and in the process had placed the current 234 shoulder on park land under a special use permit. The county then deeded to the park the land vacated by the straightening. Once it became clear in 1987 that Prince William County and Virginia wanted to improve the Lee Highway—Route 234 intersection by widening both roads, Swain called them on then special use permit. He warned that the Park Service would not give a permit to expand the road and that the Service would not renew the special use permit, which was due to expire in 1989. This meant that the county could widen only three of the four arms of the intersection, making the entire endeavor unprofitable. Talk of upgrading Lee Highway—Route 234 quieted, keeping the historic crossroad intact. Yet the quiet around the Manassas National Battlefield Park was only temporary: in 1988 the Hazel/Peterson Companies dropped a bombshell. [36]

http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/mana/adhi9d.htm