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CHAPTER THREE:
EVACUATION OF PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY FROM THE WEST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES: IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066 (continued)

EVACUEES' PROPERTY DISPOSAL

Although later evacuations tended to be better organized than the one at Bainbridge Island, difficulties continued to plague the program. The handling of evacuee property, for instance, continued to present a major problem for the government. Early in its hearings on the west coast the Tolan Committee learned that frightened, bewildered Japanese were being preyed upon by second-hand dealers and real estate profiteers. On February 28, the committee cabled Attorney General Biddle recommending that an Alien Property Custodian be appointed. [60]

Before any action was taken, however, evacuation proceedings had commenced. Spot prohibited zones had been cleared of Japanese by order of the Department of Justice immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack; the Navy had evacuated Terminal Island in Los Angeles in late February; and the Western Defense Command had urged a number of west coast residents of Japanese ancestry to leave the military area voluntarily. The military viewed its primary mission to be removal of evacuees from the designated areas rather than looking after their property.


Headquarters
Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army

Presidio of San Francisco. California
April 20, 1942

Civilian Exclusion Order No. 7

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, this Headquarters, dated March 2, 1942, and March 16, 1942, respectively, it is hereby ordered that from and after 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., of Tuesday, April 28, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, be excluded from that portion of Military Area No. 1 described as follows:

All that portion of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, within the boundary beginning at the point where the Los Angeles-Ventura County line meets the Pacific Ocean; thence northeasterly along said county line to U. S. Highway No. 101; thence easterly along said Highway No, 101 to Sepulveda Boulevard; thence southerly along Sepulveda Boulevard to Wilshire Boulevard; thence westerly on Wilshire Boulevard to the limits of the City of Santa Monica; thence southerly along the said city limits to Pico Boulevard; thence easterly along Pico Boulevard to Sepulveda Boulevard; thence southerly on Sepulveda Boulevard to Manchester Avenue; thence westerly on Manchester Avenue and Manchester Avenue extended to the Pacific Ocean: thence northwesterly across Santa Monica Bay to the point of beginning.

2. A responsible member of each family and each individual living alone in the above described area will report between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Tuesday, April 21, 1942, or during the same hours on Wednesday, April 22, 1942, to the Civil Control Station located at:

2422 Lincoln Boulevard
Santa Monica, California

3. Any person subject to this order who fails to comply with any of its provisions or with the provisions of published instructions pertaining hereto or who is found in the above area after 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., of Tuesday, April 28, 1942, will be liable to the criminal penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 21, 1942, entitled "An Act to Provide a Penalty for Violation of Restrictions or Orders with Respect to Persons Entering, Remaining in, Leaving, or Committing any Act in Military Areas or Zones," and alien Japanese will be subject to immediate apprehension and internment.

J. L. DeWitt
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Commanding

Figure 1: Civilian Exclusion Order No. 7.



PROHIBITED AREA
EXCLUSION ORDER NO.7

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY>

map of prohibited area

This map is prepared the convenience of the public; see the Civilian Exclusion Order for the full and correct description.

Figure 2: Prohibited Area Order No. 7.



WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION

Presidio of San Francisco. California

INSTRUCTIONS
TO ALL PERSONS OF
JAPANESE
ANCESTRY
LIVING IN THE FOLLOWING AREA:

All that portion of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, within the boundary beginning at the point where the Los Angeles-Ventura County line meets the Pacific Ocean; thence northeasterly along said county line to U. S. Highway No. 101; thence easterly along said Highway No. 101 to Sepulveda Boulevard; thence southerly along Sepulveda Boulevard to Wilshire Boulevard; thence westerly on Wilshire Boulevard to the limits of the City of Santa Monica; thence southerly along the said city limits to Pico Boulevard; thence easterly along Pico Boulevard to Sepulveda Boulevard; thence southerly on Sepulveda Boulevard to Manchester Avenue; thence westerly on Manchester Avenue and Manchester Avenue extended to the Pacific Ocean; thence northwesterly across Santa Monica Bay to the point of beginning.

Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 7, this Headquarters, dated April 20, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from the above area by 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., Tuesday, April 28, 1942.

No Japanese person living in the above area will be permitted to change residence after 12 o'clock noon, P.W.T., Monday, April 20, 1942, without obtaining special permission from the representative of the Commanding General, Southern California Sector at the Civil Control Station located at:

2422 Lincoln Boulevard
Santa Monica, California

Such permits will only be granted for the purpose of uniting members of a family, or in cases of grave emergency.

The Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population affected by this evacuation in the following ways:

1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.

2. Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage or other disposition of most kinds of property, such as real estate, business and professional equipment, household goods, boats, automobiles and livestock.

3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups.

4. Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence.

THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE OBSERVED:

1. A responsible member of each family, preferably the head of the family, or the person in whose name most of the property is held, and each individual living alone, will report to the Civil Control Station to receive further instructions. This must be done between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Tuesday, April 21, 1942, or between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Wednesday, April 22, 1942.

2. Evacuees must carry with them on departure for the Reception Center, the following property:

(a) Bedding and linens (no mattress) for each member of the family;

(b) Toilet articles for each member of the family;

(c) Extra clothing for each member of the family;

(d) Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls and cups for each member of the family;

(e) Essential personal effects for each member of the family.

All items carried will be securely packaged, tied and plainly marked with the name of the owner and numbered in accordance with instructions obtained at the Civil Control Station. The size and number of packages is limited to that which can be carried by the individual or family group.

3. No pets of any kind will be permitted.

4. The United States Government through its agencies will pro vide for the storage at the sole risk of the owner of the more substantial household items, such as iceboxes, washing machines, pianos and other heavy furniture. Cooking utensils and other small items will be accepted for storage if crated, packed and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner. Only one name and address will be used by a given family.

5. Each family and individual living alone will be furnished transportation to the Reception Center. Private means of transportation will not be utilized. All instructions pertaining to the movement will be obtained at the Civil Control Station.

Go to the Civil Control Station between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Tuesday, April 21, 1942, or between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Wednesday, April 22, 1942 to receive further instructions.

J. L. DeWitt
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Commanding

Figures 3-4: Instructions to All Persons of Japanese Ancestry pages 2-3.


On March 6, 1942, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, acting as the agent of the Treasury Department, was given responsibility for handling the urban property problems of the evacuees, and an Alien Property Custodian was appointed on March 11. [61] Four days later, the Farm Security Administration assumed responsibility for assisting with farm property questions. The Federal Security Agency, through its various associated agencies, agreed to provide necessary social services. Each of these agencies had representatives at the 48 WCCA civil control stations to facilitate the early initiatives for voluntary migration, and although voluntary migration from Military Area No. 1 formally ended on March 29 each agency retained its obligation under the direction of the WCCA by staffing the civil control stations in the exclusion areas until the WRA assumed total responsibility for the evacuees in August 1942. [62]

By that time, however, many abuses had already been committed. Vulnerable to opportunists, the evacuees were subjected to droves of people who came to purchase goods and to take advantage of the availability of household furnishings, farm equipment, automobiles, and merchandise at bargain prices. [63] The Tolan Committee provided a succinct example of what it had discovered:

A typical practice was the following: Japanese would be visited by individuals representing themselves as F.B.I. agents and advised that an order of immediate evacuation was forthcoming. A few hours later, a different set of individuals would call on the Japanese so forewarned and offer to buy up their household and other equipment. Under these conditions the Japanese would accept offers at a fraction of the worth of their possessions. Refrigerators were thus reported to have been sold for as low as $5. [64]

Property and business losses also arose from confusion among government agencies. The military's delay in providing reasonable and adequate property protection and its failure to provide warehouses or other secure structures contributed to initial evacuee losses. Confusion existed among the Federal Reserve Bank, the Farm Security Administration, and the Office of the Alien Property Custodian. Not only did each agency have different policies, but there was also confusion within each how to implement its program. Dillon S. Myer, a Department of Agriculture official who replaced Eisenhower as director of the WRA on June 17, 1942, after the latter became Deputy Director of the Office of War Information, decried the result of the government's efforts to protect the evacuees' property:

The loss of hundreds of property leases and the disappearance of a number of equities in land and buildings which had been built up over the major portion of a lifetime were among the most regrettable and least justifiable of all the many costs of the wartime evacuation. [65]

In general, the Japanese evacuees were encouraged to take care of their own goods and their own affairs. Given the immense difficulties of protecting the diverse economic interests of more than 100,000 people, it is not surprising that despite the government's offer of aid it relied primarily on the evacuees to care for their own interests. At the same time, it is not surprising that, facing the distrust expressed in the government's exclusion and evacuation policies, most evacuees wanted to do what they could for themselves. [66] Economic losses from the evacuation were substantial for the Japanese. Owners and operators of farms and businesses either sold their income-producing assets under distress-sale circumstances on very short notice or attempted, with or without government help, to place their property in the custody of Caucasian friends or other people remaining on the coast. The effectiveness of these measures varied greatly in protecting evacuees' economic interests. Homes had to be sold or left without the personal attention that owners would devote to them. Businesses lost their good will, reputation, and customers. Professionals had their careers and practices disrupted. Not only did many suffer major losses during evacuation, but their economic circumstances deteriorated further while they resided in assembly and relocation centers during the war. The years of exclusion were frequently punctuated by financial troubles as the Japanese attempted to look after property without being on the scene when troubles arose, and they lacked a source of income to meet tax, mortgage, and insurance payments. Goods were lost or stolen during the war years, and the income and earning capacity of the excluded Japanese were reduced to almost nothing during the lengthy detention in relocation centers. [67]



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