About a quarter to three a couple of dozen CCC boys and a couple of trucks showed up, and then the mayor arrived with seventy-five or one hundred local citizens to witness the beginning of the road. Among those present were two elderly ladies who carried small Confederate flags. I saw them talking to a member of the mayor's staff and then to the mayor. They made several trips back and forth. Finally, the mayor's assistant came to me and asked, "Mr. Wirth, where are you from?" I said, "I'm from Washington, D.C." He said, "I realize that, but in what part of the nation did you live before you went to Washington?" I said, "Well, I was born in Hartford, Connecticut, raised in Minneapolis, and went to school in Massachusetts." That settled it. He explained, "These two ladies always take part in our celebrations and dedications. There is a problem concerning whom they are to be photographed with. Would you mind if they were photographed with the mayor during the ground breaking, and then we'll have a picture of you and the mayor after they have been photographed?" It seems they were unwilling to have a Yankee in the picture with them. I understood, and I told the aide to assure them there was no harm done and I just hoped they were pleased with the location of the road. He assured me that they were. I never really had a chance to talk to them. The mayor expressed his concern over the attitude of the ladies but was very appreciative of getting the work under way. I told him there wasn't any reason to be concerned, that the project was started, which made me happy, and that my feelings were not hurt nor was I embarrassed.

In the last week of 1939 while out west I got the news that Fechner had died. He had been sick for some time, but apparently death was quite sudden. James McEntee, Bob Fechner's assistant director, was, of course, the logical person to take over, and though his attitudes were opposite from Fechner's in several ways, he had made a good second man for him. Jim had seen that the office was always in order and that business was handled on time. He believed in centralizing many of the activities of the agencies, and he began at once to transfer things around.

King George VI and Queen Elizabeth visited Fort Hunt, near Washington, D.C., in 1939 to view an exhibition of pictures of CCC work. Walking with the king are the company commander and CCC Director Robert Fechner.

McEntee established a system of central repair shops for automotive equipment and operated it out of his office. Some of these shops were three, four, or five hundred miles away from the camps they served. Any major repair jobs would require towing broken-down trucks to the central repair shop. No matter how much we discussed this matter with him and pointed out irrefutable facts—how much it was going to cost and how it would tie up our personnel and equipment for a much longer time—none of our arguments seemed to have any effect on him. The effect of the central repair shop activities on the morale of the technical agencies can be judged when one considers a specific instance: under the new system a truck from a camp near Yakima, Washington, in need of ordinary repairs had to be sent through a mountain pass in the Cascades to the central shop in Olympia, a distance of 220 miles. The technical agency's shop at Yakima could have accomplished all but major repairs, and good commercial shops were available locally for the more difficult jobs.

CCC Director James McEntee, right, inspecting a CCC training and repair shop.

One of the policies of the CCC under Fechner had been to contract with the local firms for help with problems we could not take care of ourselves. We also purchased as much of our materials and supplies locally as we could. This practice was a great help to the local communities, disseminating money in the grassroots where it was needed and fostering good public relations as well. McEntee proceeded to do away with many such arrangements. As a result we began to lose the local community spirit that had been so much a part of the CCC. It had been common for the boys to go into town to the movies in the evenings or on weekends when invited by the local people. They would also attend church services in the neighboring communities. Some CCC men went to local night schools, and a few schools arranged courses especially for them. Many of these activities were sacrificed to comply with the new policy.

Certain people like Bob Fechner can instill an indefinable sentiment or spirit that really makes an organization go. Others, proceeding in accordance with a restricted organization chart and rigid policies, instill a harsh, cold approach that kills the spirit and morale of an organization. It is entirely possible that Fechner, without the braking effect of McEntee's control, might have been too lenient, for the interaction of these two personalities was very productive. I just don't know how much influence Jim McEntee actually exerted on Bob Fechner, but as far as I know he was loyal to the director and carried out Fechner's wishes apparently to the director's full satisfaction. I am certain, however, that the CCC would not have been as highly regarded by the technical agencies, the boys, and the public as a whole if McEntee's policies had been in effect from the beginning or if the program had continued much longer than the few years he was director. It seems to be human nature that when there is a change made in the head administrative office of an organization the new man feels he has to make changes—and these changes often go far beyond improvement of existing operations. The question of central control versus dispersed operations had received long and intense discussion in the CCC Advisory Council, and, as I recall, we were all in accord with the policies and practices originally established by Director Fechner.

What McEntee was trying to do finally became so evident that it was necessary to report to the secretary of the interior the state of the Civilian Conservation Corps as the technical agencies saw it. On November 22 the secretary was informed by memorandum that the morale of the corps had deteriorated and that this condition was definitely the result of an increased number of functions being taken over by the office of the director of the CCC. He was told of complications and duplications resulting from this change. It was explained that the mutual understandings essential to the coordination of such an enterprise were being destroyed because the functions of the CCC Advisory Council had been abandoned. We stated that our understanding of the original intent of the president was that cooperation among the several departments should be the fundamental basis of the CCC undertaking and that, contrary to this, the director's office had extended its activities far beyond its original functions of policy making and coordination: that it was making field inspection of work programs, operating an expanding and excessively costly system of central equipment repair shops, insisting on giving prior approval to all automotive and construction equipment purchases and to all purchases of items in excess of $2,500 even when justified and approved in the budget and controlled by law and regular department procedures, and requiring the submission of regulations governing purely departmental CCC functions for review and approval by the director. The report to the secretary further stated that the expanded activities of the office of the CCC director had necessitated an increase of personnel in that office from some seventy-six employees during the fiscal year 1938 to a total of 1,876 positions requested of the Bureau of the Budget for the fiscal year 1942. That increase in staff had produced no noticeable improvement in the situation of the three cooperating departments, nor had it improved central administration of the corps in any way whatsoever; rather, it had slowed down the efficient operation of the corps to a considerable degree. Besides this increase in personnel there had been additional expenses incurred in connection with the construction of buildings for central repair shops, rental of office space for division offices, travel, and other incidental expenses. The secretary was told that these expenditures had not necessarily increased the budget of the corps but represented unsound and uneconomic uses of funds badly needed for the purchase of equipment and supplies to carry out CCC projects.

The secretary was further advised that there had been a gradual movement by the office of CCC director toward complete operation of the corps. There had been only eight CCC Advisory Council meetings in the calendar year October 1, 1939, to September 30, 1940. In the earlier stages of the CCC, under the guidance of Director Fechner and before his illness, meetings had been held frequently, and all matters affecting the departments were discussed before any policy was adopted. In contrast, under the new director practically the only time the council was called together was when McEntee desired to issue instructions to its members. The council had virtually ceased to function as an advisory body.

In a letter to Harold D. Smith, director of the Bureau of the Budget, Secretary Ickes restated our case, consolidating some of the points made in the memorandum of November 22, and proposed a solution:

The proper solution seems to be to revert to the early idea of the President of placing in the old line Departments the full responsibility of carrying out the functions of the CCC. I recommend the following reorganization:

That the office of the Director, CCC, be abolished.

That the War Department be relieved of its duties in connection with the CCC.

That the duties of the Army Finance Office be transferred to the United States Treasury.

That there be established a CCC Coordinating Committee consisting of one of the Executive Assistants to the President, a Representative of the Department of the Interior, and a Representative of the Department of Agriculture, with the power to determine major policies and to provide uniformity of operation.

That the Departments of Interior and Agriculture be given full authority to carry out the activities of the CCC, including housing and welfare, as well as the work program under the general policies established by the CCC Coordinating Committee.

This recommended reorganization would provide savings sufficient to permit the operation of 1,350 camps instead of 1,227 now planned with the fiscal 1941 estimate of 230 million dollars.

I would not suggest this reorganization if Mr. Fechner were still alive because of his contribution to the CCC. His death is a distinct loss and his illness of the last year and a half has been felt in the functioning of the Corps. If consideration is to be given to the reorganization of the CCC on a more economical and permanent basis, the proper time to do it is now.

The CCC Coordinating Committee should be set up immediately and given the duty to reorganize the CCC on the basis outlined above so as to become fully effective by July 1, 1940.

On the same date, January 4, 1940, Secretary Henry A. Wallace of the Department of Agriculture wrote to Smith at the Bureau of the Budget expressing his "complete concurrence" with Secretary Ickes's recommendations. Smith brought these two letters to the president's attention. There followed two years of memorandums, proposed plans for reorganization, and what not. In the meantime McEntee's office and the CCC were placed under the Federal Security Agency. Because the CCC military officers were being withdrawn for active war duty, careful study was given to the possibility of training the CCC for various war-connected activities and for management of the camps.

On January 9, First Assistant Secretary Burlew wrote a letter to the president on behalf of Secretary Ickes outlining the same suggestions for reorganizing the CCC that the secretary had submitted to the Bureau of the Budget. The president's reply of January 25 directed to the secretary was at least diplomatic.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have received First Assistant Secretary Burlew's letter of January 9, 1940, concerning the proposed reorganization of the Civilian Conservation Corps.

While I recognize that the proposal has for its purpose economy in operations and perhaps more efficient administration, it is my belief that the Corps should not lose its identity and that it should be continued as a policy making body with a Director responsible for its general functions.

I am particularly interested in many of the economies mentioned. It seems to me, however, that it would be possible to accomplish a number of these under the present organization. I am therefore asking the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to undertake a study of the Corps' activities in the near future in order to determine what savings can be made and if any practical advantages would result from the changes suggested in Mr. Burlew's letter.

Sincerely yours,
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Nothing really was done, and the corps faded out of the picture as the war came on. The staffs of the many organizations involved in the CCC program seemed to disappear almost overnight. The following list shows the directors of the Civilian Conservation Corps and the members of the CCC Advisory Council from the establishment of the corps until its dissolution: