Chapter 2:
Pothunters and Professors (continued)
Among those who worked at the Indian exhibit in
Chicago was a man against whom the collective power of the Department of
the Interior and the newly established anthropological discipline would
soon be exerted. The state of Colorado hired Richard Wetherill, a
rancher from Mancos, Colorado, to answer questions about the collections
of artifacts he and his brothers had taken from ruins in south western
Colorado and southern Utah. When Wetherill arrived in Chicago, he
possessed not only astounding artifacts of American prehistory, but
considerable knowledge and field experience as well. [17]
Wetherill's personal history was typical of the lives
of many who settled the West, except that he stumbled across something
extraordinary in the ruins of the Mesa Verde region. The eldest son of a
wandering family that had come to Colorado in search of silver,
Wetherill took responsibility for his family's less-than-lucrative Alamo
Ranch near Mancos, Colorado, during the 1880s. Wetherill and his
brothers drove their cattle through the steep canyons of southwestern
Colorado. They were peripherally aware of the many cliff dwellings that
dotted their pastures, but it was not until 1887 that one of the
brothers, Al Wetherill, discovered the first major ruin (now called
Sandal House) in what is now Mesa Verde National Park. A year later,
while hunting for stray cattle, Richard and his brother-in-law, Charlie
Mason, discovered Cliff Palace, the most spectacular of the Mesa Verde
ruins. Excited, the men rapidly uncovered additional ruins, and Richard
Wetherill found himself involved in more than a hobby. The "lost
civilization" that he thought he had discovered consumed him. [18]
The Alamo Ranch rarely provided an ample living for
the Wetherill clan, and Richard Wetherill took advantage of his growing
archaeological knowledge to support his family. In 1890 the Denver
Historical Society offered to purchase the mummy of a child that Clayton
Wetherill and Charlie Mason had discovered at Mesa Verde, and Richard
Wetherill accepted its offer of $3,000. The Wetherills then began
excavating "in a more businesslike manner," and in 1892 they assembled
an extensive collection of artifacts with the visiting Gustav
Nordenskiold of Sweden. By 1894 Richard Wetherill was a seasoned relic
hunter with extensive experience in the field. He had developed his own
cottage industry and placed advertisements in the local paper offering
curios and artifacts for sale. [19] There
was a better living in purveying the relics of a lost civilization than
ranching could provide in the Mancos region.
An individualist, Wetherill was a nineteenth-century
person in an area increasingly crowded with twentieth-century scientists
who had something to prove. He did as many westerners did, going about
his business in a region that he believed was beyond the interest and
reach of federal officials. But as the collections he made began to
attract the attention of anthropologists at universities and museums,
Wetherill's name became notorious. When the collection the Wetherills
made with Nordenskiold appeared in Sweden, American scientists howled.
Wetherill offended their professional pride and they became
nationalistic as they publicly castigated him. Simply put, his presence
at southwestern sites threatened the fledgling profession of
anthropology, and his work with foreigners gave the anthropologists an
avenue to attack him. A dramatic powerplay evolved, with Richard
Wetherill at its center. He became anathema to American anthropologists,
epitomizing chaos in the world of order they sought to create.
Wetherill was outside the institutional structure of
American science. Unlike the military surveyors, the first Americans to
explore the ruins, and the anthropologists who followed them, Wetherill
was not accountable to anyone. As anthropologists strove for
professional status, credentials such as field experience with the
United States Geological Survey (USGS) or academic training became
necessary entry cards to their discourse. Wetherill ignored such
developments. He was not a member of the cadre of professionalizing
anthropologists, and many of them regarded people like him as
pothunters, no better than criminals.
Wetherill also knew the location of more ruins than
anyone else at that time, and his knowledge made him an essential
contact for anyone hoping to find undisturbed sites in Arizona, New
Mexico, Utah, and Colorado. He attracted considerable attention among
potential excavators, and by the mid-1890s the Alamo Ranch became the
meeting place for people interested in excavating ruins in the
Southwest. Many travelers came to see the Mesa Verde ruins and to talk
to Wetherill about the possibility of future expeditions to more remote
places.
Among the expeditions Wetherill organized was one
financed by two brothers, Talbot and Frederic Hyde. Heirs to the Babbitt
soap fortune, the Hydes met Wetherill at the Columbian Exposition in
Chicago and became interested in Indian artifacts. They went to Mancos,
and in the winter of 1893 the three formed a partnership. Their first
expedition to Grand Gulch, Utah, uncovered many artifacts, and the Hydes
donated their collection to the American Museum of Natural History in
New York. [20] In the process, Wetherill's
name became more familiar to those interested in American
antiquities.
Wetherill's connection, via the Hyde brothers, to the
American Museum of Natural History gave that institution the upper hand
in the rapidly expanding field of American antiquities. At the turn of
the century, prehistoric artifacts were the most important results of
excavation. Cultural institutions and private collectors engaged in
fierce competition for these spoils. To load their halls with full
museum cases, institutions cavalierly sponsored scientists who tore
through southwestern archaeological sites in search of artifacts.
Wetherill often served as point man. His vast knowledge guaranteed the
success of expeditions in which he was involved. Others did not fare as
well, and competitors attacked Wetherill for his success because his
sponsors were often beyond reproach.
The partisan nature of anthropological politicking
helped account for the general disavowal of his discovery of the
Basketmakers, the ancestors of the people who built the cliff dwellings.
Although George H. Pepper of the American Museum of Natural History and
Dr. T. Mitchell Prudden, a medical doctor with strong ties to
institutional anthropology, reported Wetherill's find in scholarly and
commercial articles, others dismissed it as a hoax. The self-affirmed
anthropological and archaeological clique again felt threatened; without
any formal training, Wetherill was altering their intellectual terrain.
If his discovery gained credence, it could have dire consequences for
establishing professionals.
In part as a response to their perception of this
blatant challenge, institutional anthropologists in the late 1890s began
to organize an appeal for legislation designed to prevent people like
Richard Wetherill from digging up the ruins of prehistoric
civilizations. Anthropologists needed exclusive access to sites to
acquire professional respectability, if they were to avoid the challenge
represented by Wetherill's work. They sought legal remedies to protect
their territory from intrusion.
But the anthropologists faced western resentment of
their good intentions. People scratching out a frontier existence
regarded the anthropologists as aristocrats, representatives of an
eastern elite in a highly specialized field that seemed superfluous.
From a western perspective, they were out of touch with the key value of
the timesconstant progress towards a civilized West. With little
support in the West and only sporadic interest on the part of the
government, those who favored preservation of prehistoric ruins were in
a difficult position. Achieving their desired results looked to be a
very complicated proposition.
Eastern academics and scientists were a powerful
force, and they took their efforts to the legislative arena. As
representatives of a growing professional community just beginning to
assert itself, American scientists believed that the preservation of
American antiquities was an issue that demanded their input. In early
1900, at the behest of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science and the Archaeological Institute of America, Rep. Jonathan
Dolliver of Iowa introduced H.R. 8066, a measure designed to afford
protection to American antiquities scattered around the Southwest. [21]
Dolliver's proposal followed earlier patterns of
American land legislation and reflected the values of the scientific
community. It granted the president almost unlimited power to create
reservations "in the same manner and form as now provided by law and
regulation for forestry reservations." The reservations could include
almost anything of public interest, including historic and prehistoric
places and natural or scenic areas. Most important, the bill did not
restrict the size of the reservations. A much broader bill than Senator
Hoar's petition in 1882, H.R. 8066 granted powers that many in the West
feared. [22]
Westerners immediately rejected the concept. The next
day, Rep. John F. Shafroth of Colorado introduced a bill to counter
Dolliver's proposal of strong central power. H.R. 8195 focused on
punishing vandals who disturbed ruins on public property, not on
reserving lands on which there were known ruins. The House Public Lands
Committee quickly put it aside. Yet Shafroth's proposal clearly made his
point: executive interference in questions concerning the public domain
had to be checked. The bill was a gesture, its rapid introduction an
indicator of the seriousness of the issue to western representatives.
Pursuing a worthwhile end, advocates of preservation had again imposed
on the rights of individual western settlers.
His point clear to the preservationists, Shafroth
tried to negotiate a compromise. On 7 March 1900, a few weeks after his
initial bill, he offered a less extreme measure, H.R. 9245, which
allowed the USGS to survey areas containing prehistoric ruins. It
granted the secretary of the interior the power to proclaim reservations
limited to a maximum of 320 acres. Shafroth's perspective typified the
western view: Preserving antiquities was a good concept, but
safeguarding regional interests required concrete limitations on the
power granted by legislation. The restriction to 320 acres effectively
prevented a chief executive from hampering the ability of western
farming and ranching interests to prosper. Cropped as it was, H.R. 8195
allowed the president no powers he might use capriciously.
All three bills went to the House Committee on Public
Lands, where they became entangled in Washington politics. Committee
chairman John F. Lacey of Iowa, the author of many pieces of
conservation oriented legislation, passed them on to Secretary of the
Interior Ethan A. Hitchcock, who gave them to Binger Hermann, the
commissioner of the General Land Office (GLO). Hermann was a strong
advocate of preservation legislation. He inspected the bills, found them
lacking, and responded by proposing his own draft, which the House
Public Lands Committee coolly received. [23]
The question of preservation became deeply entangled
in the issue of the administration of public lands, and the first signs
of official interest in preserving southwestern ruins clearly revealed
conflicting perspectives on the issue. Western congressmen wanted to
solve the questions of their region without interference from national
policy-makers. Federal bureaucrats seemed far too willing to sacrifice
potentially valuable western land for their peculiar sense of the
overall good of the nation. Dolliver and other supporters of
preservation and conservation regarded recalcitrance on this type of
issue as evidence of individual greed and ignorance of the problems of
the future. With no consensus among the proponents, all the bills,
including Hermann's proposal, H. R. 10451, died in Congress. Unpopular
with Western congressmen, the protection of aboriginal ruins appeared to
be a classic special-interest issue.
Nearly three thousand miles away, westerners
developed new interest in the archaeological ruins that intruded upon
their economic lives. On 30 April and 1 May 1900, the Santa Fe New
Mexican reported that the Hyde Exploring Expedition, under the
direction of Richard Wetherill, was excavating ruins in Chaco Canyon,
located in the north western corner of the New Mexico territory. In an
inflammatory tone, the New Mexican insinuated that the expedition
was merely a raid on the ruins by professional pothunters.
The New Mexican did not initiate the public
reaction to the excavation at Chaco Canyon. Earlier in the spring of
1900, Edgar L. Hewett, the president of New Mexico Normal University in
Las Vegas, New Mexico, and at that time an amateur archaeologist who
staked an informal claim to the thousands of pueblo ruins on the
Pajarito Plateau north west of Santa Fe, complained to the surveyor
general of the General Land Office about the work at Chaco Canyon. The
GLO took note of the complaint but did little. When Hewett convinced the
newspaper to publish its report on the excavation, Washington dispatched
Special Agent Max Pracht from Santa Fe to the Chaco basin. Unhappy at
being sent to a remote corner of the New Mexico territory, Pracht went
unwillingly and seems to have made only a cursory attempt to understand
the situation. Nevertheless, in May 1900 he sent his report to the
commissioner of the GLO. [24]
Pracht indicated that he thought the excavation was a
responsible, professional operation. Prof. Frederic W. Putnam of the
American Museum of Natural History, an important name in American
archaeology, was the nominal head, and at the time of Pracht's visit,
George H. Pepper, one of Putnam's former students and the author of an
article about the Basketmakers, supervised the excavating. Richard
Wetherill led a band of Navajo laborers who did much of the actual
digging. Pracht believed that the artifacts the men found were being
"used in a legitimate way as a scientific collection. The result of the
work of these scientific men . . . cannot but rebound [sic] to
the immediate benefit of ethnological and historical bodies the world
over." [25]
Pracht had few options, and he suggested that his
superiors handle the question. He knew of no law that specifically
prevented excavation of public land, and indeed none existed. Pracht
thought that the secretary of the interior should contact Putnam and ask
the professor to withdraw his crew or request a presidential order that
forbade the work. The status quo was clearly intolerable. Either the
ruins had to be left alone, or a system had to be developed that
protected the ruins from depredation and destruction of all kinds. [26]
Pracht had no complaints about the Hyde Exploring
Expedition as long as someone like Pepper, with scientific credentials,
oversaw the work, and it appeared that the interests of science were
served. He hoped to thwart those intending to make a fast profit in
selling antiquities. The General Land Office in Washington, D.C., had
little to go on other than the report. Its officials concurred with
Pracht's findings and informed Putnam that a complaint had been
filed.
Not everyone accepted Pracht's verdict on the Chaco
Canyon excavations. Edgar L. Hewett particularly remained unconvinced,
and on 17 November 1900 the Santa Fe Archaeological Society, upon which
he was an important influence, requested that Secretary Hitchcock put an
end to the "depredations" at Chaco Canyon. [27] Responding to the pressure, Commissioner
Hermann secured an order requiring the excavation in the Chaco region to
cease. He sent the order to Putnam and planned another inspection of the
area, for which he selected Special Agent Stephen J. Holsinger.
The cessation order was a necessary gesture.
Disturbing reports about activities in Chaco Canyon continued to filter
back to Washington. On 18 January 1901 Special Agent S. S. Mathers of
the GLO office in Santa Fe informed Commissioner Hermann that the
delegate to the New Mexico legislature and the county clerk of San Juan
County, where the ruins were located, visited him. They reported that
although the Hyde brothers had stopped excavating, Richard Wetherill had
continued. Their most damaging contention was that Wetherill and his men
had found a very valuable piece of turquoise, which they had sold for
$1,200. Mathers also reported the existence of the Hyde Exploring
Expedition trading post with stock worth more than $80,000. Mathers
contended that Wetherill and the Hydes had made the entire sum since
beginning their work in the Chaco region. [28]
These were devastating accusations made by
responsible representatives of San Juan County, and in Washington, D.C.,
it appeared that Pracht had been deceived. Apparently unaware that
Holsinger had already been sent from Phoenix, Mathers offered to go to
Chaco Canyon. "This thing ought to be stoped [sic]," he declared,
"and what is taken from these ruins ought to be sent to the Smithsonian
Institute." [29] The entire situation had
become a serious problem for Commissioner Hermann. Mathers's report
clouded an already murky picture. Hermann's men could not agree whether
responsible scientists or pothunters were excavating the ruins.
Holsinger was one of the most dependable people that
the GLO employed in the West. He had extensive experience in settling
land claim disputes, a reputation for being fair, and an air that made
him formidable. Holsinger went to Chaco Canyon to settle the dispute by
judging the facts. Along with many that followed him, he was dragged
into a situation with no clear right and wrong and, in the end, made
judgments based as much on conviction as on discernible fact.
Holsinger's inspection at the Chaco Canyon produced
the first truly close look at the activities of Richard Wetherill and
the Hyde Exploring Expedition. Holsinger arrived at Chaco Canyon on the
evening of 23 April 1901, and by the time he left nearly a month later,
he knew as much of the excavations as did any of the participants. On 5
December 1901 Holsinger filed his report to the commissioner of the GLO.
In it he examined the situation from many points of view. His
investigation resulted in a document that juxtaposed the values of the
nineteenth-century frontier and those of twentieth-century regulatory
bureaucracy.
Wetherill's motivation particularly intrigued
Holsinger, and in his search for clues, he untangled the story of the
Hyde Exploring Expedition. According to Holsinger, Wetherill realized
that he had found an area with considerable significance for
southwestern archaeology, and from which he could make possibly the most
important collection of prehistoric artifacts yet discovered. "To make
this stupendous collection entire," Holsinger wrote, "became his one
ambition." [30] Wetherill's project
required capital he did not have, but his acquaintances from the Chicago
Exposition, the Hyde brothers, could easily afford the investment. The
Hyde Exploring Expedition was the result.
The Hydes and Wetherill went to great lengths to
convince Holsinger that they had reputable intentions. The men and their
Navajo laborers excavated in the summers following 1896, and they
estimated that they found 50,000 pieces of turquoise, 10,000 vases or
pieces of pottery, 5,000 stone implements, 1,000 wood and bone
implements, a few baubles, fourteen skeletons, a few copper bells, and a
jewelled frog in Pueblo Bonito, the largest individual ruin. The Hydes,
to whom the terms of the partnership gave the collection, reported that
they donated everything to the American Museum of Natural History, "not
a single specimen having been retained, not even a souvenir by any
member of the company or their families." In a sworn affidavit, Talbot
Hyde told Holsinger that along with the collection, the brothers gave
the museum "many other valuable artifacts purchased from Wetherill, who
secured them in Colorado and Utah." [31]
From the perspective of the GLO, the evidence posed
numerous problems. Foremost was the question of ownership of artifacts
found on the public domain. Because mineral, timber, and other rights on
such land belonged to the government, it seemed a simple extension of
law that artifacts and anything else remained federal property. If that
was the case, then the expedition was guilty of violations of federal
law. In short, from the stance of the government, their investment in
the Hyde Exploring Expedition gave the Hyde brothers no right to collect
artifacts or to donate them to anyone. The issue of the sale of what was
ostensibly federal property also appeared. If the Hydes purchased other
artifacts from the public domain from Wetherill, the government might be
able to prosecute. Holsinger's report revealed that Wetherill's cottage
industry and his ability to produce artifacts from all over the
Southwest posed an even greater threat to the ability of the GLO to
administer its domain than GLO officials had previously realized.
Fact and impression had become closely intertwined,
and the situation made Commissioner Hermann's job difficult. The Hyde
Expedition trading post at Chaco Canyon contributed to the well-being of
destitute Navajo Indians in the area, but the economics of the trade in
modern Native American goods was a side issue. The primary concern of
the GLO was the disposition of what appeared to be one of the most
important relics of the prehistory of the North American continent. If
Chaco Canyon resembled Holsinger's description, it deserved some kind of
protection from careless depredation, and Hermann believed that
accredited anthropologists should be responsible for excavating the
ruins. But short of a special act of Congress, similar to the one drawn
up to protect Casa Grande, no means to accomplish this existed.
The need for rules and regulations to govern
activities in places like the Chaco Canyon clearly emerged from the
otherwise confused situation. Government officials increasingly believed
that they had to do something to protect ruins from random excavation,
but without a law that specifically defined artifacts on public land as
federal property, they had no place from which to begin. Holsinger could
not prove that the string of Hyde trading posts were marketing relics
from the ruins, but neither was there evidence to allay his suspicions.
At the conclusion of Holsinger's investigation, it seemed that the Hyde
Exploring Expedition would continue its activities. Another existing
law, however, offered the GLO a way to stop Wetherill.
The government used the Homestead Act of 1862 as its
means to regulate Wetherill's activities. The homestead claims filed by
Wetherill and Frederic Hyde were an obvious target for concerned federal
officials. Both filed claims on quarter sections that contained ruins,
locations they were not homesteading in the traditional sense. Instead
of farming, Holsinger wrote, Wetherill "occupied and used [the land] for
the purposes of trade," a practice that did not allow an individual to
receive a perfected patent. Even so, Wetherill and the Hydes "took
frequent occasion. . . . to avow goo[d] faith and disclaim any intent to
defraud the Government or in removing relics from public." [32] But Wetherill's claims of good intention
did not sway GLO officials in Washington, D.C. In March 1902 the General
Land Office suspended his homestead claim because he had not planted
sufficient acreage in crops to satisfy the requirements of the Homestead
Act. Simultaneously, the temporary cessation order against the Hyde
Exploring Expedition became permanent. [33]
Preempting homestead claims in the Chaco Canyon on
superficial grounds hailed the beginning of a new era in the disposition
of the public domain. Spurred by Progressive reforms in other areas of
resource preservation, the GLO came to see preservation as a significant
goal. The Department of the Interior began to express a position toward
government land in the Southwest that was closely allied with President
Theodore Roosevelt, who ascended to the White House after the
assassination of William McKinley in 1901, and his belief in centralized
power.
Despite its isolation, Chaco Canyon was obviously a
national treasure, and an active Department of the Interior took a
strong stance to protect it. The issue was no longer whether the
participants in the Hyde Exploring Expedition were vandals or
responsible archaeologists. Holsinger did not complain about their
methods; instead he questioned whether individuals had the right to
appropriate a shared resource for their own gain. Although of a
different character than forests or minerals, the ruins were certainly
prone to damage.
Chaco Canyon was not an isolated example, nor was the
government singling out Wetherill for castigation. After 1902 the GLO
stepped up its efforts all over the public domain. Before then, the
bureau routinely granted requests to excavate to respectable citizens,
usually anyone who could find a congressman to ask on their behalf. But
by 1902 the outcry was sufficient to stem this practice, and GLO
officials felt a much stronger commitment to protecting archaeological
areas. After 1902 they refused requests to excavate from people without
scientific credentials. Even ostensibly responsible citizens were asked
to refrain from unsupervised digging, and no matter to what lengths
their congressmen went, permission to excavate was rarely granted. [34] A value system different from any that
Richard Wetherill understood began to govern the decisions of the
GLO.
The suspension of his homestead claim was a message
to the individualist from Mancos. His era of self-taught people was
being brought to a close by trained, accredited institutional
professionals. People like Wetherill could no longer consider the public
domain of twentieth-century America their private territory. Like it or
not, a strong central government was starting to manage resources,
regulating and legislating land use in the United States. This meant
that prehistoric ruins were no longer going to be the de facto property
of the first person to stumble over them.
According to Holsinger, Wetherill chose not to cease
his activities in the Chaco Canyon. On 15 May 1902 the agent again wrote
the commissioner of the GLO about the actions of Wetherill and one of
his brothers, who continued to excavate near Pueblo Bonito. Richard
Wetherill denied the allegations, claiming that his brother acted alone,
but Holsinger believed that both men were selling the newly found
artifacts. [35] Wetherill also told visitors
to Chaco Canyon that the excavation belonged to the Hyde Exploring
Expedition, a fact that particularly galled Holsinger. "The work is the
purest vandalism," he insisted. "The more I know of Richard Wetherill,
the more I am convinced that he is a man without principle." [36]
Holsinger's objections to Wetherill increasingly
became personal. He had given Wetherill grudging respect on his first
trip to the Chaco Canyon. Holsinger had not impugned Wetherill's or the
Hydes' statements, preferring instead to believe their sworn testimony.
But even after the cessation order, Wetherill continued to excavate;
worse than that in Holsinger's eyes, he lied about his activities and
incriminated the Hydes, who had chosen to obey the regulations.
Wetherill forfeited the right to have his word honored, and Holsinger
came to regard him in a different light. "He boasted to me that he was
known as the 'vandal of the Southwest,'" Holsinger wrote, "which at the
time I did not accept seriously but have since learned was a matter of
some pride with this man." [37] Wetherill's
behavior offended Holsinger's sense of decency and convinced the GLO
agent that the man deserved to be treated like a criminal.
Wetherill was the consummate representative of the
attitudes of nineteenth-century Americans, accustomed to doing as he
chose with out being bothered by rules and regulations. Firm in his
convictions to the point of self-righteousness and stubborn to a fault
when compelled to obey the directives of others, Wetherill believed he
had as much right to the artifacts that he found as did the government.
He felt unjustly deprived of his way to earn a living. Washington, D.C.,
was a long way from the San Juan River basin, and Wetherill knew the
Chaco area from first-hand experience. To give an order was one thing,
to enforce it another, and Wetherill felt no remorse as he continued to
dig. Perhaps realizing his days in the field were numbered, he set out
to "take all that I can get in the next four years." [38]
Holsinger was equally determined to put an end to
Wetherill's activities. He continued to keep a close eye on his suspect
and stepped up his attacks on other southwestern pothunters. In November
1902 Holsinger arrested four Mexicans in Arizona whom he caught
trafficking in illegal artifacts. He hoped that the arrests might deter
Wetherill, but by December 1902 he was convinced that Wetherill would
not stop excavating. "I have understood upon reliable information that
he has openly boasted that he would pay no attention to the warning
notices given by me in the name of the Interior Department G.L.O.,"
Holsinger wrote to his superiors, "and that he defies anyone to prevent
his despoiling said ruins." [39]
By this point, Holsinger recognized Wetherill as a
direct challenge to the ability of the government to enforce the law in
the West, and his quest for justice took on broader connotations.
Wetherill's success led others to emulate his behavior, and Holsinger
feared that people in the West would not respect the law. Further
investigation into Wetherill's affairs became a high priority.
"Wetherill has the reputation of being a 'bad man,'" Holsinger insisted.
"My acquaintance with him convinced me that he at least wants to be a
proverbially bad man. It is important . . . that he be made an object
lesson for others who would follow his example if given the least
encouragement." [40] In Holsinger's opinion,
no less than the ability to properly administer the public domain was at
stake. A symbol of the lawless frontier past, Wetherill challenged the
federal government to a confrontation. If he could catch Richard
Wetherill in the act, Holsinger would make an example of this
individualist pothunter as he had of the four Mexicans he had caught in
Arizona.
The conflict between Wetherill and the General Land
Office further emphasized the need for legislation defining what could
be done with relics found on the public domain. Wetherill was an extreme
case, but many westerners shared his sentiments about public land; laws
that did not specifically apply to a situation were not enough to
restrain those who had come to see the public domain as their own. But
the Chaco Canyon episode became an important turning point. It placed
GLO employees in the West firmly in the pro-legislation camp. Pracht,
Holsinger, and their counterparts dealt with questions about the public
domain on a daily basis. To Holsinger, Wetherill was exactly the kind of
person who had to be tamed before the West could become an orderly,
law-abiding place. To its employees in the outposts of the nation, the
federal government was a powerful entity and the one best suited to
bring the West into the twentieth century. From the perspective of the
Department of the Interior, people like Richard Wetherill were symbols
of a past that needed to be forgotten.
More than a scofflaw, Richard Wetherill was a man out
of his time. He grew to adulthood in a world where the individual
reigned supreme and people made their own rules. The West he knew was an
open place, where people had the option to do as they pleased without
interference from government. But that time had passed, and Wetherill
could not adapt. The idea of a regulated society confounded him, and he
could not adjust to federal agencies that exerted power over land
thousands of miles from Washington, D.C. He continued to act as if no
laws applied to his situation.
The clash of values between Wetherill and Holsinger
was indicative of the future. The cessation order represented new and
decisive action by the federal government, and its ramifications
stretched to Congress and beyond. Wetherill's name became synonymous
with vandalism, and his presence galvanized supporters of legislation to
preserve American prehistory. Twentieth-century congressmen, their
elitist archaeological and anthropological associates, and concerned
citizens all responded to what the name Wetherill represented, and some
came to see stopping him as their singular goal. From the battle over
Chaco Canyon, and many others like it, came the drive for legislation to
protect American prehistory.
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