MANZANAR Historic Resource Study/Special History Study

CAUSES (continued)

Robert L. Brown and Ralph P. Merritt, Final Report, Manzanar, 1946

Prepared in February 1946 by Brown and Merritt, the "Project Director's Report," in the Final Report, Manzanar, provided a lengthy analysis of the factors that led to the "Manzanar Incident" thus expressing the views of its authors with the benefit of hindsight and reflection, an opportunity to discuss issues with evacuees, and access to WRA and relocation center records. According to this report, the operation of the center under WRA administration "began to develop in a more or less normal manner" after June 1, 1942. While the operation of the center was developing during the ensuing months, however, "the development of leadership within the Center became stranded upon the shoals of mismanagement and meddling."

The struggle for leadership at Manzanar, according to this report, "was the struggle between Nisei and Issei." While there were "many variations and off-shoots of this struggle given names such as "Pro-Japanism" and "Pro-Americanism," these titles, according to the authors, were "more nearly handy labels to be pasted over old feuds rather than a representation of any real source of the struggle."

Block representatives had been a part of the Manzanar picture since WCCA days. At first block managers were appointed by the management from three nominees selected by the residents in each block. Later, as the camp was filling to capacity, a new method was effected whereby a block could elect a leader once the population of that block reached 200.

Most of the potential leaders of Manzanar recognized that eventually the block manager position would be an important one, but the younger people (Nisei) also recognized that under existing social customs governing Japanese American communities, only the elders in the community would be elected leaders. To counteract this trend, the Nisei began to exert efforts to obtain important administrative jobs and dominate the political life of the center. After the center had been operating for four months, most of the important administrative positions which were available to evacuees were held by Nisei, while most of the block manager positions were held by Issei.

Considerable discussion was conducted over the form of community self-government at Manzanar. The Washington office informed the relocation centers that a pattern of self-government would be forthcoming and requested the projects not to do anything of a permanent nature in formulating self-government procedures. The notice from Washington disturbed the Nisei who were not, in their estimation, adequately represented in any governing body in the centers. To offset this problem, they moved in two directions. At Manzanar, a group of young Nisei, led by Fred Tayama, organized the Manzanar Citizens' Federation on July 12. Simultaneously, the Japanese American Citizens League, with headquarters in Salt Lake City, organized an effective lobby to have the Washington office recognize the Nisei as the only persons capable under law to vote or hold office in the relocation center community governments.

The Manzanar Citizens' Federation was a coalition of pro-America and pro-Communist patriots whose concerns coalesced in the matter of military service, with volunteering for a "second front" the overriding concern. At Manzanar, those who organized the Manzanar Citizens' Federation claimed that the Issei were only representing one generational point of view. They claimed that cases of discrimination and infringement of civil liberties in the evacuation program could only be fought by a citizens' group — the Nisei. They also claimed that the Issei were not considerate of the Kibei group and that the Kibei were, in reality, American citizens who needed guidance from the new organization.

Four objectives were adopted as the focus of the new organization. These were to: (1) improve conditions in the camp; (2) educate citizens for leadership; (3) participate in the war effort; and (4) prepare a postwar program to meet the needs of all evacuees.

According to Brown and Merritt, the Nisei who established this organization around these goals were accused by other evacuees in the camp, comprised mainly of Issei and Kibei, of proposing such an organization merely for their personal gain. Opposition developed at the first meeting, coalescing around the general theme — "We do not need a Citizens' Federation or self-government. The government put us behind barbed wire, let it take care of us."

Personality clashes entered into the struggle for leadership of the camp's community government. At the first meeting of the federation, the arguments between individuals quickly became a clash "over records and past performances of these individuals."

In the aftermath of this meeting, Joseph Kurihara emerged as an emotional leader of the opposition to Nisei ideals, goals, and organizational framework. He quickly began efforts to establish a "counter organization called the Manzanar Relocation Center Federation." According to the proposed constitution for this federation, its purpose was to "act in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, and strive with the united efforts for the preservation of the Real Democratic principles." The federation would "act in the capacity of intermediary in carrying out instructions of the authorities to avoid misunderstanding and complexity among the Issei, Nisei, and Kibei groups." Membership in the federation would be "open, without restriction upon recommendation by fellow residents" and approval by the "Membership Board." Membership fees would be 25 cents a year, the fund to be under the "sole jurisdiction and control of the officers," and the proceeds to be "used to defray administrative expenses of the federation."

On September 4, WRA Administrative Procedure No. 34 arrived at Manzanar from Washington, containing regulations for the establishment of community government in the relocation centers. The "bombshell" in the document was that "only citizens could hold elective offices in any center." The Japanese American Citizens' League had thus won its battle, since enforcement of the procedure would place Nisei in control of center community government.

Administrative Procedure No. 34 directed the individual project directors to appoint a commission to draw up a charter for community government, the items that the WRA required in the charter being enumerated in the document. The entire center population would then be asked to vote on the acceptance of the charter.

In accordance with the directive, Project Director Nash appointed a commission to draw up a charter for Manzanar. Essentially, the members of the commission were leaders of the Manzanar Citizens' Federation. After they drew up a preliminary charter as directed by the WRA, a struggle between Nisei and Issei erupted over voting on the charter. Dates for the election were set and postponed twice, as the evacuee population in the center came "to a fine pitch of excitement" over the issue.

According to Brown and Merritt, the state of confusion in the center began "catching in the ranks of the members" of the WRA appointed personnel. The chief of community services and the employment officer were the first to "break openly and denounce each other in a staff meeting." The chief engineer, never very sympathetic with the evacuees, was the subject of a number of attacks in written memoranda by key WRA staff. This discord between members of the staff was "immediately picked up by evacuees and used to point out in evacuee circles the ineffectiveness of federal management."

Two orders by center management during the late summer caused considerable unrest among the evacuee population. The first was an order for all persons to move out of Blocks 1 and 7, the first to be used exclusively for administrative offices and the latter to be used for schools. At first, the residents, led by a group of openly identified "anti-administration" evacuees, refused to move from their quarters, arguing that the government had sufficient money to build schools and office buildings. Because schools were important to many evacuees, the residents of Block 7 "eventually gave in to pressure and moved." However, the residents of Block 1, composed primarily of bachelors, staged "what amounted to a sit-down strike which occasioned several 'ultimatums' by the management, the last one of which was obeyed but not without a great deal of resentment."

The second instance "of bungling on the part of the administration was a hurriedly written bulletin by the Project Director" following a meeting held by the Kibei in the mess hall of Block 15 on August 8. At the meeting, anti-administration voices roundly denounced the WRA administrators and the federal government in Japanese. Incensed by the meeting, Project Director Nash issued Director's Bulletin No. 16 stating that "no more public meetings will be permitted where Japanese is spoken as the principal language."

Anti-administration forces were quick to point out that this order canceled the inherent right of free speech in America guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, they used the bulletin as evidence that the administration was not in sympathy with problems facing the evacuees, and that the tone of the notice clearly demonstrated that Manzanar "was a prison camp, not a Relocation Center."

During this period, tensions mounted among the block managers. In August, for instance, the first block manager resigned after having made a fiery speech against the administration in which he asked, among other things, who was to pocket a supposed $14,000 profit from the camp's canteen/general store and who authorized a printing bill of $2,000 which, it was rumored, was the price paid to print the script. He urged the people not to move from Block 7 for schools, and concluded by claiming that his American citizenship was meaningless and that he wanted nothing to do with America. This first open rift in the block managers touched off "a series of accusations, recriminations, and resignations the next month or two." Soon, the chairman of the block managers, who had at one time enjoyed considerable personal popularity in the camp, was attacked for immoral behavior. Although he scoffed at these charges at first, he later tendered his resignation, the grounds for his resignation never being "completely clarified in any of the meetings."

According to Brown and Merritt, the first signs of nationalistic sentiments at Manzanar began to be noticed during the summer months following an announcement by Washington on July 20 that Kibei would not be allowed to leave the camp on work furloughs. Many of the Kibei, their emotions "taut because of conflicts of language, ideologies, and living patterns," felt that the order keeping them in the center, even though they were American citizens, was "a great act of discrimination."

Led by "anti-administration" leaders, many Kibei openly denounced their American citizenship and pledged their allegiance to Japan at a public meeting in early August. Tokie Slocum also attended the meeting and openly boasted of being an FBI informant. After this declaration, Slocum found it necessary to hustle out of the meeting for his own protection. The meeting became so boisterous that WRA staff members intervened and asked for adjournment. Such pronouncements presented an opportunity for many Nisei, who had ambitions to control the community government of the center, to point out that there was a large element of "dangerous pro-Japanese forces" in the camp "whose avowed purpose was to smash any constructive program of the administration and make the camp a "prison camp for Japs." The "pro-Japanese" or "anti-administration" group, on the other hand, claimed that many Nisei were "dogs, stooges, and informers" because of their positions in offices and their close association with WRA staff members.

Evidence of a rising underground movement began to surface as bulletins appeared in the mess halls and latrines signed by the "Blood Brothers" and the "Black Dragon Society." The first attacks were leveled against the community government program, but soon they switched to tirades against the camouflage net project. Other targets included the Manzanar Cooperative ("an obvious plot to impoverish us Japanese"), the education program ("We don't need a useless American education"), and furlough work in the sugar beet fields of the western states ("the white man told us to get out of California; now they want to use us as economic serfs. Do not go on furlough.")

Amid the struggle for power in the camp, the Kitchen Workers' Union was established in late September under the leadership of Harry Ueno. As "his bargaining weapon," Brown and Merritt observed that Ueno "manufactured out of wholecloth, without any basis of fact, that the administration was stealing sugar which belonged to the evacuees and was selling it outside at black market prices." Ueno was "able to stir up a great deal of excitement among the evacuees, but was unable to use this to any advantage with the administration." Ueno managed, however, "to get himself thoroughly disliked by the then Assistant Project Manager [Ned Campbell] who, on several occasions, threatened to throw the organizer bodily from the room."

Failing "to gain a point in having his union recognized and also failing to have his union members go on strike because of the sugar," Ueno, according to Brown and Merritt, "joined forces with the "pro-Japanese" group," which had rallied around the leadership of Joseph Kurihara. The names of Campbell and Chief Steward Joseph Winchester were thus added "to the list of 'dogs, stooges, and informers, who, by this time, were going to be 'liquidated' by the people."

Harvey M. Coverley, the new Acting Project Director, sensed the seriousness of the charges posed by Ueno. Accordingly, he launched an investigation of the sugar controversy and presented his findings to the block managers. These men, for the most part, accepted the administration's findings that the charges were baseless and transmitted the information to the residents of their blocks. By this time, however, "it was too late to kill the old antagonism between the organization of the Kitchen Workers and the administration, particularly certain individuals in the administration."

In this state of turmoil, Roy Nash, who had served as project director of Manzanar since the WRA had assumed administrative control of the camp on June 1, resigned to "take up new duties in South America." For the next six weeks, the center was administered by two different acting project directors, Coverley and Solon T. Kimball, sent from the regional office in San Francisco.

On November 24, Ralph P. Merritt, who had been chairman of the Inyo-Mono Associates and of the initial Citizens Committee in the Owens Valley appointed by Thomas dark in March, arrived from his ranch in Nevada to serve as project director. Although associated with the establishment of the camp, he had been away from the area for more than six months and "was not aware of the manifold conflicts which had brought the management and evacuees to an exploding point." A number of staff members, however, sensed the "potential powder barrel, and, in a series of early conferences" with Merritt "attempted to outline the situation as it stood at that time."

On his first day on duty at Manzanar, Merritt wrote that he was "greeted by a staff meeting with all the courtesy and curiosity which usually attends such occasions." Beneath "the veneer of the pleasantries of those first greetings," however, he sensed a "tenseness that came from misunderstandings, lack of leadership, and frustrations." Because of insufficient housing at Manzanar, much of the staff lived in Independence and Lone Pine. Merritt observed that it "was obviously a problem of first importance to build sufficient housing on the Center so the staff members might develop a better understanding of their problems and better relationships with each other and the evacuees whom they served."

The next day, Merritt attended a meeting in Town Hall in which the charter for community government was discussed. The Nisei "tactfully explained that the basic principles of the charter were the result of the planning of the Washington staff of WRA." The Issei, on the other hand, "were solidly in opposition to the adoption of any form of government which would rob them of power and prestige, and the opportunity to participate in the government affairs of the community." Merritt's attention was caught by the statement of one impassioned speaker; "Look out the window and what do you see? There is barbed wire, there is a watch tower, and there is a soldier who guards us by day and night and shoots us if we break the law. Because it is called self-government and we have no self-government, I move that: the damned charter be thrown out the window." The motion was passed unanimously. Merritt observed that he vaguely "began to understand that the problem of first importance with the evacuees was the creation of a method of Center administration that would create, rather than destroy, mutual confidence." Less than two weeks later, these tensions would result in violence. [80]