CHAPTER ELEVEN: VIOLENCE AT MANZANAR ON DECEMBER 6, 1942: AN EXAMINATION OF THE EVENT, ITS UNDERLYING CAUSES, AND HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (continued) MILITARY AND CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS Following the violence at Manzanar, the Ninth Service Command ordered the Commanding Officer, Central Security District, Reno, Nevada, to convene a Board of Officers to investigate the conduct of the 322d Military Police Escort Guard Company during the events of March 5 and 6 with particular reference to the use of weapons on the night of December 6. On January 3, 1943, Captain Hall testified that 2d Lieutenant Zwaik had fired at the driverless automobile on his direct order and that Privates Ramon Cherubini and Tobe Moore had fired their weapons under a standing order that in "dealing with an unarmed mob no shots will be fired, except on orders from an officer or unless men are in danger of physical attack." He believed that their actions were consistent with his orders, and he indicated that the men did not deserve disciplinary punishment." Each of the men also testified that they had fired their weapons, because they believed they were "being rushed by the Japanese" and were in "personal danger." On January 4, the board issued a statement of findings, exonerating the military police of any wrongdoing or violation of orders. The findings included the following statements:
Although the Board of Officers absolved the military police of any malpractice or violation of orders during the violence at Manzanar because the men believed they were in personal danger, a somewhat divergent interpretation of the events on the night of December 6 emerged during hearings conducted by a special subcommittee of the Senate Committee of Military Affairs during January-March 1943. Under questioning by Senator A. B. Chandler of Kentucky on March 7, Project Director Merritt testified that the "wind was blowing and blew the tear gas [fired by the military police] away from the crowd," while Hall claimed that his men were forced to shoot after the tear gas failed to disperse the gathered evacuees. After further questioning. Hall admitted that after the first tear gas canisters were fired, the evacuees "went back and gathered in little knots and crowds and in some of the kitchens. We gassed them again in those places and they broke up." Since the shots by Cherubini and Moore followed the second round of tear gas firing, this admission provided the basis for future questioning as to whether the military police were in actual physical danger, or whether they fired blindly at the unarmed evacuees at point-blank range amid the chaos and confusion of the "night-time" mob scene. Captain Hall raised further questions by informing the subcommittee of the overwhelming amount of "firepower" that the military police at Manzanar possessed to counter the demonstrations of the unarmed evacuees. Weapons issued to the military police company at Manzanar, according to Hall, included "four light machine guns," "two heavies," "eighty-nine shot guns," "twenty-one rifles (Enfield)," and "twenty-one tommie guns." [84]
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