Legislative Taking

The legislative taking gained momentum in the early fall: Sen. Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.), chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, National Parks and Forests, devoted his subcommittee's work to the mall controversy. Bumpers toured many western national parks during the summer recess. Amidst the magnificent scenery, he found several disturbing things. Condominiums and shopping centers abutted the Rocky Mountain National Park, threatening winter range critical to the park's wildlife populations. The Church Universal and Triumphant planned to develop lands adjoining Yellowstone National Park for their geothermal potential, possibly disturbing the most significant natural geyser basin in the world. Although, Bumpers admitted, Congress could not stop all these threats to the national parks, some land could be saved. [40]

One piece of land that Bumpers could preserve was the William Center tract. He brought the House's legislative taking bill and Warner's compromise plan before his committee members. He set the tone of the hearing by flatly stating his support for the taking bill, later calling Warner's compromise a "fig leaf" offering. Bumpers had been reading James M. McPherson's Pulitzer Prize-winning account of the Civil War, Battle Cry of Freedom, and had talked with historic preservationists about the significance of the William Center land. He had also talked with Hazel/Peterson and Prince William County representatives, to gain an understanding of their reasons for allowing the mall to proceed. What he saw in the western national parks, though, confirmed that he had to take action before development made it impossible to act. The example at Gettysburg, where the battlefield park was surrounded by tacky commercial development, further prompted him to act. [41]

Determining how to act became the issue at the 8 September subcommittee hearing. Interior Secretary Hodel reiterated his position that the most serious threat to the battlefield park came from the traffic problems on Lee Highway and Route 234, a situation the legislative taking proposal did not directly address. If Congress took the William Center land, traffic might temporarily be abated, but only until another development went in down the road. The estimated $70-million price tag for the William Center would be better spent, in Hodel's opinion, by redirecting traffic out of the park and converting the park roads to their historic nonpaved appearance. Hodel so strongly believed that the legislative taking was the incorrect action that he stated he would recommend a presidential veto it if it did pass the Congress. [42]

Other people testified at the September hearing in support of Interior's compromise plan, which allowed mall construction and offered the Route 234 bypass as a solution to expected traffic increases through the park. Kathleen Seefeldt reminded Congress of the gravel trucks that barrel down the park roads and disturb places set aside for quiet reflection, such as the New York monuments located along Lee Highway. Congress could best protect the battlefield from such invasive noise, Seefeldt argued, by providing funding to build the Route 234 bypass. Seefeldt also noted that the county's growing population required the type of commercial development the William Center would offer. The tax revenues, estimated at $23 million a year, would allow the county to provide education, health, and other services to residents. Til Hazel reiterated the tax benefits of his development. No-growth residents who opposed the mall, he argued, had "thwarted all planning and growth and all effective development" in the county for twenty-five years, leaving the county without sufficient funding to support its burgeoning population. The William Center was a "quality project, [that would] serve Prince William and make a little money on the way." He saw Interior's plan as a "win-win" solution that Congress should support. [43]

Further testimony revealed significant flaws in Interior's plan. James M. McPherson, Edwards Professor of American History at Princeton University, made the unequivocal statement that "the very fate of the nation" was at stake at Second Manassas. In his opinion, the William Center tract had "the same kind of historical significance as Seminary Ridge does at Gettysburg." Lee and his generals James Longstreet and J. E. B. Stuart had their headquarters on the William Center land. Forty thousand Confederate and Union troops had congregated on the tract over the course of the three days of the battle. Some skirmishes resulted. Two Confederate field hospitals had stood on this land, and "probably hundreds of Confederate and some Union soldiers [were] buried on this property." McPherson stated that there was no evidence that these bodies had ever been reinterred. [44]

McPherson's testimony demonstrated that Interior's compromise plan was untenable because the historical significance of the William Center property warranted its protection. And there were other problems with the plan. William Leighty, the deputy secretary of transportation for Virginia, noted that the state had designated money in its six-year plan for design work on the 234 bypass, but not construction. This meant at least a six-year delay before the road work could begin. When questioned on the amount needed to build the bypass and widen I-66, Leighty stated that the cost would exceed $100 million. As the entire construction fund for all of northern Virginia was only $78 million, the state would require substantial federal assistance to complete the road program proposed by the Interior Department, but the compromise plan contained no specific provisions for financing road construction. In addition, the plan did not require that the mall's opening coincide with the road closures, thereby assuring the park's protection from mall traffic. Combined with McPherson's testimony, this information gave subcommittee members considerable reason to doubt the merits of Interior's compromise plan. [45]

The death knell of the compromise plan was the petition urging a halt to mall construction signed by 75,000 people from across the nation, which Annie Snyder presented to Congress. The Save the Battlefield Coalition had collected these signatures in only seven months, whereas during the boundary expansion debate in the 1970s, it took four years to obtain 9,000 signatures. The Coalition's efforts against the William Center property had effectively reached a broad segment of the country in a remarkably short period of time. A local zoning question had been transformed into a national issue. The senators responded and voted in favor of the legislative taking, both in the subcommittee and the full Energy and Natural Resources Committee. Warner's compromise proposal to buy only a portion of the tract and prohibit mall construction was seen as insufficient for protecting the historically significant land included in the William Center. [46]

On 7 October 1988, in the waning hours of the 100th Congress, Bumpers engaged in a debate on the legislative taking bill with James A. McClure (R-Idaho). Senators settled into their chairs after dinner as Bumpers began, with accompanying maps and charts, a decidedly Southern history lesson on the Civil War and Second Manassas. His "absolutely rhapsodic" retelling of the importance of a Southern win at Manassas captured the Senate's attention. In August 1862 General Lee thought the Confederacy's future rested on a victory at Manassas, as Britain and France had indicated that a decisive victory might lead them to provide much-needed industrial support to the South. Bumpers emphasized this fact to his spellbound audience. National Parks and Conservation Association representative Bruce Craig, who viewed the proceeding, stated that "it was one of the most amazing things where the floor of the Senate actually became a place for education and debate." Many senators made up their minds on this issue based on what they learned from Bumpers and McClure that night. [47]

McClure, intending to defuse his opponent's argument with hard realities, instead added fuel to Bumpers's fire. The conservative Republican reminded his colleagues that "there is not a single battlefield free" from the pressures of development. One-hundred-foot microwave towers threatened Bolivar Heights and Antietam. Richmond, Virginia, was inching its way over the Civil War battlefield of Cold Harbor. At what point, asked McClure, will this battle over land end? McClure concluded with the observation that "perhaps the most significant battle of the entire Manassas Battlefield with respect to the William Center tract is that being fought now"—not the Civil War battles. And so McClure unknowingly summed up the position taken by mall opponents: the William Center property required federal protection because it represented one of the few places Congress could save from the seemingly relentless attack of development. The senators voted 50 to 25 for the legislative taking. [48]

Victory in the Senate did not ensure success of the legislative taking. To avoid a certain presidential veto, the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, who was a friend of Mike Andrews, attached the taking legislation to the Tax Technical Corrections Bill. But negotiations between House and Senate conferees on the tax portion of this bill broke down just before Congress adjourned, without much hope of finding a compromise. On 21 October headlines announced what seemed to be the certain failure of the legislative taking. Then, at 1:00 A.M. the next day, the bill passed. On 2 November it reached the White House. On 10 November President Ronald Reagan signed the bill into law, without fanfare or comment. At that very moment, the 558-acre William Center tract became part of the Manassas National Battlefield Park. [49]

Congress proved to be the essential factor in halting the mall and acquiring the William Center tract. Without congressional action, Til Hazel would have proceeded with his development. Prince William County officials offered no resistance to the mall proposal, affirming its legality. The Save the Battlefield's media campaign only made Hazel more determined to continue building, as evidenced by the twenty-four-hour, seven-days-a-week construction schedule that resulted in the near completion of three model homes. Public outcry was important in convincing individual members of Congress to support Andrews, Mrazek, Bumpers, Wolf, and Vento with the legislative taking. But all the media coverage and letters to Congress would not have stopped Hazel/Peterson if these members of Congress had not been convinced of the intrinsic importance of saving Stuart's Hill and the surrounding land from the impending development. Their commitment to preserving the William Center tract made the taking possible. [50]

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