MANZANAR
Historic Resource Study/Special History Study
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CHAPTER THREE:
EVACUATION OF PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY FROM THE WEST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES: IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066 (continued)

ASSEMBLY CENTER SELECTION

Once the decision was made that evacuation would no longer be voluntary, a plan for immediate compulsory evacuation was needed. To facilitate the evacuation effort, the WCCA determined to separate evacuation from the problem of removing evacuees to more permanent relocation centers. The War Department's Final Report stated:

It was concluded that evacuation and relocation could not be accomplished simultaneously. This was the heart of the plan. It entailed the provision for a transitory phase. It called for establishment of Assembly Centers at or near each center of evacuee population. These Centers were to be designed to provide shelter and messing facilities and the minimum essentials for the maintenance of health and morale....

The program would have been seriously delayed if all evacuation had been forced to await the development of Relocation Centers. The initial movement of evacuees to an Assembly Center as close as possible to the area of origin also aided the program (a) by reducing the initial travel; (b) by keeping evacuees close to their places of former residence for a brief period while property matters and family arrangements which had not been completed prior to evacuation could be settled; and (c) by acclimating the evacuees to the group life of a Center in their own climatic region. [41]

During the period of the voluntary evacuation program, the Army had begun the search for appropriate camp facilities, both temporary and more permanent. Regarding the criteria for selection of assembly centers, as the temporary camps came to be called, General DeWitt later wrote:

Assembly Center site selection was a task of relative simplicity As time was of the essence, it will be apparent that the choice was limited by four rather fundamental requirements which virtually pointed out the selections ultimately made. First, it was necessary to find places with some adaptable pre-existing facilities suitable for the establishment of shelter, and the many needed community services. Second, power, light, and water had to be within immediate availability as there was no time for a long pre-development period. Third, the distance from the Center of the main elements of evacuee population served had to be short, the connected road and rail net good, and the potential capacity sufficient to accept the adjacent evacuee group. Finally it was essential that there be some area within the enclosure for recreation and allied activities as the necessary confinement would otherwise have been completely demoralizing. The sudden expansion of our military and naval establishments further limited the choice. [42]

By early March 1942, the Army had selected issued instructions to establish these centers two sites as "reception centers." DeWitt through which Japanese Americans would be funneled out of Military Area No. 1. Work began immediately on the construction of the two centers — Manzanar at the eastern base of the Sierra Nevada in Owens Valley in eastern California and Poston south of Parker Dam on the Colorado River Indian Reservation in Arizona. The two sites, located in barren areas and constructed to house some 10,000 evacuees each, were designed "to provide temporary housing for those who were either unable to undertake their own evacuation, or who declined to leave until forced to." Designed initially by the WCCA as assembly centers to provide temporary quarters for evacuees, the two sites would later become two of the ten permanent relocation centers under the WRA. [43]

Meanwhile, the other assembly center sites, which were to serve as temporary quarters for the evacuees, were selected with dispatch. On March 16, Bendetsen dispatched two site-selection teams of federal officials, including representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation in the Department of the Interior, the National Resources Planning Board, Soil Conservation Service, and Farm Security Administration in the Department of Agriculture, the Works Projects Administration, and the Corps of Engineers, South Pacific Division, with instructions to locate facilities capable of housing 100,000 people. Within four days these teams reported back to Bendetsen, listing between them 17 potential sites. The War Department's Final Report described their selection:

After an intensive survey the selections were made. Except at Portland, Oregon, Pinedale and Sacramento, California and Mayer, Arizona, large fairgrounds or racetracks were selected. As the Arizona requirements were small, an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps camp at Mayer was employed. In Portland the Pacific International Live Stock Exposition facilities were adapted to the purpose. At Pinedale the place chosen made use of the facilities remaining on a former mill site where mill employees had previously resided. At Sacramento an area was employed where a migrant camp had once operated and advantage was taken of nearby utilities. [44]

After quick review, DeWitt, on March 20, ordered the Army's Corps of Engineers to proceed with construction of 16 (including the Manzanar and Poston "reception centers") "Assembly Centers for the housing of evacuees," and gave the Corps of Engineers a deadline of April 21 for making the camps ready. Thirteen assembly centers were located in California (Marysville, Sacramento, Tanforan, Stockton, Turlock, Salinas, Merced, Pinedale, Fresno, Tulare, Santa Anita, Pomona, and Manzanar), and the other three at Puyallup, Washington, Portland, Oregon, and Mayer, Arizona. [45]

Thus, as systematic compulsory evacuation began, the evacuation program and the operation of the assembly centers were under the authority of the Army by agreement with the WRA. Evacuation was under military supervision, while the centers were operated by the WCCA.



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Last Updated: 01-Jan-2002