Whtie Sands Administrative History

The enthusiasm of the park service for solution of land claims at White Sands in December 1941 later seemed ironic, as no one knew the consequences of events that month in the far-off Pacific Ocean. Johnwill Faris noted that "for the first time we will have a uniform and definite agreement on all grazing." He further remarked to his superiors at SWNM headquarters: "It was very gratifying to find all the ranchers as cooperative in getting these permits straightened out." One reason for the cooperation may have been the petition of the U.S. Army in June 1941 to secure 1.25 million acres of public and private land in the Tularosa basin for a bombing range. Since the United States had yet to enter the Second World War, the Army did not pursue the land withdrawal. Instead, Custodian Faris wrote of the increase in visitation of uniformed personnel from Fort Bliss and Biggs Field, in and near El Paso. By July 1941, soldiers and their families comprised 15 percent of visitors to the dunes, and nearly 2,000 other soldiers stopped at park headquarters to see the exhibits in the museum. [27]

All this would change after December 7, 1941, when the Japanese armed forces struck the U.S. naval installation at Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawai'i. The war would replace the economic uncertainties of the 1930s with the exhilaration and stress of national security. White Sands would stand alone in the park service as part of what John Freemuth later called "islands under siege;" park service units surrounded by commercial development. In the case of White Sands, the U.S. Army would establish its Alamogordo Army Air Base within weeks of the Pearl Harbor attack. Johnwill Faris also noted the economic and psychological impact of the war. "Seemingly the tension of Our Country being at war," he reported, "means a higher strung type of visitor and stops are noticeably shorter." There had already been a statewide "blackout," where citizens turned off outside lighting to reduce potential risk from invading forces. Faris remained optimistic, telling his superiors: "One thing now, we have no doubt about the men in the Service [;] they are all in uniform." [28]

More doubtful for Faris and his staff was operation of their park unit amidst the changing orders and demands of their new neighbors. Issues that had been merely problematic (water use, understaffing, budget reductions) escalated under the dual strain of wartime bombing around (and sometimes on) the monument, even as the military brought thousands of soldiers to the dunes for picnics and maneuvers. White Sands thus differed from its peers in the park service in the chaotic nature of park management in wartime.

Three weeks after Pearl Harbor, Interior secretary Harold Ickes initiated the process of change that would fundamentally alter the history of White Sands. Ickes, under whose purview fell not only the NPS but also much of the public land in the Tularosa basin, recommended to President Roosevelt that the Army's request for 1.25 million acres in southern New Mexico be approved. Nearly 275,000 acres of the bombing range belonged to the state of New Mexico, and almost 35,000 more acres had been claimed by private citizens. Ignoring the complex negotiations of 1941 that had "resolved" the NPS-New Mexico disputes over claimants in the monument, Ickes encouraged FDR to sign Executive Order No. 9029, creating the Alamogordo bombing range. The order contained a clause calling upon the Army to "consult" with Interior officials about bombing targets. In addition, the order promised to restore the lands to Interior "when they are no longer needed for the purpose for which they are reserved." [29]

Demand for public land to house the vast bombing facility quickly generated a need for water. The scarcity of water in the Tularosa basin had plagued the early years of White Sands' development. But the scale of consumption anticipated by the Army staggered the imagination of park service officials. In April 1942, the Arizona Constructors, who had the contract to build the runways at the air base, approached Johnwill Faris for access to the Garton well. The aridity of the basin - one of the assets for year-round testing of aircraft - required large amounts of water to compact the desert soil, then mix into concrete for thousands of cubic yards of cement. The NPS regional office considered the petition "a critical defense project," and authorized Faris to grant the company a permit to withdraw up to 75,000 gallons of water per day (a figure that would soon grow to 175,000 gallons daily). Charles Richey of the SWNM office further suggested that Faris "discuss informally with the Army engineers in charge of the airport the possibility of our purchasing water from the city of Alamogordo at the end of the Army's new pipeline at the airport." The regional director concurred, remarking that the 1930s effort to create a wildlife refuge at Garton Lake "is of minor importance and should not dominate . . . our plans for the development of the area." [30]

By June 1942, the Arizona Constructors had completed runway paving at the air base, and no longer needed access to Garton Lake water. White Sands then negotiated access to the air base's water line from Alamogordo; something that a lack of funds had prohibited before the war. Another benefit generated by the expansion of military spending was the placement of two CCC camps at the base. The pleas of the NPS for similar work at White Sands had gone unheeded, but the bombing range managed to lure the work force north from El Paso. This increase in work prior to completion of the Alamogordo water line drew the Army Engineers to the Dog Canyon site, where the Army envisioned a 15.5 mile-long pipeline to another air field planned south of monument headquarters. Congress, however, did not authorize these funds in the 1943 fiscal year appropriation for the Army, leaving plans for Dog Canyon water development in abeyance. [31]

By the summer of 1942, the NPS had reason to worry about the growth of the military presence around White Sands. Regional personnel and Custodian Faris joined with Army officials to plan for expanded usage of the monument by soldiers and their families. Visitation for the 1942 travel year (October 1941-September 1942) declined 34 percent, but army personnel accounted for 15,500 of the total of 52,000 patrons. The dunes provided the only recreational alternative to Alamogordo, which regional director M.R. Tillotson saw as having "some beer parlors and one bowling alley." Soldiers desperate for relief in the heat of summer had gone to a "borrow pit" near the lake (a hole dug by road crews to extract building materials), and used it for swimming, only to have one man drown due to lack of supervision. The park service suggested to the Army that it dredge Garton Lake to accommodate the large number of soldiers, and that the Army be responsible for "maintenance and control" of this "swimming pool." Unfortunately, Army tests of the water revealed it to be "contaminated," and plans for the pool were dropped. [32]

Despite the problem of water quality, the Army continued to press for usage of Garton Lake. In August 1942, Colonel A.S. Albro, air base commander, asked SWNM's Charles Richey for permission to train pilots to eject over the water and have crews "rescues" them as part of their "tactical training." The Army also admired the adobe style of monument architecture, and asked Faris for the "plans, specifications, and bill of materials." SWNM's Richey thought that "it would be a fine thing if we could influence the Army . . . along the lines of the architectural precedent we have set for the White Sands area." Less attractive to the NPS staff was Faris' granting of permission to the Army to conduct full-scale maneuvers in the dunes. The Army wanted its truck drivers to gain experience in the difficulties of desert travel, and saw the dunes as a perfect location. Faris in addition carried water to the Army in NPS vehicles, which cost the park service 15 cents per mile to transport from town. Richey warned Faris: "We should also be very careful and not let the Army gradually expand its use at White Sands so that they feel they can do as they please there." Then in a judgment that would be prophetic in the postwar era, Richey concluded: "Should this [use] ever happen, administration at White Sands will be extremely difficult." [33]