MANZANAR
Historic Resource Study/Special History Study
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CHAPTER
ELEVEN:
VIOLENCE AT
MANZANAR ON DECEMBER 6, 1942: AN EXAMINATION OF THE EVENT, ITS
UNDERLYING CAUSES, AND HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
(continued)
CAUSES (continued)
Joseph Kurihara Statement in March 1944 and Merritt Interview with
Kurihara, November 12, 1945
By March 1944, Joseph Kurihara, one of the principals in the events
at Manzanar on December 5-6, 1944, had been transferred to the Tule Lake
Segregation Center. At the request of the Community Analysis Section in
the WRA's Washington Office, Kurihara, still embittered by his
experiences at Manzanar and subsequent treatment by the WRA, prepared a
written statement concerning the issues that led to violence at
Manzanar. Kurihara stated:
Camp Manzanar was sailing along very satisfactorily until the
introduction of the J.A.C.L. around the beginning of August 1942. This
was the dynamite which only needed a spark to touch it off. I started to
blast them to Hell, but they were so well entrenched behind the
Administrative wall with official backing, it took several blastings
before they were completely routed.
Togo Tanaka, one of the leading sponsors had personally admitted to
me that he saw the sign of defeat on the very first night of the
meeting. He withdrew and did not appear at the second meeting. However
the sneaky Fred Tayama and Kiyoshi Higashi persisted in trying to
salvage the bursted pieces of J. A. C. L. and attended without
authorization, the National Convention of the J.A.C.L. at Salt Lake
City, Utah.
In the meantime the Kibeis were very active trying to form a group of
their own to offset the J.A.C.L. Permission to organize was not only
denied but even the usage of the Japanese tongue thereafter was
definitely prohibited. My petition to form the Manzanar Welfare
Organization likewise was denied before presentation by Assistant P.D.
Ned Campbell. None other than the J.A.C.L. was recognized and permitted,
a discrimination which roused the feelings of the interested and the
impartials.
This political controversy would have remained dormant had the
J.A.C.L. been kept out of the centers. It was natural that feelings
against everything American would be keenly entertained through the
sting of evacuation. In the midst of such treacherous atmosphere, the
J.A.C.L. had been boldly introduced. Had we been respected and treated
as American citizens, the reaction might have been a welcoming one, but
when we were classed as Japs and treated as such, I cannot see where in
we should further americanize the youngsters of the centers. Unjustly
General DeWitt had denounced us as "Once a Jap, always a Jap." Why then
must we keep our vows to uphold the constitution of the U.S.? We were
not unloyal. We were made disloyal by the greatest saboteurs in the
service of the country, General DeWitt. . . .
Concluding his remarks, Kurihara sounded a warning that represented
the frustrations and bitterness of many evacuees:
In short, let's take the fences out, the towers should also be
removed. If the Army must have them, have them erected miles away. Give
the inductees the chance to scout the surrounding hills. Give them every
privilege of humanity. Short wave news and free expression of their
emotions. Cut out all the vicious lies and discrimination. It is
Un-American. All the dirty things said and done will not help win the
war. Otherwise do not criticize what they do over there if America can
not practice Democracy and the Doctrine of the Four Freedoms.
Finally make no promise which cannot be kept, or threaten the
Japanese. They will surely call your bluff. [81]
After the war's end, on November 12,1945, curiosity led Merritt to
seek out "possible hidden reasons" behind the violence at Manzanar on
December 5-6, 1942. At Tule Lake, he interviewed Joseph Kurihara, then
making preparations to leave for Japan as a result of having renounced
his American citizenship, Merritt prepared a memorandum, to WRA
headquarters, dated January 7, 1946, based on his interview with
Kurihara. During the 2 1/2-hour dialogue, Kurihara provided some
significant insights regarding his personal involvement in the unrest at
Manzanar that Merritt passed along to his superiors:
. . . . The substance of his statement was that at the time of the
evacuation a number of the Nisei leaders of JACL sold out the Issei and
the Japanese cause in general. When he met those same leaders in
Manzanar he made up his mind to expose them and drive them out of the
Center. These men were Tayama, Tokie Slocum, Tanaka, Higashi, and Kad
Yoneda. . . .
He said that, in the summer of 1942, Slocum had gotten himself a job
on the police force and was working on the graveyard shift for the
purpose of taking records from the administration offices to copy them
and return them before daylight in order to have complete knowledge of
all that was going on in the Center. Slocum was in fear of Kurihara and
told him what he was doing and agreed to give Kurihara copies of all of
the material which he got. I asked Kurihara for evidence of this and he
showed me documents copied from the Manzanar files, particularly certain
documents which he said were written by Tayama which were transmitted to
the FBI through the Manzanar Police Department.
On August 8, 1942 the Kibei meeting was held in which Kurihara spoke
as a representative of the citizens' group who had been mistreated by
the Government. Tayama sent a report of this to the FBI. Kurihara gave
me a copy of that report at Tule Lake. Because of the statement made by
Tayama about Kurihara's speech, Kurihara says he decided to kill Tayama
and therefore he organized the group which beat up Tayama on December
5th. Kurihara was not a member of the group and pretended to be
surprised next morning when he heard the news of the beating. In the
attempt to find the culprits of the beating, I, as Project Director,
arrested Harry Ueno, a mess-hall worker who had been the head of the
Kitchen Workers' Union.
On the morning of December 6th, a meeting was held at Kitchen 22 to
demand the release of Ueno and from this meeting the Manzanar 'riot' was
precipitated. Kurihara was a speaker at the meeting held that: day and
was one of five people who composed a committee to call on the Project
Director demanding Ueno's release. Because he was the most talkative, he
became the leader of the group. As Project Director, I made an agreement
for settlement of the disturbance on the evening of December 6th.
Kurihara went before the group and spoke in what was supposed to be
Japanese, telling them of the settlement. He admits and it is now
generally agreed that he spoke a Hawaiian dialect of Japanese which was
not understood by the crowd except when he told them that a report would
be made at 6 o'clock that evening at Kitchen 22. Such a meeting was in
violation of the agreement. This meeting developed the mob which later
created the riot. When the mob appeared and the situation got out of
control, Kurihara says he tried to prevent violence and get them to go
home but that he lost control and the crowd broke up to be led in
various directions by those who had particular grievances against
Tayama, who was in the hospital, Slocum who was supposed to be in his
barrack, Tanaka in his barrack, and others.
Kurihara took full responsibility in his talk with me for this entire
matter. He said that he had spent three years in praying for forgiveness
and in studying Japanese so that he in future might speak
understandably. He said he was returning to Japan with the feeling that
he would probably be killed but he intended to speak for America and the
democratic way of living. [82]
manz/hrs/hrs11f.htm
Last Updated: 01-Jan-2002
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