MANZANAR
Historic Resource Study/Special History Study
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CHAPTER
ELEVEN:
VIOLENCE AT
MANZANAR ON DECEMBER 6, 1942: AN EXAMINATION OF THE EVENT, ITS
UNDERLYING CAUSES, AND HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
(continued)
CAUSES
WRA Investigations
Following the violence at Manzanar on December 5 and 6, WRA
administrators, shaken by the seething tensions in the camp, launched
several investigations in an attempt to determine the principal causes
of the unrest. In a document, entitled "The Manzanar 'Incident':
December 5 to December 19, 1942," WRA investigators concluded:
From the preceding sketchy picture of what happened for two weeks at
Manzanar it can be seen that an extremely complex situation developed.
To list briefly some of the contributing factors to the general
condition: self-government charter controversy, personal grudges,
Japanese-American Citizen's League, camouflage, housing, dissatisfaction
with certain administrators. The two most important factors were: first,
the inherent conflict between those culturally Japanese and those
culturally Americans, and secondly, the close confinement within the
area. The latter is a strong force that tends to aggravate any
preexisting conflicts.
The clean sweep that would eliminate a goodly portion of these
problems naturally would be relocation. . . . [72]
Although many factors contributed to the tensions that led to
violence at Manzanar, WRA authorities nevertheless concluded that the
confinement within barbed wire fences of various divergent groupings of
persons of Japanese descent was a major underlying cause of the unrest.
These groupings ranged from traditional, and hence conservative, rural
agricultural communities such as Florin near Sacramento, where members
of the burakumin, a class of Japanese "untouchables," had
settled, to "Japanesy" working class communities such as Terminal Island
and San Pedro near Los Angeles Harbor, to middle class neighborhoods in
West Los Angeles and Los Angeles suburban communities such as Pasadena
and Glendale. Evacuees from agricultural areas, such as Bainbridge
Island, Washington, Florin, French Camp near Stockton, Venice, and the
San Fernando Valley, and college-educated professionals from Los Angeles
had little in common. Furthermore, stresses and strains had developed
between the younger largely-Americanized Nisei and the older, more
Japanese-oriented Issei who had dominated prewar Japanese American
communities. [73]
In the aforementioned WRA report on the events of December 5 and 6
submitted to Director Myer on December 22, 1942, a section entitled
"Probable Causes" elaborated further on the underlying factors leading
to the violence. The report noted in part:
Ueno was very popular at Manzanar. Tayama was despised as an informer
and a stool pigeon. The spark that set off the incident was the arrest
of Ueno on suspicion of participating in the assault on Tayama, and his
removal to a local jail. Few of the evacuees believed that Ueno was
guilty, most of them thought that he was arrested because of the
personal animosity of Mr. Campbell; that, even if he were guilty, he
ought not to be punished for assaulting an informer of Tayama's
character; and that his guilt should be determined by a hearing at
Manzanar rather than in the local courts.
It is the consensus of the administrative staff at Manzanar and many
of the evacuees who were interviewed that, while the arrest of Ueno was
only an immediate cause of the incident, the real causes lay in a long
series of deep-seated grievances which culminated in the event on
Sunday, December 6. Tom Ozamoto detailed most of these grievances when
his committee met with Mr. Merritt on December 14. Dr. Goto listed many
of the same grievances. Togo Tanaka and other representatives of the
Manzanar Free Press confirmed this analysis. . . .
Thus, the WRA report listed 25 reasons as the underlying causes for
the unrest that led to violence at Manzanar. The grievances were listed
"without attempting to indicate the particular persons who assigned them
as basic reasons for the unrest." The list included:
Discrimination against the Issei and their exclusion from
positions of importance in project administration.
Reliance by the project administration upon JACL leaders who were
not regarded as representative of the evacuees and upon other purported
leaders who aided in the evacuation.
Pre-evacuation quarrels and differences between various factions
of the Japanese.
The presence of informers within their relocation
center.
Rumors of misappropriation of sugar.
Frequent changes in the Project Director.
Frequent changes in administrative policies.
Indecision and vacillation in the determination of
administrative policies.
Delays in the payment of clothing allowances.
Delays in making wage payments.
The wage differential between chefs and cooks.
Variation in food between the kitchens in different
blocks.
The pro-government policy of the Manzanar Free Press.
The inadequacy of literal translations of English into
Japanese.
The presence of objectionable flag-waving groups within the
center.
The assumption by the JACL of the right to speak for the evacuees
without consulting them, on such subjects as the application of the
selective service system to the Japanese Americans.
The separation of Japanese aliens held in internment camps from
their families, many of whom reside in Manzanar.
The labor policy for the camouflage net project.
The arrest of evacuees and their trial outside the relocation
area.
The administration's effort to organize an evacuee council
without consulting representative Issei groups.
Dissatisfaction with some members of the administrative
staff.
The attitude of some members of the administrative staff toward
the evacuees; unnecessary familiarity, fraternalism.
Uncertainty about the future in this country.
Loss of income and property as a result of the
evacuation.
The unfavorable national press. [74]
manz/hrs/hrs11b.htm
Last Updated: 01-Jan-2002
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